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ABSTRACT 
The strategy process of a firm has been identified as an important area in the field of 
strategic management. It has been argued that understanding the process of how strategy 
is generated and executed is vital for the success of firms; particularly for Multinational 
Corporations (MNCs) who are expanding into new regions, having to adapt their 
strategy process to address local demands. This has led to a growing interest on how the 
strategy process changes within turbulent geographical regions, such as conflict zones. 
Sharing the same operational region, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have 
been recognised as influential institutions but have been rarely considered. Hence, there 
was a need to understand how firms account for institutional pressures in their strategy 
process within a conflict context. Drawing on institutional theory, this study explores 
external organisational influences on firm strategy. This thesis reviews the theoretical 
concept of legitimacy and power to understand how NGOs can pass the firm legitimacy 
filter and influence firm strategic decision-making. In connection, it was necessary to 
comprehend which actors within NGOs possess an influential ability, developing the 
notion of agency.  
 
To gain a comprehensive perspective of NGO influence on the strategy process, the 
research design was based on a multilevel method of analysis. Three research questions 
were aligned with a macro, meso and micro perspective. Empirical data was collected 
from twenty-one semi-constructed interviews with senior managers in MNCs and 
NGOs. The context of study was based in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
economic zone. This thesis provides a contribution to strategy process literature and 
institutional theory. Firstly, this study extends the strategy process literature to conflict 
zones providing a contextualised conceptual framework. The main implications 
recognised were feasibility indicators and an institutional rank of importance. Secondly, 
theoretical contributions have been made to sources of legitimacy, institutional control 
and embedded agency. NGOs gain legitimacy from ‘institutional value’ or 
‘interception’, ultimately enforcing power by ‘disturbing the bottom-line’. NGOs would 
need to impact the firm’s financial flow or business operations. Two types of actors 
within NGOs can influence strategy: a specialist authoritative partner or a prominent 
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1.1 Introduction  
 
Within the strategic management field there has been an increasing interest in the 
strategy process from academics (Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst, 2006; 
Burgelman, Floyd, Laamanen, Mantere, Vaara and Whittington, 2018). 
Chakravarthy and Doz (1992) highlighted a seminal distinction to research on 
strategic content, motivated on competitive advantage and positioning, where 
strategy process insight intends to uncover how strategy is shaped and validated. 
Studies have built on this understanding, reviewing how strategy is formulated and 
developed within different contexts and variables (Pettigrew, 1992; Regner, 2003; 
Mirabeau and Maguire, 2014). Strategy process insights have shown sequential 
stages along with internal and external factors that can influence strategic decision-
making (Van de Ven, 1992; Farjoun, 2002). It can be seen that understanding the 
strategy process is integral for the performance of a firm (Hart and Banbury, 1994; 
Wiltbank et al., 2006; Mirabeau and Maguire, 2014). This is evident, particularly for 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) who are expanding into new regions addressing 
global competition (Melin, 1992; Dimitratos et al., 2011) and increased external 
influences (Vachani, Doh and Teegen, 2009). Subsequently, interest has also grown 
concerning how MNCs adapt their strategy process in differing contexts (Shepherd 
and Rudd, 2014).  
 
MNCs operating within turbulent regions have become an emerging area of research, 
particularly with changes in strategy planning (Oetzel and Getz, 2012; Driffield, 
Jones and Crotty, 2013). Studies have explored how firms operate within conflict 
zones, reviewing how firms react to political risk and respond strategically to 
regional violence (Oetzel and Getz, 2012; Darendeli and Hill, 2016). It is known that 
the performance of firms is crucial to countries recovering from civil conflict due to 
their ability to stabilise the local economy, reduce the risk in investment and aid in 
mediation between parties (Hiatt and Sine, 2014). As Branzei and Abdelnour (2010) 
state, companies are strategically growing and generating commerce within 
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developing countries. However, it has been seen that conflict countries lack 
economic stability and good governance (Kolk and Lenfant, 2012; Dai, Eden and 
Beamish, 2013). As a result, business strategy has been adapted to operate with 
political instability and social conflict (Berman, 2000). Consequently, this direction 
of research extends strategic enquiry to understand how businesses plan for turbulent 
markets and geographical environments (Grant, 2003; Hiatt and Sine, 2014). The 
aspect of environmental influences on strategic decision-making therefore needs to 
be analysed (Delmas and Toffel, 2008) and explored to understand how the strategy 
process changes within geographical areas of instability.  
 
In stable geographical environments firms have to assess the competitive ability and 
legitimacy of market and non-market stakeholders (Henisz and Zelner, 2005; Leask 
and Parker, 2007). A main aspect of strategy is to gain market leadership taking into 
consideration other competitors and factors that could influence firm decisions 
(Kornberger and Clegg, 2011). As Foss, Lyngsie and Zahra (2013) highlight, market 
interests remain the main strategic goal exploiting business opportunity. However, 
when operating within complex environments, external influences such as civil 
conflict (Kraemer, Whiteman and Banerjee, 2013) and institutional pressures 
(Sharma and Henriques, 2005) gain more attention and analysis. With advancements 
in international business and strategy research, influences that are inflicted upon firm 
strategy within different geographical regions have been questioned (Schemeil, 
2013; Husted, Jamali and Saffar, 2016).  
 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have been recognised within business 
literature as influential institutions (Doh and Teegen, 2002; Kolk and Lenfant, 2012; 
Hollensbe, Wookey, Hickey and George, 2014). This is due to their ability to act as 
social regulatory bodies driven by societal welfare. NGOs are trusted by society, in 
turn establishing the ability to question and regulate other organisations (Hollensbe 
et al., 2014; Berman et al., 2017). NGOs have been seen to influence firms who 
share the same operational environment, particularly where there have been 
contradictions in their objectives (Soule, 2012; Soule, Swaminathan and Tihanyi, 
2014). For example addressing unethical business practices in human rights (Kolk, 
2015) and corruption (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). Hence, firms have become cautious of 
the social expectations set by NGOs (Teegen, Jonathan and Lisner, 2004). Literature 
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has recognised that institutions play an influential role in the strategy process 
(Farjoun, 2002). This has raised questions concerning how firms react to institutional 
influences within their strategy (Paroutis and Heracleous, 2013). 
 
Business strategy can be influenced from macro, meso and micro levels (Hitt, 
Beamish, Jackson and Mathieu, 2007; Paroutis and Heracleous, 2013). Particularly 
in strategy process enquiries, micro influences have resulted in macro level changes 
(Kouame and Langley, 2018). Hence, to fully comprehend management insight it is 
important to incorporate a multilevel perspective (Hitt et al., 2007). Use of a 
multilevel approach can enrich understanding of organisational phenomena 
(Paruchuri, Perry-Smith, Chattopadhyay and Shaw, 2018). The notion of a macro 
level is commonly used to describe phenomena at the business level and 
relationships with the environment (Kouame and Langley, 2018). Accordingly, a 
macro level perspective entails an investigation into firms and how they formulate 
strategy within their markets (Hitt et al., 2007). The meso level is placed between a 
macro and micro perspective, understanding the link between firms and institutional 
organisations (Jackson and Deeg, 2008). Hence, the meso level of analysis explores 
external organisations such as NGOs and what impact they could have on firm 
strategy (Kraemer et al., 2013). Lastly, the micro level investigates the impact of 
individuals (Tracey, Phillips and Jarvis, 2011). The objective in assessing the micro 
level phenomena is to understand individual actors within organisations, who 
become the fundamental agents of change (Battilana, Leca and Boxenbaum, 2009). 
 
1.2 Researching the Strategy Process 
 
Van de Ven's (1992) early suggestions of researching the strategy process highlight 
the necessity to understand terminology and meaning. This strand of strategic 
management literature identifies how business strategies are formulated 
(Chakravarthy and Doz, 1992). Thus, a process describes sequential phases a firm 
undergoes in establishing a strategic direction (Pettigrew, 1992). Studies have shown 
how the strategy process has increased in complexity from expanding industries and 
knowledge sources (Song, Zhao, Arend and Im, 2015). For example, strategy 
formulation in the technology sector has to take into account rapid market changes 
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due to continuous research and development (Song et al., 2015). Furthermore, it can 
be argued that external influences on strategic decision-making have also increased 
where firms are being held accountable for factors beyond market interests 
(Shepherd and Rudd, 2014; Stevens, Xie and Peng, 2016). Consequently, Farjoun 
(2002) describes the strategy process as ‘organic’, being shaped by both internal and 
external influences. Nevertheless, importance to understand the strategy process is 
still paramount, being vital to firm success (Lampel et al., 2014). Particularly, 
understanding the multilevel phenomena of the strategy process has become an 
emerging topic recognising how micro influences equate to macro outcomes 
(Kouame and Langley, 2018). To advance strategy process insight, there is a need to 
extend research into new contexts and understand the individual actor’s influential 
role in shaping strategic decision-making (Burgelman et al., 2018). 
 
Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst (2006) argue that strategy process research has 
evolved into a field of ever increasing concepts and frameworks. However, this can 
be the nature of strategy when understanding different contexts and external 
pressures (Sharma and Henriques, 2005). The strategy process model can change 
when placed within differing institutional environments (Hutzschenreuter and 
Kleindienst, 2006). Where it is known that firms have to respond to non-market 
actors such as NGOs (Delmas and Toffel, 2008), the strategy process literature has 
been vague, particularly with the specifics of NGOs and where they are recognised 
within the firm’s sequential steps. Thus, strategy process research must establish an 
understanding and develop a conceptual framework to illustrate such phenomena. 
Additionally, strategic decision-making within the process is significantly governed 
by a firm’s operational context (Shepherd and Rudd, 2014). Hence, there is an 
importance to extend the strategy process literature into understanding institutional 
influences within a conflict context, which is an unexplored area of research.   
 
1.3 The Context: Conflict Zones 
 
Conflict zones have become an emerging research context in order to understand 
how businesses can operate within geographically turbulent areas (Driffield et al., 
2013; Katsos and Forrer, 2014). Being in a non-stable environment, businesses have 
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to account for several external factors that could impede financial gain (Maitland and 
Sammartino, 2015). In conflict zones firms can experience an increase of external 
organisations attempting to influence strategic decision-making (Flammer, 2013; 
Kolk, 2015). Being exposed to external pressure and political or civil tension can 
increase business risk (Dai et al., 2013). Consequently, firms that operate in unstable 
environments have to adapt their strategy planning to analyse the situation and other 
players who share the region (Hiatt and Sine, 2014).  
 
To gain more clarity within a conflict context, studies have been conducted on how 
firms operate in high political risk (Hiatt and Sine, 2014; Maitland and Sammartino, 
2015) and areas of terrorism (Branzei and Abdelnour, 2010; Dai, Eden and Beamish, 
2017). Driffield et al. (2013) also examine the economic rationale for firms to invest 
in conflict locations given the increase in strategic complexity. However, knowledge 
of how firms contextualise their strategy process within these environments is 
limited (Elbanna and Child, 2007; Jamali and Mirshak, 2010). Particularly from a 
macro firm level of analysis, it is not clear as to what indicators firms utilise within 
the strategy process when entering conflict zones.  
 
Within conflict zones, NGOs have attempted to influence firm strategy through both 
activism (Scherer, Palazzo and Seidl, 2013) and collaborative efforts (Kolk and 
Lenfant, 2012). Consequently, discussions of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
and shared value (Porter and Kramer, 2011; Husted et al., 2016) have entered the 
conflict context. However, external organisations operate with differing agendas 
(Werker and Ahmed, 2008). This raises questions concerning how firms incorporate 
activist and collaborative NGOs within their strategic framework. Furthermore, the 
literature has shown that NGOs have gained the ability to interfere with strategic 
decision-making if they disagree with business operations (Claasen and Roloff, 
2012; Scherer et al., 2013; Berman et al., 2017); for example, NGOs pressurising oil 
extractive firms to exit operations due to ecological and community impact 
arguments (Idemudia, 2010; Kolk and Lenfant, 2012). Due to the increase of 
external demands, firms have developed a macro legitimacy filter to gauge the 
importance and urgency to respond (Henisz and Zelner, 2005; Scherer et al., 2013). 
Therefore, there is importance in understanding how NGOs can influence strategy at 
a meso level and which individual actors are involved at a micro level of analysis. 
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Use of a theoretical lens is therefore needed to comprehend organisational influences 
at multiple levels (Hitt et al., 2007; Bitektine and Haack, 2015). 
 
1.4 An Institutional Theoretical Perspective  
 
Institutions can be recognised as organisational structures that establish rules and 
norms within an institutional setting (Scott, 2005). Consequently, institutions are 
known for governing social expectation taking regulative, normative and cognitive 
approaches (Scott, 1995). The study of institutional theory has process into 
understanding how social rules are established into society affecting all players that 
operate in the institutional environment (North, 1991). As institutions act as 
administrative bodies shaping both informal constrains (traditions, taboo) and formal 
rules (law) (North, 1991), studies have enquired into the impact of institutions on 
firm strategy (Peng, 2004; Meyer et al., 2009). 
 
An institutional environment can be interpreted as a setting of rules and regulations 
which ‘players of the game’, such as firms would have to abide by (Peng, 2003). 
Thus, institutions can dictate how firms must precede their business operations by 
enforcing a social expectation (Jia and Mayer, 2017). A common example is a 
national government who establishes laws by which stakeholders must abide by 
(Selznick, 1996; Ang, Benischke and Doh, 2015). Institutions have been recognised 
within the strategic management literature in understanding how the external 
environment can influence strategic change (Paroutis and Heracleous, 2013). From a 
theoretical perspective, NGOs can be seen as institutions (Doh and Teegen, 2002; 
Hollensbe et al., 2014). This is due to their ability to set a social rule in an attempt to 
enhance social welfare (Zald and Lounsbury, 2010). Recognising the increasing 
strength of NGOs, firms are becoming more cautious in their strategic actions and 
selecting their institutional setting (Arregle, Miller, Hitt and Beamish, 2013). 
Particularly within a conflict context, NGOs have been able to influence firm 
strategy due to MNCs overseeing social expectations (Doh and Guay, 2006; 




To comprehend organisations’ ability to influence other players, a theoretical 
concept of legitimacy had been established (Suchman, 1995; Deephouse and 
Suchman, 2008). Legitimacy has become an important concept within institutional 
theory as it can explain why some external influences dictate strategic change over 
others (Gifford, Kestler, and Anand, 2010; Oliver, 1991). Legitimacy assesses 
organisations, forces and actions considering their relevance to an assessor 
(Suchman, 1995). Accordingly, at a macro level firms have set a legitimacy filter 
within their strategy process to assess the importance of external demands (Scherer 
et al., 2013). At a meso level, understanding the typologies and sources of legitimacy 
can provide further clarity as to how NGOs can influence the strategy process 
(Bitektine, 2011; Suddaby et al., 2017). If organisations are legitimised from 
assessors, a question remains as to how power is gained to influence strategic 
direction (Hudson, Okhuysen and Creed, 2015).  
 
In connection, the notion of power has been commonly associated with organisations 
becoming legitimised (Hudson et al., 2015). Hence, both legitimacy and power are 
needed in the phenomena of organisational influence. To understand how 
organisations can gain power over a firm’s underlying principles, the concept of 
institutional control has been explored (Lawrence, 2008). Such insights have 
uncovered how organisations can gain management capacity over a firm’s strategic 
direction (Mtar, 2010). Studies have further associated power with key individual 
actors becoming agents of change (Maclean, Harvey and Kling, 2014; Greve and 
Zhang, 2017). As a result, institutional insight has extended into understanding 
which agency (individual actors) possesses legitimacy and power from a micro 
perspective (Abdelnour, Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2017). Hence, to gain a 
comprehensive perspective of legitimacy, theoretical concepts of power and agency 
need to be aligned in the same discussion (Lawrence, 2008). 
 
Within a conflict environment, institutional theory can be used to understand the 
aspects of legitimacy, power and actors in NGOs. Where it is not fully 
comprehensible how NGOs can influence firm strategy in a conflict context, a 
multilevel method of analysis can be useful to bridge theory to the business field 
(Hitt et al., 2007; Kouame and Langley, 2018), particularly where legitimacy needs 
to be understood from both macro and micro perspectives (Bitektine and Haack, 
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2015). By understanding NGO influences on the strategy process, it can be possible 
to address current theoretical limitations in ‘sources of legitimacy’ (Deephouse and 
Suchman, 2008), ‘institutional control’ (Lawrence, 2008) and ‘embedded agency’ 
(Abdelnour et al., 2017). Deephouse, Bundy, Suchman and Tost (2017) further state 
that the institutional narrative can advance by extending key concepts into an 
empirical setting of natural disasters and epidemics.  
 
1.5 Research Rationale  
 
It has been recognised that research concerning the strategy process can advance by 
examining the external influence of institutions within conflict zones. Understanding 
the formulation of strategy is necessary to gauge how businesses operate (Farjoun, 
2002), particularly when the geographical context can change strategic decision-
making (Nadkarni and Barr, 2008; Shepherd and Rudd, 2014). Thus, a key 
motivation in this thesis was to understand how the strategy process changes within 
conflict zones. Furthermore, NGOs have been recognised as influential institutions 
due to their social objectives (Kolk and Lenfant, 2012). Sharing the same operational 
environment as MNCs, it is important to understand the link between both 
organisations particularly where NGOs intend to influence the firm’s strategy 
process (Vachani et al., 2009). This is due to the evident knowledge of NGOs’ 
ability to create social change and regulate other players (Husted et al., 2016). NGOs 
have been recognised as powerful institutions, which needs to be recognised in 
strategy (Kolk and Lenfant, 2012).  
 
To extend the strategy process and theoretical literature, the aim of the research was 
to understand how the strategy process is influenced by social institutions within an 
unstable context. Drawing on institutional theory, this study seeks to understand the 
influence of NGOs from a multilevel perspective (macro, meso and micro) (Tracey 
et al., 2011; Kouame and Langley, 2018). To address the overarching research aim, 
three research questions were formed: 
 




2) How can NGOs as institutions possess legitimacy and power to influence a 
firm’s strategy process in conflict zones? 
 
3) Which external individual actors are involved in influencing strategic 
decision-making for a firm in conflict zones? 
 
Each research question is designed to represent a macro, meso and micro level of 
analysis. This provides a comprehensive understanding of organisational influence 
on the strategy process. The first research question is based on understanding the 
macro firm level changes. Understanding how the strategy process is contextualised 
provides a platform to understand linkages at lower levels, such as NGO influences 
and individual actors. The second research question represents a meso level of 
analysis designed to understand NGO influence; this level of understanding focuses 
on the theoretical concepts of legitimacy and power. To gain a complete perspective 
of influencing strategy it is necessary to review individual actors. Therefore, the third 
research question assesses the micro phenomena developing the theoretical concept 
of agency.  
 
1.6 Research Approach and Method 
 
An empirical enquiry was conducted using an inductive approach. It was recognised 
that to draw inferences from business experiences, a qualitative method would be 
necessary (Tracey et al., 2011). A qualitative research design was important in this 
study to understand the relationship of MNCs and NGOs from a multilevel 
perspective. Particularly when attempting to grasp the notion of legitimacy, a 
qualitative method is necessary to learn from individual judgments (Courpasson, 
Dany and Clegg, 2012; Stevens et al., 2016). 
 
Twenty-one semi-constructed interviews were conducted with senior managers, of 
which ten were from MNCs and eleven from NGOs. Interviews were face-to-face 
with those based in the UK. Telephone or Internet-based communication such as 
Skype was used for international participants. The context of the study was the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) economic zone. MENA was chosen as an 
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ideal area of study due to both operating a large amount of commerce as well as 
being exposed to instability through conflict (Bullough, Renko and Myatt, 2014). 
MENA was also selected due to the high concentration of recent conflict identified 
by the Council on Foreign Relations (2016), Heidelberg Institute for International 
Conflict Research (2016) and Nobel Prize (2016).  
 
Building on existing theory requires collected data to be appropriately interpreted 
and coded (Strauss and Corbin, 1994). To ensure qualitative rigor, data analysis was 
based on the Gioia method (Gioia, Corley and Hamilton, 2012). As a result, data 
analysis involved several stages generating first-order categories, second-order 
themes and aggregate theoretical dimensions. Furthermore, this study ensured 
‘qualitative trustworthiness’ through three criteria: credibility, confirmability and 
transferability (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
 
1.7 Overview of Thesis Chapters  
 
This thesis consists of nine chapters in total. Subsequent to this introduction, the 
structure follows a detailed literature review, methodology and presentation of the 
findings. The following subsections highlight an overview of each of the remaining 
chapters. To support an exposition, Figure 1.1 provides a framework to understand 
the link between the chapters and key concepts. The diagram has segmented the 
chapters into the three levels of analysis, illustrating where key theoretical concepts 
are connected. Chapter two begins the research enquiry by establishing a conceptual 
strategy process framework. The conceptual strategy process framework is further 
developed through conflict insight (chapter three) and findings from the macro data 
analysis (chapter six). To gain a clearer understanding of NGO influence on the 
strategy process, institutional theoretical concepts have been reviewed in chapter 
four. As seen within Figure 1.1, legitimacy and power has been placed within a meso 
level of analysis and individual actors (agency) at a micro level of analysis. These 
three concepts have been further developed in the meso (chapter seven) and micro 
data analysis and findings (chapter eight).  
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1.7.1 Chapter 2: Underpinnings of the Business Strategy Process 
 
Chapter two begins the first of three literature review chapters. To understand how 
external organisations can influence strategy, it is beneficial to start an assessment 
from a macro perspective. The aim of this chapter is to provide a foundation 
showcasing key aspects of the business field relevant to this study. The chapter 
begins by assessing common definitions of business strategy and wider meanings. 
Subsequently, two categories of business strategy (corporate and competitive) are 
highlighted selecting which standpoint is relevant to this study. Historical 
developments of the strategy process are further reviewed, establishing common 
sequential steps. A conceptual framework has been provided for visual 
demonstration followed by a description of each step.   
 
1.7.2 Chapter 3: Examining the Impact of Conflict Zones on Business and the 
Strategy Process 
 
Chapter three introduces the context of this study showcasing different aspects, 
which businesses take into account when operating within conflict environments. 
The chapter begins by defining and understanding the different phases of conflict. 
The literature review progresses to recognise how businesses operate in conflict 
environments, understanding the rationale to enter such regions and the 
consequential effect. This chapter builds on the notion of NGO influences sharing 
the same operational environment. Given the nature of this topic, ethical 
considerations are inevitably reviewed due to certain industries which have been 
questioned for malpractice in conflict regions (Lujala, 2010; Land, Loren and 
Metelmann, 2014). In gaining an overview of business practise in conflict zones, key 
outcomes are integrated into the strategy process developing the conceptual 





1.7.3 Chapter 4: An Institutional Theoretical Perspective of NGOs’ Influence on 
Firm Strategy 
 
Chapter four introduced the theoretical lens of the study. This chapter fragments the 
relevant theoretical concepts, beginning by understanding the meaning of institutions 
and NGOs. NGOs have been recognised as organisations driven primarily on 
humanitarian goals rather than commercial objectives (Werker and Ahmed, 2008). 
Being a main research subject and an influential institution (Doh and Teegen, 2002; 
Bruton, Ahlstrom and Li, 2010), this chapter aligns theoretical literature with NGOs 
and the strategy process. Accordingly, this chapter reviews the theoretical concepts 
of legitimacy, power and agency to support an understanding of organisational 
influence. Chapter four closes by articulating the limitations of institutional theory.  
 
1.7.4 Chapter 5: Methodology 
 
Chapter five describes the methodological research design used throughout the 
study. It is important for researchers to recognise their philosophical stance and 
understand which paradigm to adopt (Mir and Watson, 2000). Hence, this chapter 
begins by reviewing the research philosophy. In highlighting an appropriate 
philosophical stance with justification, the chapter processes onto data collection 
comparing qualitative and quantitative approaches. Subsequently, data analysis is a 
major aspect to understand the research findings, in turn contributing to literature 
and theory (Shook et al., 2003; Shah and Corley, 2006). This chapter therefore 
highlights the method used in the data analysis showcasing Gioia et al.'s (2012) 
variation of grounded theory. In discussion of data analysis, the macro, meso and 
micro data structures developed from the empirical study are presented. Chapter five 









1.7.5 Chapter 6: The Strategy Process for Conflict Zones – Macro Data Analysis 
and Findings 
 
Chapter six begins the first of three data analysis and findings chapters. This study 
presents its findings and contributions following the macro, meso and micro data 
structures highlighted in the methodology chapter. Chapter six presents the macro 
findings as supportive evidence to the data structure. This chapter has been designed 
to answer the first research question, reviewing the contextual changes to the 
strategy process when placed within a conflict environment. The macro findings 
form two aggregate theoretical dimensions: 1) feasibility indicators and 2) an 
institutional rank of importance. 
 
1.7.6 Chapter 7: NGOs Passing the Firm Legitimacy Filter – Meso Data Analysis 
and Findings 
 
Chapter seven is designed to answer the second research question from a meso level; 
the main emphasis being to understand how NGOs could gain legitimacy to pass 
firm filters and power to influence strategic decision-making. Theoretical constructs 
become apparent within the participant responses. Themes of how firms gauge 
external pressure, NGOs’ organisational differences and influential channels were 
formed from participant responses. The chapter further explores how NGOs could 
gain institutional power. The meso findings form two interlinked aggregate 
theoretical dimensions: 1) institutional value or interception, and 2) disturbing the 
bottom-line. 
 
1.7.7 Chapter 8: Embedded Agency who can Influence Strategy – Micro Data 
Analysis and Findings 
 
Chapter eight focuses on answering the third research question from a micro level. 
This entails understanding which individual actors within NGOs represent influence 
and change. Representative data are shown highlighting which individuals MNCs 
appeal to work with and the necessary characteristics embedded agents within NGOs 
 
15 
require. The micro findings form two aggregate theoretical dimensions: 1) a 
specialist authoritative partner, and 2) a prominent micro actor. 
 
1.7.8 Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
Chapter nine is the final chapter of the thesis. This chapter revisits the research 
rationale, highlighting the key literature and theoretical contributions. An overview 
of the findings is shown with use of a diagram highlighting the link between the 
three levels of analysis. Contributions to the strategy process narrative are described 
followed by contributions to institutional theory. The findings extend insight into the 
sources of legitimacy, institutional control and embedded agency. This chapter 
progresses to articulate recommendations for future research and highlights the 
research limitations. The chapter concludes this thesis with a managerial summary 























UNDERPINNINGS OF THE BUSINESS STRATEGY PROCESS 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
Strategy is a key topic throughout the business literature, in particular within the 
management narrative and business decision-making (Driouchi and Bennett, 2012). 
Covering major elements from planning to evaluation, business strategy clearly plays 
an important role in business performance (Leask and Parker, 2007). Lampel et al. 
(2014) state that strategy in commerce involves making tactical decisions to 
overcome a variety of business challenges, such as market competition and 
increasing profits. However, strategy can be subjected to influences from multiple 
levels (Paroutis and Pettigrew, 2007). It is therefore beneficial to fragment the 
process of strategy, understanding how strategy is shaped, validated and 
implemented (Chakravarthy and Doz, 1992). The aim of this chapter is to introduce 
the concept of the strategy process. 
 
To fully understand the impact of external organisations on strategy, it is beneficial 
to start an assessment from a macro perspective, setting a platform (Kouame and 
Langley, 2018). Recognising processes and characteristics of organisations from a 
wider lens can contribute to linkages at lower level analysis (Kozlowski et al., 2013). 
For example, understanding firm relationships with institutions at a meso level and 
individual actors involved at a micro level of analysis (Husted et al., 2016). This 
chapter begins a literature review by assessing common definitions of business 
strategy and wider meanings. Subsequently, two categories of business strategy 
(corporate and competitive) are examined in order to understand which standpoint is 
relevant to this study. The chapter will progress by comprehending the historical 
developments of the strategy process. By establishing the commonalities in previous 
authors’ assessments of the strategy process, a conceptual framework is generated 





2.2 Establishing a Modern Definition for Business Strategy  
 
To understand the strategy process, it is important to establish a key definition of the 
business field as a whole (Chaffee, 1985; Whittington, 2007). Strategy has become 
ingrained into modern society as it describes the everyday workings of corporations 
and institutions (Carter, 2013). As Rumelt (2011) claims, strategy is recognising and 
adhering to companies’ strengths to overcome key challenges. The idea of strategy 
can be rooted back to the formation of war and international relations (Arikan and 
Shenkar, 2013; Carter, 2013). For example Sun Tzu, a historic Chinese general in 
400 BC was known for being a military strategist to conquer his opponents on the 
battlefield (Mintzberg and Lampel, 1999). Modern strategy has been adapted to 
enhance commerce in the world of business (Barney, 1991; Carter, 2013). Porter 
(1996) claims that strategy can be formed for a business by consciously developing a 
plan to become different from its competition.   
 
A sustainable business has become dependent on how strong a strategy has been 
formed making it difficult to be imitated by others (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; 
Thietart, 2016). Whittington (2011) elaborates stating ‘strategic sense’ allows key 
decision-makers to be able to grasp short-term situations and engage operations for 
tactical long term planning. However, over the years business markets have become 
more challenging with the advancement of innovation (Dahlander, O’Mahony and 
Gann, 2014). Strategy, as a result, needs to be consistently developed to address the 
rise of innovation in practice (MacIntosh and MacLean, 2015). Table 2.1 highlights 













Table 2.1: Different perspectives in defining strategy 
 
Author Key themes in defining strategy 
Ansoff (1957), Rumelt (1982) Core skills, Business growth 
Lyles and Mitroff (1980), 
MacIntosh and MacLean (2015) 
Problem framing and problem 
solving 
Sharma and Henriques (2005) Stakeholder influences 
Fink and Kessler (2010) Environmental resources 
Ronda-Pupo and Guerras-Martin, 
(2012) 
Firm, Environment, Action and 
Resources 
Porter and Kramer (2011), 
Lampel et al., (2014) 
Shared value 
Song et al., (2015) 
Performance vs. Innovation, 
Market intelligence, Survival 
 
Early discussions within the strategy narrative link business practice as a method to 
grow an organisation (Ansoff, 1957). The growth strategies suggested by Ansoff 
(1957) focus on four potential directions: 1) market penetration, 2) market 
development, 3) product enhancement, and/or 4) diversification. Ansoff (1957) 
suggests that, by taking a strategic direction in business practise, a firm could 
increase their profits. Therefore, strategy was initially based on businesses expanding 
the use of their core skills to generate high profit (Rumelt, 1982). The notion of 
strategic intervention for business growth is argued to still be relevant within modern 
business culture growing in line with globalisation (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). 
Khanna and Palepu (2000) demonstrate this through a longitudinal study showcasing 
how firms increased their profits by entering the same markets overseas. Khanna and 
Palepu (2000) however could not form a link for firms diversifying into unrelated 
market and financial performance. This therefore demonstrates a change to how 
businesses operate within global expansion. As a result, studies have questioned 
what types of developments have been made in business strategy for firms to adapt 
when operating in different environments (Ackermann and Eden, 2011).  
 
Prior to understanding business challenges that give importance to the concept of 
strategy within an organisation, Lyles and Mitroff (1980) raise an important 
discussion of problem formulation. The authors suggest that understanding the 
process of how firms become aware of an issue and approach taken is pivotal in 
generating a strategic solution. Particularly where fundamental questions within 
strategic management is concerned with how business problems come to the 
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attention of key managers and how they aim to resolve them (Lyles, 1987). Hence, a 
central issue in strategy is how firms define the business problem they are faced 
with, which is necessary to understand the problem-solution process (Lyles and 
Mitroff, 1980). Lyles and Mitroff (1980: 102) articulate that importance needs to be 
placed on the  “critical first stages of problem solving, that is, the process by which 
alternative views or definitions of a problem are generated and selected for further 
consideration in arriving at a formulation of the problem”. 
 
The views of Lyles and Mitroff (1980) are still relevant as highlighted by MacIntosh 
and MacLean (2015) particuarly in the diagnosis of business issues. Where strategy 
should be established in responce to specific circumtances, problem framing is 
fundamental (MacIntosh and MacLean, 2015). MacIntosh and MacLean (2015) 
share that different specialists within a firm can diagnose business issues from 
differing perspectives. For example a fall in market share could be classed as a 
marketing issue as well as poor logistics, which could have impacted customer 
experience. Consequently, if a firm were to misdiagnose an issue and implement a 
strategy that does not address the root cause, not only would the situation remain 
unchanged but also the firm could experience further dilemmas (MacIntosh and 
MacLean 2015). Beech and MacIntosh (2012) suggest that organisations approach 
strategic issues either through open or closed framing. Open framing invites multiple 
insights to address a broader objective such as a need to regain market leadership 
(MacIntosh and MacLean, 2015). Taking an open approach allows a space to foster 
creativity where strategists could approach a scenario from their own experiences 
and specialisms. Alternatively, a closed framing approach readdresses a previous 
issue with focusing on a specific variable, for example achieving a certain 
percentage within a set time scale.  As Beech and MacIntosh (2012) suggest, some 
organisations would be interested to closed framing, helping to stimulate efforts and 
increase the likelihood of producing a strategic solution. Nonetheless, MacIntosh and 
Maclean (2015) have articulated that the attention of strategy is based on logic and 
control-oriented tasks. Hence, the focus is on problem solving rather problem 
framing. This is particularly the case for firms being exposed to external pressures 




As international business has expanded, firms have recognised an increase in 
external influences on firm strategy (Doh and Teegen, 2002; Driffield et al., 2013). 
The rise of external influences in strategic management has raised questions of if and 
how non-market stakeholders could change strategic direction (Harrison, Bosse and 
Phillips, 2010), particularly if the impact from a firm’s operational environment can 
affect growth and financial performance (Hart, 1995). Impact can be felt by external 
influences from other players within the same operational environment, such as 
governmental bodies or interest groups (Henisz and Zelner, 2005). Sharma and 
Henriques (2005) contribute suggesting that external interest groups can redefine 
how industries operate when questioned on how sustainable firm practises are. Their 
empirical study shows how the external pressure from NGOs influenced business 
practice particularly when business and social agendas differed. For example, a 
logging company had to change its operations due to an argument concerning the 
firm’s lack of sustainability in pollution control and damage to the ecosystem. Such 
studies have questioned the formulation of strategic management incorporating the 
influence of external institutions (Daniels, Johnson, and De Chernatony, 2002). The 
literature shows that firms have to select the best strategy, using their resources to 
respond to external requirements (Berrone et al., 2013). 
 
Prior studies stress that the external influence on a firm’s strategic decision-making 
has increased in recent years (Oetzel et al., 2010; Darendeli and Hill, 2016; Dai et 
al., 2017). Farjoun (2002) similarly states that business strategy has to co-align with 
its operational environment to respond to industry developments and influences. As 
a result, a sense of mutual benefit has to be interpreted by all stakeholders (Hillman 
and Keim, 2001). Therefore, firms are obligated to incorporate the demands of 
external stakeholders within strategic decision-making (Delmas and Toffel, 2008; 
Ackermann and Eden, 2011). However, at times, external demands can hinder 
business performance, where firms have to develop strategies in how best to respond 
to them (Nadkarni and Barr, 2008). It has been argued that firms could benefit by 
creating the value-based strategy in response to stakeholder and environmental 
demands (Bourne and Jenkins, 2013; Pfitzer, Bockstette and Stamp, 2013). In turn, 




Shared value can be defined as corporate actions, which are mutually beneficial to all 
actors that the organisation operates with (Lampel et al., 2014; Porter and Kramer, 
2011). It is a relevant concept for business strategy in which corporations are being 
held accountable for their business actions (Nadkarni and Barr, 2008). Consumers in 
recent years have questioned the credibility of business actions in society (Eesley 
and Lenox, 2006). Though firms have attempted to highlight benefits by using their 
products or services (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990), there has been a demand to 
demonstrate community value (Hillman and Keim, 2001). For example, companies 
within the cocoa industry have placed their association with “Fair Trade”, a 
foundation established to promote fairer pay rates for suppliers in developing nations 
(Porter and Kramer, 2011). 
 
With the consistent view of businesses excelling at social costs and need for 
sustainable practices, the concept of shared value has arisen (Campbell, Edgar and 
Stonehouse, 2011; Dahlander et al., 2014; Sharma and Henriques, 2005). There has 
been a coherent request for businesses to grow and co-exist with values shared by 
consumers and institutions. As Porter and Kramer (2011) explain, shared value 
directs a firm’s operating practices and policies to advanced competiveness, 
simultaneously improving social and economic conditions. Indirectly heightening 
corporate image, this corporate strategy is being adopted by firms satisfying the 
needs of external stakeholders (Steyn, 2004). However, in some cases the 
organisational values are still not accepted by individual actors regardless of a firm 
making a social effort (Bourne and Jenkins, 2013). The organisation and community 
could differ tremendously, for example within the oil extraction industry due to 
ethical factors (Bourne and Jenkins, 2013). Hence, how firms incorporate shared 
value into their strategic decision-making can be context driven, conditional upon the 
industry and operational environment (Cordeiro and Tewari, 2014). Nevertheless, 
defining business strategy has evolved to consider a wider audience linked to the 
performance of the firm (Porter and Kramer, 2011). 
 
Whittington (2011) and Rumelt (2011) both reiterate that defining strategy has 
become more diverse and complicated. It can still be argued that the aim of strategy 
is to gain a return on investment. However, the means to do so have also increased 
(Foss, Lyngsie, and Zahra, 2013). The argument lies with how strategy can be 
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formed to encapsulate all factors of commerce, especially when operating within 
geographical areas of instability. Firms, especially in conditions of uncertainty can 
gain sustainable advantage through liaising with external organisations (Hillman and 
Keim, 2001; Pitelis, 2009; Oetzel and Getz, 2012). 
 
Contributing to these insights, Fink and Kessler (2010) assert that 
internationalisation of business culture has become dominant with the expansion of 
resources and necessity of knowledge to innovate. Hence, a modern definition of 
strategy must include the ability to use ‘environmental resources’ with ‘market 
intelligence’ (Song et al., 2015). Ronda-Pupo and Guerras-Martin's (2012) review of 
the evolution of defining strategy highlights similar views. Terms such as ‘firm’, 
‘environment’, ‘action’ and ‘resources’ remain the essence of strategy. Considering 
these global advancements, a relevant definition of what strategy has become for the 
21st century can be “the dynamics of the firm’s relation with its environment for 
which the necessary actions are taken to achieve its goals and/or to increase 
performance by means of the rational use of resources” (Ronda-Pupo and Guerras-
Martin, 2012: 182). 
 
To summarise, the definition of business strategy has progressed to recognising that 
performance is connected to a firm’s relationship with its environment (Ronda-Pupo 
and Guerras-Martin, 2012). As external influences have increased for firms shaping 
their business strategy (Berrone et al., 2013), firms have to use their resources 
innovatively in line with values shared by stakeholders (Oetzel et al., 2010; Porter 
and Kramer, 2011). Values could be from national government bodies or special 
interest groups. Recognising that strategy has become complex raises the importance 
to analyse external influences on the strategy process (Farjoun, 2002). However, 
prior to examining processes, to gain further clarity it is necessary to distinguish the 
level of strategy that needs to be assessed.  The next section will present the different 






2.3 Distinguishing Between Two Levels of Business Strategy  
 
Strategy has developed into an understanding of where the leaders of an organisation 
cultivate a plan to sustain firm performance for the future (Carter, 2013; Mintzberg 
and Waters, 1985). In most cases, a business can adopt different strategies to reach 
their organisational goals. Johnson et al. (2008) categorise two main levels of 
strategy, competitive and corporate.  
 
Firstly, strategy at a competitive level dictates how a firm attempts to promote their 
products and services to overcome competitors (Johnson, Scholes and Whittington, 
2008). These could be in the form of adjusting pricing or distribution channels 
(Johnson, Scholes and Whittington, 2008). Prahalad and Hamel (1990) state that root 
competitiveness is based upon a firm’s ability to utilise its core competencies to the 
best of its abilities. Providing an example of the Japanese automotive manufacturing 
firm, Honda was able to break into the western market by coordinating skill and 
integrating technology at a reduced cost (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). Foss et al. 
(2013) conversely argue that competitive strategy has become more advanced in 
recent years. Firms are required to gain external sources of knowledge to overcome 
competition and exploit new opportunities (Foss et al., 2013). For example, the IT 
firm IBM chose a competitive strategy to partner with specialist knowledge-based 
companies (Baldwin, Siobhan, and Quinn, 2003). In doing so they were able to 
secure unique patents giving them competitive advantage. The necessity for external 
knowledge is due to increasingly crowded markets and the faster pace of innovation 
to enhance products (Dahlander et al., 2014). 
 
These examples display some insight into what would be expected of modern day 
firms to survive within already developed markets. The functional aspects of 
competitive strategy can digress into product positioning dynamics (Henderson, 
1970; Mintzberg and Lampel, 1999; Porter, 1980; Semadeni, 2006) and reviewing 
market structures (Alcacer and Chung, 2014; Barney, 1986; Pitelis, 2009). This level 
of strategy however is predominantly based on company products in line with 
competing firms and market trends (Campbell-Hunt, 2000; Greve, 2000). From an 
organisational evaluation, studies have shown external influences targeting the 
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corporate level of strategy in a firm (Harrison, Bosse, and Phillips, 2010; Henisz, 
Dorobantu, and Nartey, 2014).  
 
Secondly, corporate strategy concentrates on the wider objectives of the organisation 
(Jensen and Zajac, 2004). Corporate strategy is linked to fulfilling opportunity such 
as geographical movements (e.g., entering new countries, manufacturing plant, office 
space), diversification into new industries and understanding the expectations of 
shareholders (Johnson et al., 2008). This level of strategy is directed by senior 
executives and CEOs with an objective to advance the strategic direction of the firm 
(Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001; Jensen and Zajac, 2004).   
 
Decision-making in corporate strategy has historically focused on the internal 
organisational structure (Fredrickson, 1986). This structure would entail how the 
organisation would construct itself based on departments and operational levels 
(Fredrickson, 1986). Studies on organisational structures have assessed successful 
performance, authority (Dimitratos et al., 2011) and capabilities (Wilden et al., 
2013). Van de Ven's (1976) earlier work also reviewed three key dimensions of 
organisational structure; 1) centralisation, 2) formalisation and 3) complexity. 
Centralisation referred to the degree of decision-making, where firm change is 
directed by key individuals (Fredrickson, 1986). A high level of centralisation 
however places substantial cognitive demands on firm executives to make the correct 
decisions (Mintzberg, 1979). In contrast, formalisation would shift the direction of 
corporate strategy through procedures, amongst a variety of members each owning 
tasks (Papadakis, Lioukas and Chambers, 1998). The third suggested organisational 
structure refers to complexity. Firms that possess multiple layers of management and 
geographical locations would become complex in directing strategic decisions within 
corporate strategy (Paroutis and Pettigrew, 2007). These seminal insights into 
business organisational structures have shown that external influences with an aim to 
change strategic decision-making would occur at the corporate level, particularly, 
where corporate strategy has progressed in international commercial venturing 
(Melin, 1992).  
 
Prior research suggests that a focal point for corporate strategy is to move into new 
markets, diversifying a firm (Hotho, Lyles, and Easterby-Smith, 2015). Kirsch, 
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Goldfarb and Gera (2009) argue that decision-makers often have to quickly make 
decisions with limited information to hand due to the speed of the industry. 
Conversely, this statement is based on the assumption that corporations are working 
within stable and safe markets. When an organisation considers a move into 
uncertain territories, a different strategy would need to be utilised (Oetzel and Getz, 
2012). Planning to enter an environment prone to instability, the strategic decision-
making process could differ (Hiatt and Sine, 2014). Hiatt and Sine (2014) support 
this view through their study on new venture survival in Colombia, South America. 
Due to the national government’s failure to ensure public safety and maintain order, 
entrepreneurs operating in this region have been challenged with political and civil 
violence (Hiatt and Sine, 2014). The results show that though firms were not direct 
targets of violence, unstable environments affected the flow of resources from 
suppliers to customers. In turn, the planning stages in strategy needed to be 
comprehensive yet equally adaptive. Additionally, as firms are expanding their 
geographical reach, institutions such as NGOs have questioned the integrity of firm 
practices (Henisz and Zelner, 2005). Teegen et al. (2004: 466) define NGOs as 
“private, not-for-profit organizations that aim to serve particular societal interests by 
focusing advocacy and/or operational efforts on social, political and economic goals, 
including equity, education, health, environmental protection and human rights”. 
This definition aligns with common themes of NGOs operating for a social cause 
(Doh and Guay, 2006) and value creation within an environment (Berrone et al., 
2013; Dahan et al., 2010). Where both organisational values could contradict, NGOs 
would attempt to influence a change of corporate strategy (Eesley and Lenox, 2006).  
 
It is clear that to understand how strategy changes due to environmental factors, 
further investigation is needed at the corporate level (Henisz, Dorobantu and Nartey, 
2014; Hiatt and Sine, 2014). Moreover, it has been seen that external organisational 
demands are placed on the firm’s relationships with its environment (Delmas and 
Toffel, 2008). Thus, how institutions are accounted for within strategic plans can 
only be understood from the corporate rather than competitive perspective (Guler, 
2007), particularly where firms are expanding into new territories (Davies and 
Walters, 2004). As well as market conditions, firms can face pressure from 
institutions such as NGOs, regulatory bodies and local community groups (Delmas 
and Toffel, 2008). In these conditions, decision-makers have to choose which 
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direction would best assist the company with fewest unintended consequences for 
their strategic plan (Driouchi and Bennett, 2012).  
 
To summarise, strategy can be viewed from both competitive and corporate levels. 
To understand the geographical impact (Henisz et al., 2014; Hiatt and Sine, 2014) 
and external influences (Delmas and Toffel, 2008) concerning the strategy process, a 
study has to focus on the corporate level of strategy. From this standpoint an 
investigation can be made on a firm’s strategic decision and organisational change 
(Papadakis and Barwise, 2002). A competitive strategy standpoint would be 
irrelevant being concerned predominantly with market interests (Campbell-Hunt, 
2000). In distinguishing the two major levels of strategy, this review can continue to 
fragment the meaning of the strategy process.   
 
2.4 Understanding the Fundamentals of the Strategy Process  
 
To understand organisational influence on strategy it is fundamental to begin by 
examining firm-level processes from a macro perspective. Van de Ven (1992) 
describes the study of strategic processes as an examination of how strategies are 
formed and implemented. A ‘process’ can be applied when referring to category and 
concepts or regarding a sequence of events which could change over time (Van de 
Ven, 1992). With regard to generating corporate strategy, the term ‘process’ is used 
to identify the steps and procedures that are taken. 
 
The strategy process is seen to be integral for the performance of a firm, holding the 
content and execution of strategy (Pettigrew, 1992; Kouame and Langley, 2018). 
This has been evident especially in multinational corporations (MNCs) when 
developing synergies between their departments and various business units (Paroutis 
and Pettigrew, 2007). Paroutis and Pettigrew (2007) highlight through their 
longitudinal study within the energy industry, that the strategy process is a key area 
to face global competition. Managing directors and CEOs worked with strategy 
teams to formulate plans of direction to overcome industry challenges. Furthermore, 
it has been well established that understanding the strategy process can make a 
positive difference for firms operating in environments of uncertainty (Hart and 
 
27 
Banbury, 1994; Dimitratos et al., 2011; Maitland and Sammartino, 2015). The 
employees internal to the firm would however need to be considered when 
examining the degree of strategic implementation (Lê and Jarzabkowski, 2015). 
Hence, studies have also demonstrated the importance of examining the strategy 
process to assess how strategy is formed and which actors can influence change in 
operations (Courpasson, Dany, and Clegg, 2012; Herrmann and Nadkarni, 2014). By 
examining the strategy process at the firm level, it is possible to recognise 
organisational influences that operate at the meso level and which individuals are 
involved at a micro level of analysis.  
 
Different empirical studies and reviews have contributed to how the process is 
formulated (Hart, 1992; Farjoun, 2002; Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst, 2006). 
Though process models have some interrelationship, each company will build their 
own unique process in practice which can differ throughout industry (George and 
Bock, 2011). As Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst (2006) elaborate, strategy process 
research has evolved into an ever-increasing field of concepts and frameworks, each 
focusing on different levels. Nevertheless, it can be beneficial to grasp the 
fundamentals of how relevant authors have contributed to the field. Establishing 
commonalities from previous models will aid creation of a conceptual framework, 
identifying how decision-making and influences are interpreted. Table 2.2 shows a 
comparison between previous strategy process models, each suggesting key steps 
within the process and provide some description to the external environment. 
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- Identifying opportunity and 
risk 
- Necessary resources 
- Non-economic 
responsibility to society 
Implementation 
- Organisational structure 
and relationship 
- Organisational processes 
- Top leadership 
 
A prescriptive model showing corporate strategy based on two key steps; 
formulation and implementation. It begins by assessing environmental 
opportunities/risk and weighting the companies’ resources to fulfil any 
gap. Society needs are also considered within the planning stages.  
 
This model shows strategic decision-making predominantly by top 
leadership and their personal values. Thus, authors have built on this to 
recognise other internal actors whom contribute to strategy. The model 
also questions whether strategy process models should be normative (how 
things should be done) or descriptive (how things are done).  
 

























- External and internal trends 
Degree of urgency 
- Monitor / Issue project 
Periodic planning 
This model introduces the importance of both internal and external 
analysis. Based on these finding, the process then goes on to question the 
degree of urgency and firm capability to pursue any opportunity. Ansoff 
and McDonnell (1990) also emphasise the importance of monitoring the 
opportunity before committing resources as well as thorough planning. 
This would include reviewing strategies, introducing the notion of 
restructuring based on environmental changes.  
 
Subsequent authors have gained understanding on building planning 
stages from feedback and real-time market response. Furthermore, this 
model leads direction on how firms can gain profit in turbulent 
environments. This introduces a scale to turbulence, affecting speed of 

























- Mission/ goal objectives 
What 




- Strategy formulation 
- Strategy implementation 
- Strategic control 
Guidelines 
- Policies and procedures 
Digman’s (1990) approach to the strategy process is based on the 
company’s main goal. In knowing this, the strategy formation is highly 
informed by situational analysis of both the environment and 
organisational resources. This model has included the concept that 
strategy has to follow guidelines based on policies and procedures.  
 
This model allows the consideration to identify stakeholder 
expectations and values. Where previous models have been business 
centric, this process integrates stakeholder concerns beyond customers. 
More recent citied studies have also recognised that strategic 
formulation requires sense making and the importance for employees 



















Unit of analysis 
- Environmental content 
(markets, society) 
- Firm 
- Individual (inside and 
outside firm) 
Assumption about decision-making 
- Rational 
- Bounded rational 
- Extra rational 
Strategy process 
- Business policy & planning 
- Institutional economics 
- Organisational theory 
Chakravarthy and Doz's (1992) seminal paper on strategy process 
research provides an initial concept of disciplines involved. The 
authors share a matrix of which the axes have been titled ‘unit of 
analysis’ and ‘assumptions about decision-making’. Each formed box 
shows the basis of disciplines where organisational behaviour in taken 
into account for strategy formation.  
 
This concept has suggested that strategic content is formed in-between 
a firm and their environmental content. Adjacent to this is the strategy 
process where a firm meets at the point of bounded rationality. It is has 
been recognised that within this early insight, institutions have been 
referred to along with the social environment. Thus, the strategic plan 







Floyd and Lane, 
(2000) 
 





















- External: societal/ task 
- Internal: structure/culture/resources 
Strategy formation 
- Mission, objective, strategic, 
polices 
Strategy implementation 
- Programmes, budgets, procedures 
Evaluation and control 
- Performance 
A sequential approach beginning with a thorough scanning of 
both the internal and external environment. The process 
considers the task required as well as the societal setting. This 
model incorporates the organisational culture, which previous 
models have lacked. An evaluation of the strategy performance 
links the process into a cycle. This model demonstrates the 
importance of planning for firm performance. Furthermore, this 
model assists the recognition of failure due to not using a formal 
strategic planning process. Subsequent studies endorse this 
process identifying a need to track performance to improve 


















- Firm organisation: internal forces 
and influences, resources, social 
structures, technology 
- Firm environment: external forces 
and influences, actors, relationships 
Strategy realisation/implementation 
- Managing real-time, 
complementing, refining, securing 
& sequencing strategy 
- Emergent strategy 
Firm performance 
- Quality of short and long term co-
alignment 
- Review of firm environment and 
firm organisation 
Farjoun’s (2002) model contributes to strategy process research 
by highlighting the organic growth of strategy. This process 
recognises that strategy can be influenced by both internal and 
external forces. From an organisational level, strategy can be 
realised and consistently refined from real time knowledge. This 
could be from markets or particular actors. This process 
incorporates previous models by adding a review of firm 
performance at the end. 
 
This process refers to when the changing the behaviour of 
strategic leaders can organically form strategy. Additionally it 

































Executive core self-evaluation 
Strategic processes 
- Non-comprehensive decision 
making 
- Fast decision-making 
- Centralised decision-making 
Strategic choices 
- Large stakes 
- Deriving from industry norms 
- CEO initiated 
Organisational performance 
Different to the common strategic processes Hiller and Hambrick 
(2005) address this narrative from an individual level. The process 
begins by evaluating the strategic decision-marker’s personality. The 
choice of strategic action is, therefore, governed by the individual 
cognitive function.  
 
Studies have recognised this insight by identifying the CEO influence 
on strategy. Hubris or over confidence has been the topic of 
discussion that could negatively influence strategy. Conversely, from 
an optimistic viewpoint an individual’s personality can shape the 

















- Environmental context 
- Strategic context 




- Strategists static characteristic 
(formulation) 
- Strategists personal cognitive 
(implementation) 
Outcome 
- Environmental context 
- Strategic context 
- Performance 
In reviewing pervious strategic processes Hutzschenreuter and 
Kleindienst (2006) form an integrative model. This model includes 
contextual planning as well as reviewing performance at the 
beginning and end of the process. The model positions the technical 
aspects of strategy making into formulation. However, the authors 
argue that the implementation is shaped through personal cognitive 
decisions.  
 
More recent studies utilise this process model in confirming 
environment hostility can affect decision-making. Dynamic 
environments also encourage competitive aggressiveness. Where this 
model recognises both internal and external actors can shape strategy, 
authors also question which actors are involved within the emergent 
of new strategy. This argument continues a micro perspective 




































Chia and Holt’s (2006, 2009) approach to strategy making argue that 
formulation is derived from actors’ cultural relationship in practice. Hence 
where previous interpretations of the strategy process have presented goal-
oriented frameworks of which firms aspire to follow, the human dynamic 
also needs to be accounted for. The authors argue those human agencies that 
deliberately engage in purposeful strategic activities possess a ‘dwelling’ 
mode in which strategy emerges non-deliberately through everyday 
‘practical coping’. This suggests that strategy making is beyond predicted 
conceptual plans but rather shaped through past experiences and daily 
engagement, which forms unintentional strategic direction. Taking a 
rational perspective of humans’ engagement in worldly activities, the 
authors suggest that strategy, rather a form of navigation, is considered as a 
process of ‘wayfinding’. This implies that strategic direction is driven from 
iterative action and continuous adjustments, not predetermined agendas.  
 
Jarzabkowski 















Nonlinear and network feedback 
systems 
 




Stacey (1995, 2011) provided an early review of Chakravarthy and Doz’s 
(1992) strategy process model, critiquing from the science of complexity. 
Based on the understanding that organisations are feedback systems from 
the interactions between human agency, organisations experience feedback 
loops which are nonlinear. Thus, the strategy process has to incorporate the 
experience and actions of actors which could be a continuous learning 
experience. As a result, strategy making is as much of ‘trial and error’ as 
well as predetermined planning. The author suggests that the strategy 
process cannot be fully rational modes of strategy making due to limits in 
informational processing and cognitive frameworks restricting managers. A 


















Rational plans and creative 
development of human engagement 
Rules of thumb 
 
Carefully crafted plan 
Reality 




MacIntosh and MacLean (2015) have provided a comprehensive 
explanation of ‘the strategy cycle’. The strategy cycle highlights a 
production of rational plans but also has incorporated the dynamic of 
individual actors involved within strategy making. For example, within 
strategic plans, strategists may need to engage in informed 
improvisation when reality of a situation has not been shown as 
predicted. The authors share that strategists build a story from sense 
making in order to craft a plan. Those who formulate the strategy cycle 
also refer to the ‘rules of thumb’, a method of guiding decisions based 
on an understanding of the industry and rules of the game. Strategists 
can strengthen their plans by identifying and reframing the rules of 
thumb, gained through feedback.  
 
The authors’ share that planning should be based on establishing 
principles which underpin improvisation rather a production of detailed 
scripts. These principles can be generated from conversations, forming 
and updating the rules of thumb. However, there is a complexity to 
conversations due to the nature of human minds, where conversations 
may not fully reflect day-to-day life. Hence, there is a sensitive period 
where carefully crafted plans meet reality. Mismatch then leads to 
improvisation and experimentation from strategists, in turn reinforcing 







Table 2.2 demonstrates the key attributes seen in the strategy process put forth by 
numerous studies. Each process model contributes to the field of study by 
recognising an additional section or reviewing strategy from a different perspective. 
Andrews’ (1987) early insight, for example, takes into account social considerations 
within the formulation of strategy, though these considerations are embedded as an 
addition, focusing primarily on a firm’s ability to utilise resources for market gain. 
Ansoff and McDonnell's (1990) model highlights the importance of an 
environmental analysis within the strategy process. The analysis on the environment 
was market-based suggesting that firms need to gauge how fast industry is changing 
with regards to production and creativities. By conducting an analysis, firms would 
be able to match their capabilities to respond to the change (Ansoff and McDonnell, 
1990). These findings are still seen to be relevant in modern strategy as it has 
inspired thinking for firms’ capability to respond to non-market stakeholders and 
external demands (Galbreath, 2010; Moussetis, 2011). Aragón-Correa and Rubio 
(2007) recognise the notion of environmental analysis with their study of the food 
industry. A firm’s strategy process needs to formulate a comprehensive plan for 
external stakeholder pressure because firms cannot immediately respond to the 
external demands due to an increase in expense. Within the environmental analysis1, 
the importance of planning and reviewing firm performance is a common theme 
throughout the process models. This is because one aspect of business failure is due 
to not using formal strategic planning processes (Terziovski, 2010). 
 
Other process models highlight the micro level. The micro level of analysis 
examines the impact of individual actors within organisations, such as management 
control figures (Thomas and Ambrosini, 2015). For example, Digman's (1990) 
model highlights that all employees need to work towards the organisational goal. 
Particularly within the strategy process, managers have the responsibility to engage 
and motivate employees to reach this organisational goal for a successful corporate 
strategy (Eppler and Platts, 2009). A study within an automobile components 
manufacturer showed that sharing the strategy chart with the operational team 
allowed for strategic sense-making and motivated the staff to discuss their views 
(Eppler and Platts, 2009). Alternatively, Hiller and Hambrick (2005) suggest 
                                                          
1 Environmental analysis refers to the factors linked with the operational geographical area and 




‘executive core self-evaluation’ within their process model. This entails that the 
personality of decision-makers would influence how the strategy is formulated. Due 
to this, decision-making would be centralised, referring to the internal organisational 
structure reviewed earlier. Studies have built on Hiller and Hambrick's (2005) 
process model recognising how excessive confidence in decision-makers’ 
personalities can negatively influence firm performance (Resick et al., 2009). 
 
In similar discussions, whether strategy is deliberate or realised is a continuous 
debate in literature (Thomas and Ambrosini, 2015; Thietart, 2016; Burgelman et al., 
2018). A concept established by Mintzberg and Waters (1985) questions if strategy 
is formed internally or arises naturally by experienced trade in practise. Farjoun's 
(2002) model incorporates these debates by recognising the organic nature of 
strategy formation. Relating to the context of this research, Farjoun (2002) shows 
that strategy is formed by real-time information and refined by forces both internal 
and external. Farjoun’s (2002) model, therefore accounts for external forces to 
influence strategy within its process. However, Farjoun's (2002) model fails to 
justify how external forces can enter strategic decision-making discussions. Drori 
and Honig's (2013) study on legitimacy within firms shows that external influences 
must align with firm values to be recognised as a legitimate source. The study 
recognises this process of legitimisation as a cognitive filter. Accordingly, the 
process of legitimatisation has not been represented within the strategy process 
model, to question if the external force holds any legitimacy or power to influence 
strategic decision-making, particularly where influence can occur over multiple 
levels (Tracey et al., 2011); hence, the effect of the institutional environment needs 
to be recognised within the process models (Chakravarthy and Doz, 1992). Viewing 
the strategy process from an institutional perspective would allow for concepts such 
as legitimacy and power to be recognised (Peng et al., 2009).  
 
Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst (2006) provide an integrative process combining 
the key attributes noted from previous studies. The main elements are segmented 
into antecedents, strategy process and outcome. Where Hutzschenreuter and 
Kleindienst (2006) have provided some reference to the micro level complexity of 
the strategy process, the subsequent three perspectives seen in Table 2.2 emphasise 




not be based fully on predetermined plans due to human actors engaged in directing 
strategy. The authors suggest that ‘building strategy’ is where strategists construct a 
representation of the world without any practical engagement. Rather in reality, 
strategic actors engage in ‘dwelling’ where by local adaptions are formed in 
‘practical coping’. The term practical copying suggests that micro-strategizing 
happens on an everyday basis, representing the true nature of the strategy process. 
The actors engaged in strategic decision-making would also therefore be aware of 
the limits in pragmatic engagement.  
 
In similar nature, Stacey (2011) informs the strategy process narrative through a 
complexity theoretical lens. This is based on the notion that organisations are 
feedback systems, where by strategy making is derived from interactions between 
human actors and subsequent feedback to the firm. Therefore, a firm would 
experience feedback loops where actors engaged in strategy making would share 
their continuous experiences. Stacey (2011) suggests that the strategy process is 
formed by ‘trial and error’ rather than predetermined planning. Building further on 
the micro complexity of actors engaged in strategy making, emotions and firm 
politics could also be unexpectedly tied into the process. This would make the 
strategy process nonlinear.   
 
Taking a combined approach, MacIntosh and MacLean (2015) have incorporated the 
arguments of complexity in human agency within their presentation of ‘the strategy 
cycle’. The authors have argued that strategy is a combination of rational plans as 
well as the dynamic of strategists engaged in making them. Strategists build 
carefully crafted plans from conversations and sense making. However, rather 
following a predetermined course of direction, actors who engage in conversations 
are continuously developing their ‘rule of thumb’; a shorthand guided decision based 
on their understanding of how the industry and game operate. Hence, strategy 
making is a continuous set of identifying and reframing the rules of thumb gained 
through feedback. At times, the complex nature of conversations does not match 
reality misinforming carefully crafted plans. Consequently, strategists would engage 
in informed improvisation and experimentations. The authors also note that the 
diagnosis of a business challenge is based on problem framing, increasing 




The reviews of the strategy process contributions in Table 2.2 have shown 
importance towards understanding business challenges. Particularly where strategy is 
aimed to solve a particular issue or area of growth, which a firm wants to achieve 
(Farjoun, 2002). However, in formulating a strategic solution to business challenges 
in the early stages of the strategy process, Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst (2006) 
suggest that the effectiveness of implementation has been largely overlooked. The 
question of separating formulation and implementation can be concerned with how 
change is managed and whether the key organisational members involved in strategy 
take part (Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst, 2006). MacIntosh and MacLean (2015: 
118) have articulated that within the strategy cycle “traditional distinction between 
formulation and implementation is much less meaningful since each is an aspect of 
the same cycle of conversation and action”. Thus, as there is no formal handover 
process between formulation and implementation, the most important strategic 
decision lies on who participates in strategic decision making (MacIntosh and 
MacLean, 2015). Similarly, Farjoun (2002) illustrates that both internal and external 
members can influence the strategy process. Hence, importance also needs to be 
placed on external forces, such as social institutions that play a role in influencing 
strategic direction (Delmas and Toffel, 2008). 
 
Strategy research varies depending on the level of analysis from organisational to 
individual members (MacLean and MacIntosh, 2015). This can be seen in Table 2.2 
from how each author has theorised their arguments. To define and contribute to the 
strategy process narrative, a subsequent empirical study would need showcase what 
theoretical lens and context the arguments are being placed. Where the aim of this 
study is to understand how the strategy process is influenced by social institutions 
within an unstable context, an appropriate theoretical lens would be needed. An 
appropriate theoretical perspective would support an understanding of where conflict 
zones and social institutions are accounted for within the strategy process and how 
external actors can enter strategic discussions. 
 
In recognising steps along with other common themes, a conceptual strategy process 
framework has been produced, as seen in Figure 2.1. This model provides a general 




the process is subjected to external influences being a key area of investigation. Each 


























2.4.1 Step one - Situational analysis 
 
The first step of the strategy process is to conduct an overall analysis of the situation. 
Wheelen and Hunger (2012) describe this as an overview to assess the current 
internal and external conditions before any further strategic plans can be assessed. It 
can be argued that this is a vital aspect as it allows a firm to recognise their current 
performance and identify resources needed to reach their organisational goals 
(Farjoun, 2002). Thus, one component of the situational analysis is recognising a 
firm’s internal organisation dynamic. Beginning the analysis on the organisation 
itself would entail an assessment of firm goals and what resources are available to 
use for strategic changes on a corporate level (Papadakis, Lioukas, and Chambers, 
1998). The internal analysis, in turn would further enquire if the current firm 
performance is achieving the organisational goals (Chakravarthy and Doz, 1992; 
Elbanna and Child, 2007). Consequently, it has been argued that firms should review 
their internal characteristics, assessing if their organisational structure and arranged 
teams are working efficiently (Fredrickson, 1986; Paroutis and Heracleous, 2013). 
The situational analysis would then be able to progress onto analysing the firm’s 
strategic context. Steyn (2004) describes this component as a firm choosing their 
strategic intervention from a corporate level such as mergers and acquisitions, 
strategic alliances or joint ventures. The strategic context would also review if a firm 
would decide to enter a new market or geographical location (Melin, 1992; 
Terziovski, 2010). Additionally, as articulated by MacIntosh and MacLean (2015) 
the complexity of problem framing would need to be taken into consideration when 
attempting to solve a business challenge. Within the diagnosis, how firms perceive 
an issue and which actors are involved can impact the success rate of strategic 
intervention (MacIntosh and MacLean, 2015). Firms would need to take into 
consideration whether to employ an open or closed framing approach to diagnosis 
(Beech and MacIntosh, 2012). 
 
In understanding the organisational dynamic and strategic context, a firm would also 
attempt to understand their environmental context within this step of the strategy 
process (Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst, 2006). Reviewing the environmental 




strategic action (Nadkarni and Barr, 2008). Based on a subjective projection of the 
operational environment rather than completely understanding the situation could 
affect managers’ ability to respond effectively (Nadkarni and Barr, 2008). The 
environmental context has been recognised as a necessary area for further contextual 
investigation due to the impact it can have on the strategy process (Arregle et al., 
2013; Kouame and Langley, 2018), particularly if firms intend to operate within 
turbulent geographic regions (Dai et al., 2013). 
 
Business management literature has provided some insight into how firms respond in 
geographical areas of instability (Dai et al., 2013; Driffield et al., 2013). 
Understanding how firms plan their strategy in conflict territories has shown a 
degree of strategic complication (Grant, 2003). As well as facing competition and 
economic changes, a firm could be subjected to political or social forces (Herrmann 
and Nadkarni, 2014). Thus, firms are exposed to both market and non-market 
external influences within the strategic process. Herrmann and Nadkarni (2014) 
explain that senior management within a firm have to consider all pressures within 
the environmental context. An adaptive strategy would allow a firm to respond 
appropriately to all forces (Herrmann and Nadkarni, 2014). Hence, there is a 
necessity to contextualise the strategy process to gain further clarity (Balogun et al., 
2014), predominantly where the environmental context is a major influencer on other 
functions such as how strategy is formulated and evaluated (Shepherd and Rudd, 
2014).  
 
Welter (2011) highlights that a contextualised perspective can provide greater 
understanding in phenomena. Illustrating contexts can be relevant particularly when 
examining the impact of an institutional setting (Welter, 2011) and geographical 
regions (Arregle et al., 2013). Nonetheless, there appears to be a limitation towards a 
comprehensive integration of these insights to the strategy process narrative. To fully 
understand NGO influence in conflict zones, it is necessary to first gauge a macro 
perspective of how the strategy process changes in these regions and where 
institutions are placed within the strategy process. Successfully, organisational 
relationships at a meso level and actors at a micro level can be approached (Tracey et 




Formulation and Evaluation step of the strategy process, being exposed to external 
influences.  
 
2.4.2 Step two – Formulation 
 
The formulation of strategy can be defined as choosing a strategic outcome and 
establishing a plan of how a firm can direct strategic change (Farjoun, 2002). 
Whittington and Cailluet (2008) review insight from established author Mintzberg 
(1987) to identify where strategy has progressed. The planning of strategy within 
organisations has been interpreted as a ‘craft’ whereby the process is formed through 
experiences (Mintzberg, 1987; Bhide, 1994). As a result, teams engage themselves 
beyond the common forms of strategic reporting, such as workshops and field visits 
(Whittington and Cailluet, 2008). Literature has shown that the formulation of 
strategy is shaped by three assemblies: the Strategy Team Dynamic (Samra-
Fredericks, 2003), the Executive Decision-Makers’ Dynamic (Westphal and 
Fredrickson, 2001) and Internal and External influences (Floyd and Lane, 2000; 
Nadkarni and Barr, 2008). 
 
Strategy teams are generally small and flexible, holding responsibility which spans 
across the firm (Paroutis and Pettigrew, 2007). These strategy teams work as support 
functions for higher management, involving and interlinking themselves in adaptive 
activities with other departments (Paroutis and Pettigrew, 2007). This central form of 
strategy making was also expressed in previous studies showing continuity of 
practice (Burgelman, 1983; Regner, 2003). Formerly, it was recognised that a board 
of directors and a CEO would be instrumental in leading these strategy teams 
(Carter, 2013; Fredrickson, 1986; Herrmann and Nadkarni, 2014). However, with the 
growth of internationalisation increasing the scale of MNCs, Breene, Nunes, and 
Shill (2007) show that many organisations have delegated a chief strategy officer 
(CSO) who reports directly to the CEO. A CSO’s foremost objective is to establish 
strategic plans to position a firm competitively in continuously changing 
environments (Chatterjee, 2014). They could represent change agents and internal 
consultants specialised in an area which the CEO could rely upon to overcome 





Planning is an important aspect of the strategy process especially for firms that 
operate in areas of uncertainty (Grant, 2003). Dependent upon the environmental 
context, the uncertainty could be linked to economic and political changes (Branzei 
and Abdelnour, 2010; Hiatt and Sine, 2014). As a result, strategy teams and senior 
executives would benefit from a particular design specific to their organisations. For 
example, a banking firm such as Royal Bank of Scotland would strategically act 
differently when facing an unstable economy (Namaki, 2014) compared to the oil 
and gas firm British Petroleum, planning to operate in turbulent environments 
(Grant, 2003). Hence, a contextual application is needed for executive decision-
makers to plan (Cordeiro and Tewari, 2014). 
 
The CEO and board of directors represent the executive decision-makers (Kirsch, 
Goldfarb and Gera, 2009; Kleinbaum and Stuart, 2014). Though it is evident that 
senior management holds the responsibility for firm strategic movements, a debate 
exists of whom fundamentally directs change. With many large firms governed by a 
board of directors, studies have questioned whether the elected CEO’s industry 
experience can over-succeed compared to that of a collective board (Westphal and 
Fredrickson, 2001). Westphal and Fredrickson's (2001) study shows that the board 
possess a strong influence on strategic formation; however, individualism of 
directors could be seen in determining a direction. Consequently, between strategy 
teams and senior management, it can be difficult to generalise actual influence on 
strategy due to each firm customising internal operations. The degree of internal 
decision-making could also change for firms functioning within different contexts 
which could require experience, such as enterprise within conflict zones (Dabic, 
González-Loureiro, and Furrer, 2014; Jamali and Mirshak, 2010). To fully 
understand company resources and capacity highlights the importance of a thorough 
Situational Analysis prior to moving to the Formulation stage in the strategy process 
(Figure 2.1). It has been seen that learning about the strategic and environmental 
context is essential in this formulation stage (Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst, 
2006).  
 
In similar discussion, the study of Courpasson et al. (2012) shows how formulation 




organisations making strategic decisions from top hierarchy of management (Hart, 
1992; Herrmann and Nadkarni, 2014;) there can be resistance to change 
(Jarzabkowski and Kalpan, 2015). The resistance is seen to influence planning in a 
progressive manner observing a temporary reversal of decisive power. This raises the 
concept of co-creation in strategy highlighting one area of complexity within the 
strategy process. Nevertheless, Pitelis (2009) describes this resistance element as 
beneficial for firms as it promotes innovation and value with how organisations 
operate. Hence, from one angle resistances can be seen as productive within the 
strategy process. Conversely, there can also be a counter-effective aspect. 
 
In comparison, Eisenhardt and Bourgeois's (1988) earlier review underlined an 
interesting analysis of internal organisational behaviour effecting strategic 
management. It was demonstrated that firm politics would also govern strategic 
decisions. Actions such as withholding information and forming internal coalitions 
existed with senior management. Within Eisenhardt and Bourgeois’s study, it was 
seen that political incentives arose by secondary executives when decisive power 
was centralised. In comparison to the study of Courpasson et al. (2012), this form of 
indirect conflict within a firm illustrates the differences of productivity when several 
actors are included in the strategy process. The opposing difference identified with 
Eisenhardt and Bourgeois's (1988) study showed that firm politics had a decreasing 
effect on performance, indicating a negative side of resistance. The dynamics of this 
phenomenon are demonstrated in Figure 2.1 showing the two-way link between the 
Strategy Team Dynamic and the Executive Decision-Makers’ Dynamic. The 
represented link between these two strategy-forming assemblies indicates co-
creation, complexity from resistance to change and internal politics.   
 
In a more recent study, Mueller et al. (2013) raise the same notions of politics and 
power pertinent to strategic decision-making. Researching strategy-as-practice (SAP) 
has seen political actions between the strategy-forming team and company 
executives. The phenomenon of informal firm politics has been anticipated in the 
strategy process for modern business operation (Farjoun, 2002). Individuals can 
interpret executives overexerting power differently. For example, certain decisions 
could be seen to promote personal agendas or protect an executive’s position of 




difficult. Strategic decision-making can become disordered in the early stages of the 
process due to the high stakes involved, particularly when coalitions are created and 
information is distorted or manipulated (Lampel et al., 2014). Lampel et al. (2014) 
express that this type of internal competitive nature can lead to inefficiencies, which 
highlight the necessity to diffuse firm politics immediately. Some techniques 
expressed include a balance of power for specific roles and sharing a common goal. 
These examples demonstrate how the micro level phenomenon of individual actors 
can be recognised within the overarching macro strategy process of a firm. 
Recognising the complexities between senior individuals internal to the firm 
reinforces how the dynamic of strategy formulation has changed over time. 
Nonetheless, the commonality between studies shows these universal links of how 
strategic decision-making is formulated (Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst, 2006).  
 
As seen in Figure 2.1, internal and external forces can influence strategy teams and 
company executives, further contributing to the formation of strategy. To gain a 
greater insight of who influences strategy and to understand their motives, this 
review has created two categories, internal and external.  
 
2.4.3 Step two – Formulation: Internal influences 
 
Within a firm the CEO, board of directors and senior management all possess the 
responsibility to direct the organisation (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988; Westphal 
and Fredrickson, 2001). Johnson et al. (2008) show that these roles require them to 
establish a financially viable corporate strategy determining the direction a firm can 
take. Being a crucial aspect to business growth, a CEO’s judgement could positively 
or negatively impact a firm (Papadakis and Barwise, 2002). This highlights the 
importance for management to execute streamlined strategic decision-making 
(Bromiley and Rau, 2015). Namaki (2014) provides the example of the technology 
firm, Hewlett Packard, having faced several challenges in competition but 
successfully overcoming them through well-planned mergers and acquisitions. 
Carter (2013) refers to the same company finding that strategic leadership had come 




clear that senior management require proficient business acumen to direct corporate 
strategy (Covin and Miles, 2007).  
 
If the competitive strategy were in line with the corporate strategy, an organisation 
could expand its operations (Johnson et al., 2008; Dabic et al., 2014). To reach this 
position however, a firm must incorporate and synergise the differing views of 
middle managers that could influence strategic direction (Ahearne, Lam and Karaus, 
2014). As seen earlier in the literature review, employees resisting certain planned 
strategies can force senior management to rethink their strategic direction 
(Courpasson et al., 2012). Employee resistance can encourage progressive thought 
within a firm which could lead to innovation (Courpasson et al., 2012) or increase 
inefficiencies with teams (Lampel et al., 2014). Therefore, from this perspective, 
how middle management react could be resourceful or a strain on the strategy 
process and strategic change (Floyd and Lane, 2000).  
 
The study of Ahearne et al. (2014) demonstrates the impact of middle managers on 
firm strategy. It was seen that individual actors have different influences based upon 
how other employees regarded them within the firm and how much ‘social capital’ 
they possess. The social capital within a business context refers to an individual’s 
social network and reputation (Ahearne et al., 2014). As a result, social networks 
within the firm can determine whether change could be made within strategy 
(Kleinbaum and Stuart, 2014). It was seen that middle management who possess 
high social capital based on reputation could influence above their position (Ahearne 
et al., 2014). This was different from those who possessed informational social 
capital impacting performance below their position. This finding reinforced Pappas 
and Wooldridge's (2007) previous study on middle management’s ability to 
influence based upon their business networks. Nonetheless, internal firm politics 
based on social structures can influence strategic decision-making, making it 
difficult to generalise organisational traits across all sectors (Mueller et al., 2013).  
 
In similar discussions, firms selecting their operational environment can be 
complicated if the internal members are dismissive (Jarzabkowski, Le and Van de 
Ven, 2013). Paroutis and Heracleous (2013) emphasise that adapting a firm’s 




internal workers must also accept a strategic change. A strategic change must be 
accepted from a micro perspective ensuring firm action can be implemented at team 
and individual levels, particularly when firms analyse their environmental context. 
There is a need to understand the characteristics of the external environment to 
ensure there is no resistances from internal employees which could affect firm 
performance (Shepherd and Rudd, 2014). 
 
2.4.4 Step two – Formulation: External influences 
 
Most companies worldwide are influenced by external forces that can govern many 
aspects of their operation (Hart, 1995; Porter, 1996). From a macroeconomic level, a 
firm would be subjected to the PESTEL analysis model (Political, Economic, Social, 
Technological, Environmental and Legal) which can influence their strategy process 
(Eden and Ackermann, 2004). As Freeman (2010) describes, especially through 
globalisation and interconnectivity, firms have to consider the wider aspect beyond 
their internal means.  
 
Though incorporated within a firm’s planned strategy, any one of the PESTEL forces 
can change the course of strategic direction due to the power they hold (Henisz and 
Zelner, 2005; Jensen and Sandstrom, 2011). Google’s experience provides a useful 
illustration of this when attempting to expand into China (Stevens, Xie and Peng, 
2016). Due to the country being highly regulated in both social activity and online 
occupation, Google had to negotiate for many years with the Chinese government to 
launch within their online environment (Stevens et al., 2016). Even though corporate 
agreements were made, Google had further difficulties due to constant governmental 
intervention for further censorship (Stevens et al., 2016). Governments holding 
strong bargaining power where regulation is high can influence firms into 
unintended directions, placing a strain in resources and performance (Lampel et al., 
2014). 
 
The external environment of a firm can be a key determinant on strategy and 
performance (Farjoun, 2002). In many cases the operational environment can be a 




these aspects can be decisive factors within the strategy process. The complexity, 
again however would fall under a case-by-case analysis. There is a need to 
understand the environmental context to comprehend which external influences 
could enter the strategy-making discussions (Nadkarni and Barr, 2008). Firms 
operating within high-risk, unstable environments have to make strategic decisions 
on how to respond to certain organisational threats (Oetzel and Getz, 2012). Though 
there appears to be an academic gap to explain why businesses address 
environmental conflict differently, Oetzel and Getz (2012) reassert that it would be 
in a firm’s interests to solve conflict due to the risk of losing high financial 
investment.  
 
Soule et al. (2014) provide an example of an external influence on strategy, where 
many firms were limited in expanding their operations into Burma due to global 
trading sanctions. Trading sanctions was due to the country violating human rights. 
Eventually, when sanctions were lifted and many companies allocated foreign direct 
investment into Burma such as PepsiCo, they were faced with external pressure from 
interest groups (Soule et al., 2014). PepsiCo had to end its joint venture with a local 
company having been linked to inhumane repression towards an opposing political 
party and corruption (Soule et al., 2014). Furthermore, PepsiCo also faced criticism 
from human rights activists across the globe for partnering with actors of unethical 
practice (Soule et al., 2014). The pressure from external interest groups therefore 
impacted the firm’s strategic plans, influencing them to divest their interests. This 
example introduces the importance of understanding the relationship between firms 
and external organisations, operating at the meso level of analysis. External 
influences from interest groups could be detrimental to the firm’s financial 
performance and brand image. Consequently, it can be argued that it would be 
beneficial for firms to work with NGOs, incorporating their resources into the 
strategy process (Kolk and Lenfant, 2012; Teegen et al., 2012).  
 
The literature illustrates how enterprises can be resilient in areas of geographic 
instability (Branzei and Abdelnour, 2010). Environments characterised by political 
and civil violence can be difficult to predict due to being unstable (Hiatt and Sine, 
2014) As a result, firms can gain support in facing such situations by seeking 




(Oetzel et al., 2010; Porter and Kramer, 2011). From a meso level of analysis, firms 
can actively seek external guidance to form strategy (Foss et al., 2013). Foss et al. 
(2013) describe these as external knowledge sources such as consultants, public 
R&D centres and conferences. It can be common for firms to use these sources to 
gain industry insight seeking an opportunity to exploit (Foss et al., 2013). Utilising 
strategy consultants can aid businesses to branch into new markets due to being 
specialised in particular industry knowledge (Kornberger and Clegg, 2011; Regner, 
2003).  
 
Studies have highlighted institutions that could influence firm strategy (Ackermann 
and Eden, 2011). Government bodies, as expressed by Stevens et al. (2016), can be 
an influential political institution especially when operating within areas of economic 
and political instability. Governing bodies, however also depend on businesses being 
crucial players to stabilise the local economy and reduce risk in investment (Abadie 
and Gardeazabal, 2003; Hiatt and Sine, 2014). Therefore, there can be a fluctuation 
in power dynamics. Additionally, NGOs have been recognised as an influential 
institution (Kraemer et al., 2013; Hollensbe et al., 2014). Doh and Teegen (2002) 
state that NGOs, as institutions, act as social regulatory bodies governing the social 
norms of an area. Being transnational institutions, NGOs can operate within more 
than one geographical location (Hudson, 2001), particularly when their 
organisational goals are to govern international business practices (Den Hond, De 
Bakker and Doh, 2015) or in humanitarian aid (Pache and Santos, 2010). It has 
therefore been argued that NGOs have gained power to challenge other players 
within a field due to their international reach (Dahan et al., 2010). 
 
NGOs could be positive for a firm demonstrating shared value or seeking 
consultation when operating in adverse conditions (Getz and Oetzel, 2009; Porter 
and Kramer, 2011). Conversely, NGOs with conflicting interests against a firm’s 
corporate strategy could interfere with operations due to ethical arguments as seen 
within the forestry industry (Kraemer et al., 2013) or raw mineral extraction (Eesley 
and Lenox, 2006). These notions raise the argument within the meso analysis of how 
NGOs possess legitimacy and power to influence the strategic decision of a firm. 
This further goes to question, which individual actors within NGOs can join the 




executives. Thus, clarity is also needed at a micro level phenomenon to understand 
individual actors within NGOs. An institutional perspective would be able to provide 
theoretical insight into these functions (Suddaby, Bitektine and Haack, 2017). 
 
Another external influence on strategic decision-making is the customers who have 
been pivotal within strategy design (Hillman and Keim, 2001). Customers can shape 
a firm’s strategy based on product and service interests (Skaggs and Youndt, 2004). 
Barney (1986) suggests that customers’ expectations of product value can be enough 
to influence which strategy a firm decides to implement. In more recent discussions, 
it can been seen that consumer trends towards ethical business practice have also 
forced companies to reassess their supplier sources and produce ethical certifications 
(Aragón-Correa and Rubio, 2007; Wheelen and Hunger, 2012).  
 
Furthermore, given the nature of this thesis, other external factors which can 
influence strategy can be linked to the reasons of geographical conflict within a 
turbulent environment (Dai et al., 2013). These could range from civil and political 
violence (Hiatt and Sine, 2014), terrorism (Henisz, Mansfield and Von Glinow, 
2010) or international disputes (Henisz and Zelner, 2005). Findings have shown that 
environmental hostility can lead to an erratic change in strategic decisions and in 
some cases lead to business failure (Mitchell et al., 2011). For example, fast food 
franchise McDonalds saw a fall in firm performance during the conflict in Lebanon 
resulting in permanent closure of many branches (Jamali and Mirshak, 2010). 
 
2.4.5 Step three – Implementation 
 
The implementation of strategy plays a crucial factor for firm performance and 
strategic success (Kleinbaum and Stuart, 2014). As Lee and Puranam (2015) 
recognise, this step of the strategy process alone can be a separate field of study due 
to a need for strategic precision in competing markets. Additionally, as also 
recognised, internal firm dynamics can further complicate strategic implementation 
from disagreements (Lê and Jarzabkowski, 2015). Nevertheless, the process outcome 
seen in Figure 2.1 determines how formulated strategy in the previous process step is 




undertakes particular activities needed to execute a plan. Moreover, Barney (1986) 
highlights that a firm’s ability to manage financial resources well would contribute to 
successful strategic implementation. This contemplation further highlights the 
importance of the Situational Analysis and Formulation stages. The method firms 
use within the process outcome can be linked to the environmental context (Lee and 
Puranam, 2015). Hence, examining the process outcome is restricted without 
application to a situation or scenario (Shepherd and Rudd, 2014).  
 
Moving forward within the implementation stage, the literature has shown employee 
recognition as an influential aspect of strategy (Wilden et al., 2013). As seen in 
Figure 2.1, employees of the firm acknowledge the strategic intervention at this 
phase of the strategy process. Herrmann and Nadkarni (2014) suggest that employees 
of a firm can decide at this stage whether they accept the chosen strategic 
intervention. Accepting or rejecting the strategic decision can affect the company’s 
performance (Herrmann and Nadkarni, 2014). As a result, firms attempt to 
understand how their employees respond to strategic decisions by measuring internal 
satisfaction levels (Mirabeau and Maguire, 2014). Additionally, understanding 
satisfaction levels can be important for employee retention, particularly where many 
MNCs invest in training their staff (Iriyama, Kishore and Talukdar, 2016). As 
recognised earlier, resistance to change could recreate tension within the 
organisation costing resources and manager’s time (Floyd and Lane, 2000). Hence, 
employee recognition needs to be represented within the strategy process.  
 
2.4.6 Step four – Evaluation and the emergent process 
 
Evaluation is the process where firms review the results of their strategic movements 
(Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst, 2006). This is a necessary step within the strategy 
process to ensure the intended outcome was met (Hart, 1992). It also allows the firm 
to consistently monitor and readjust their corporate strategy in line with market and 
environmental changes (Laureiro-Martinez, Brusoni, Canessa and Zollo, 2015). It 
has been noted that firms can improve their corporate strategy by evaluating their 
performance after strategic implementation (Thomas and Ambrosini, 2015). The 




context, adhering to useful feedback (Dimitratos, Petrou, Plakoyiannaki and 
Johnson, 2011). Performance evaluations are conducted in two main areas, 
organisational activities and resources (Farjoun, 2002). Evaluating the organisational 
activities assesses if the strategic outcome meets the firm goals (Farjoun, 2002). 
These findings are connected with an evaluation of firm resources, conducting an 
analysis on finances (Song et al., 2015) and personnel (Elbanna and Child, 2007; 
Nadkarni and Barr, 2008). Eppler and Platts (2009) suggest that these forms of 
evaluations are conducted by compiling strategic charts. Strategy charting can allow 
evaluators to understand the change of firm performances based on a series of 
implemented events (Eppler and Platts, 2009). Firms can compare their performance 
with previous strategic movements, examining the impact of operating in new 
institutional settings and market environments (Davies and Walters, 2004). 
Following strategic implementation, firms will also be subjected to the views of 
external stakeholders (Stevens et al., 2016). This has been represented within the 
Evaluation step as stakeholder review.  
 
Stakeholders are “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of an organization’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984: 46). Key stakeholders 
within the strategy evaluation phase are competitors, consumers (Greenley and 
Foxall, 1996; Mirabeau and Maguire, 2014), government, local community and 
special interest groups (Wiltbank et al., 2006; Delmas and Toffel, 2008). Prior 
studies show that the influence of non-market stakeholders on the firm’s strategic 
direction has increased in more recent years (Oetzel et al., 2010; Porter and Kramer, 
2011; Sharma and Henriques, 2005); for example, the increase in environmental 
regulation from traditional stakeholders such as governing bodies and the local 
community (Hillman and Keim, 2001). Firms must comply with environmental 
standards in order to avoid facing legal action or penalties (Sarkis, Gonzalez-Torre 
and Adenso-Diaz, 2010). Furthermore, social representation from NGOs can 
mobilise public opinion, forming expectations on how businesses should operate 
(Sarkis et al., 2010). As a result, NGO stakeholders could enhance or decrease firm 
reputation on reviewing their strategic implementation (Freeman and Mc Vea, 2001; 
Aragón-Correa and Rubio, 2007). The NGO’s ability to question firm practices 
further highlights the need to understand how firms account for such pressure within 




evaluating strategy performance and stakeholder review are linked back to the first 
step of the strategy process, contributing knowledge for the strategy to be enhanced. 
These assessments and progression can be interpreted as the ‘emergent process’ or 
similarly, as organic growth (Farjoun, 2002; Paroutis and Pettigrew, 2007; Thomas 
and Ambrosini, 2015). 
 
The emergent process was a concept presented by Mintzberg and Waters (1978, 
1985) suggesting that strategy formation is derived from both deliberate and 
emergent strategies (Figure 2.2). It is a concept which supports a link of the 
evaluation step back to the first situation analysis step, restarting the strategy cycle 
(Farjoun, 2002). Deliberate strategies are specific movements of an organisation 
formulated from rationality (Hart, 1992). These strategies, in general, are formal 
control systems designed by conscious thought to dictate how a firm should move 
(Mintzberg and Lampel, 1999). Mintzberg and Waters (1985) elaborate stating that a 
firm would carry forth a deliberate strategy with an exact intention. Additionally, the 
design of the deliberate strategy cannot be interfered by external forces where the 
outcome must portray what was intended.  
 









Source: (Mintzberg, 1978: 945) 
 
Priem, Rasheed and Kotulic (1995) assess rationality within the strategy process. 
The results showed a positive link to firm performance using a deliberate strategy 
when operating within dynamic environments (Priem et al., 1995). A positive link 
between rationality and performance, however was inconsistent with previous 
studies showing opposite results (Fredrickson, 1983). Consequently, whether a 
1. Intended Strategy  
 












deliberate strategy would be successful for a firm has been debated within the 
literature (Wiltbank et al., 2006; Thomas and Ambrosini, 2015). It has been argued 
that deliberate strategy making has only succeeded within stable market conditions 
(March, 2006). Rapid changing markets such as the technology industry would not 
be able to sustain reapplying the same deliberate strategy in repetition (Davies and 
Walters, 2004; March, 2006). Transition economies are a key example where, 
traditionally, China was fixed in its operational activities (Davies and Walters, 
2004). However, in the last decade, China has been forced to adapt its methods of 
enterprise when trading with western firms and customers (Davies and Walters, 
2004). Farjoun (2002) therefore argues that firms can reach their realised strategy 
(Figure 2.2) through constant evaluation and learning through past experiences. As a 
result, firms gain emergent strategies (Figure 2.2) to cope with changing 
environments that require consistent evaluation (Covin, Green and Slevin, 2006). In 
other words, through evaluation, a firm can review and enhance their strategic 
direction. This renewal of strategy is argued as being emergent (Mirabeau and 
Maguire, 2014). 
 
A notion of strengthening strategy through evaluation was recognised by Priem et al. 
(1995), reviewing the manufacturing industry. Firms had gained competitive 
advantage through experienced industry knowledge and efficient processes. March 
(2006) further reiterates that successful businesses would have reflected on their core 
strengths, adapting their strategic design when necessary. Emergent strategies have 
been considered as a tool to adapt a firm’s systematic approach in line with both 
industry and geographical environments (Mirabeau and Maguire, 2014). The 
importance of emergent strategies has been well recognised for firms to reinvent 
their strategy (Hamel, 2009) and the ability to be fluent during changes of the 
economy (Herrmann and Nadkarni, 2014). March (2006) describes emergent 
strategies as adaptive intelligence whereby firms would be able to continue 
exploiting markets through strategy evaluations, consistently amending strategy with 
market knowledge.   
 
Mirabeau and Maguire (2014) provide an insightful example where large 
telecommunication firms have utilised emergent strategies within their strategic 




an autonomous strategic behaviour to an emergent strategy. As seen in Figure 2.2, 
two outcomes can derive from a firm’s intended strategy. One possibility represents 
areas of the strategy that failed to work, becoming unrealized strategy. From 
applying the deliberate strategy, a firm would experience the second possibility with 
expected results from the known repeated action shown as realized strategy. Hence, 
this model introduced the notion of emergent strategy representing actions that were 
not initially planned nor intended by senior management. Within Mirabeau and 
Maguire's (2014) study, it was seen that a company had adopted a deliberate 
strategy, which maintained a standard service but did not address a multi-lingual 
service needed for long-term growth. Middle managers recognised this limitation 
and formed a multi-lingual call centre, establishing an emerged strategy through 
evaluation.  
 
In similar discussions, it has been argued that entrepreneurs have often become 
‘accidental’ through this same process of evaluating strategy (Shah and Tripsas, 
2007). An individual could have discovered an emerged strategy enhancing a 
product or service before a competitive firm, who were too engaged in their 
deliberate strategy. For instance a technological breakthrough invented by in-house 
developers inspired to innovate, establishing a better solution (Shah and Tripsas, 
2007). Thietart (2016) concurs identifying the relevance for modern day strategy, 
whereby strategic evaluation can result in faster response to environmental changes. 
However, this can raise questions of how firms within areas of uncertainty can 
formulate emergent strategy given the extra factors of consideration; particularly, 
how emergent strategies can be influenced by turbulent environments (Grant, 2003).  
 
Firms can move from deliberate strategy to emergent strategy by modifying their 
operations with each location (Fort, 2009). For example, in Lebanon, Citi Bank’s 
ability to continue providing loans to the country (during conflict) increased their 
negotiation capacity with the national government (Jamali and Mirshak, 2010). The 
governing body had recognised the bank’s ability to reduce civil conflict through 
providing loans, in turn legitimising their actions (Jamali and Mirshak, 2010). 
Similarly, Oetzel and Getz (2012) also identify that companies would incorporate 
mediation or arbitration with groups engaged in conflict within their strategy 




positive emerged strategy. Nevertheless, a gap has remained within the strategy 
process literature to explain how NGO institutions or individual actors are 
legitimised by firms to influence their strategic decisions (Berrone et al., 2013). To 
gain a comprehensive understanding of the strategy process, contextual application is 
needed in organisational research (Covin et al., 2006; Corley and Gioia, 2011).  
 
To summarise this section, insight into the strategy process has identified four main 
sequential steps, Situational Analysis, Formulation, Implementation and Evaluation. 
Situational analysis provides an overview for a firm to identify their resources and 
select a strategic direction (Farjoun, 2002). In this step, a thorough internal analysis 
needs to be undertaken as well as the strategic and environmental context a firm 
intends to enter. The formulation step has provided an overview of internal and 
external influencers (Whittington and Cailluet, 2008). Understanding the different 
elements in internal and external influences has provided a greater understanding of 
strategic complication for decision-makers (Grant, 2003; Lampel et al., 2014). 
Implementation of the strategy would follow with a set of activities to achieve the 
strategic plan (Kleinbaum and Stuart, 2014). Finally, the last step allows a firm to 
evaluate the performance of their strategic direction and understand stakeholder 
reviews (Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst, 2006). Becoming well acquainted with 
the fundamentals of the strategy process is essential. As noted within the review, 
further analysis of the environmental context is required as the geographical and 





The purpose of this chapter was to gain an understanding of business strategy and 
several factors associated in the strategy process. An evolution in the definition of 
strategy has highlighted a firm’s ability to manage resources with its external 
environment (Ronda-Pupo and Guerras-Martin, 2012). Furthermore, to understand 
the geographical impact and external influences on a firm, it was seen that an 
empirical enquiry had to focus on the corporate level of strategy (Henisz et al., 2014; 




2007), it was first important to understand the firm’s strategy process from a macro 
perspective. The strategy process examines the development of how strategies are 
generated and what factors are included in the creation (Hutzschenreuter and 
Kleindienst, 2006). Following a historical review, a conceptual strategy process 
framework was created based on four major steps: Situational Analysis, 
Formulation, Implementation and Evaluation. Understanding this macro perspective 
supported a review of NGO influences from a meso level and individual actors from 
a micro level of analysis.  
 
Situational analysis allows a firm to assess their current performance and review 
their resources (Farjoun, 2002). The firm would then be able to assess their strategic 
context and environmental context. The Formulation step demonstrates that strategic 
decision-making is a play off between strategy teams, firm executives and internal-
external influences. As all three assemblies are linked, it is noted that the internal 
human dynamics can increase complexity (Courpasson et al., 2012). Furthermore, 
external influences can enter strategic discussions where PESTEL factors have 
increased for firms (Eden and Ackermann, 2004). Businesses can collaborate with 
governing bodies and NGOs to seek consultancy. Implementation of strategy would 
conduct particular activities to accomplish a firm’s plan (Lee and Puranam, 2015). 
This step entails the process outcome and acknowledges employee recognition. 
Evaluation, being the fourth step of the strategy process, is necessary to refine 
strategy based on assessing performance and stakeholder reviews (Thomas and 
Ambrosini, 2015). Through evaluation the strategy process cycle repeats. This 
renewal of strategy has been argued as emergent (Farjoun, 2002). 
 
In becoming acquainted with the fundamentals of the strategy process, this chapter 
has shown that further insight was required to assist an empirical study. The 
necessity to contextualise the strategy process framework was augured. Context can 
not only influence how firms approach their operational environment (Nadkarni and 
Barr, 2008) but also strategic decision-making seen within the formulation step 
(Shepherd and Rudd, 2014). Though business management literature has provided 
insight into how firms respond in unstable environments (Dai et al., 2013; Driffield 
et al., 2013), there appears to be a limitation of a comprehensive integration to the 




understand businesses in conflict zones and the impact these regions could have on 
the strategy process framework. The next chapter shows how conflict literature can 



































EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF CONFLICT ZONES  




The previous chapter explored strategy and the fundamental stages of the strategy 
process. Additionally, the importance of contextualising the strategy process was 
also recognised. A context can not only influence how firms approach their 
operational environment (Nadkarni and Barr, 2008), but also how firms respond to 
external influences (Shepherd and Rudd, 2014). Business in conflict zones is an 
interesting topic in strategy, management and international business literature 
(Branzei and Abdelnour, 2010; Dai et al., 2013; Hiatt and Sine, 2014; Oetzel and 
Getz, 2012; Darendeli and Hill, 2016). The aim of this chapter is to extend the 
insights of the strategy process, placing the process in the context of a conflict zone. 
 
Over the years, questions have emerged with respect to how firms operate within 
unstable locations. What is the economic rational to enter a conflict zone (Branzei et 
al., 2004; Oetzel et al., 2010)? How do firms react to violent conflict (Jamali and 
Mirshak, 2010; Oetzel and Getz, 2012)? How does Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) influence firm strategy in conflict zones (Delmas and Toffel, 
2008; Kolk and Lenfant, 2012)? Conflict zones are a unique context to study due to 
being complicated by many players within an operational environment. Businesses 
play an important role in stabilising the economy of a conflict zone (Boge, 
Fitzpatrick, Jasper, and Paes, 2006). Likewise, NGOs are equally important within 
conflict zones due to their social objectives to raise welfare (Katsos and Forrer, 
2014). Therefore, it is necessary to understand the relationship between MNCs and 
NGOs within adverse environments, reviewing how they can work with each other 
and for what motive. To gain a comprehensive multilevel perspective first required a 
macro understanding of how the geographical context impacts a firm’s strategy 
process. The objective of this chapter is to highlight conflict literature that informed 




framework. Successively, this chapter could further understand NGO relationships 
from a meso level and individual actors from a micro level of analysis.  
 
This study aims to understand how the strategy process is formulated within conflict 
zones and how NGOs as an external institution can influence this process. For 
example, gold mining firm Anglo Gold Ashanti has been criticised by the NGO 
Human Rights Watch for providing financial assistants to rebel groups operating in 
East Congo (Kolk and Lenfant, 2012). The NGO, questioning the integrity of the 
firm, applied pressure to change their strategic actions. Kolk and Lenfant (2012) 
reiterate how business and NGO collaboration can avoid malpractice whereby both 
parties can work towards a shared goal. This example highlights why it is necessary 
to explore the phenomena of organisational influence in unstable environments, 
described further within the chapter.  
 
This chapter will begin by establishing a definition of a conflict zone. This will also 
incorporate an understanding of the different stages of conflict followed by the costs 
incurred. Subsequently, the chapter will continue by examining business operation in 
conflict zones. Reviewing this literature will provide understanding of why 
businesses enter such environments and the consequential effect. This section will 
also build on the NGO–business link within conflict zones. In understanding 
organisational relationships, the review will integrate relevant themes to the strategy 
process, developing the conceptual framework generated in the previous chapter.   
 
3.2 Establishing a Relevant Definition of Conflict  
 
In order to achieve the aim of this thesis, it is necessary to understand what is meant 
by conflict. Rummel (1976) describes conflict as an evident expression of tension 
between two or more groups with alternate interests. The nature of conflict has been 
seen as a philosophy rooted from the need to gain power over another due to 
differing ideologies (Rummel, 1976). Cox and Tung (1997) build on this philosophy 
identifying conflict arising from distinct socio–cultural groups creating tension. As a 
result, geographical regions will experience conflict focused in a particular place 




cross border), insurgency, or severe lawlessness” (Anderson, Markides, and Kupp, 
2010: 8). This definition corresponds with Kolk and Lenfant's (2012) understanding 
where the lack of good governance and regulation can lead to violent conflict arising. 
This definition brings together three important aspects of how a conflict zone can be 
conceptualised. Some studies have determined conflict zones by focusing on one 
particular aspect, for example, national animosity and war (Arikan and Shenkar, 
2013; Dai et al., 2013). Others have described conflict zones in relation to armed 
conflict and rebellions (Lujala, 2010; Berman et al., 2017) as well as highlighting 
lack of governance (Collier and Sambanis, 2005; Kolk, 2015). Though these are all 
common themes to define conflict zones, the definition described by Anderson et al. 
(2010) provides a well-rounded perspective. 
 
It has been suggested that there can be different stages of conflict. Woocher (2009) 
demonstrates this in Figure 3.1.  
 













Source: Woocher (2009: 3) 
 
Figure 3.1 shows the stages a region will go through when experiencing conflict. 
Beginning with peace, the country moves into instability from a certain escalation. 
This escalation could be from civil or political disputes (Woocher, 2009). The rise of 




highlight that international turmoil can lead to economic instability. Regions that are 
however, subjected to international conflict can be complex to understand due to 
historical events conspiring to the breakout of conflict (Katsos and Forrer, 2014).  
Nonetheless, Figure 3.1 provides an insightful imagery of how a conflict zone can 
rise and fall. The stage of conflict a host country is going through can also be linked 
to the country’s economic development and foreign direct investment (FDI) 
prospects (Driffield et al., 2013). In many cases a firm would want to invest in the 
de-escalation of conflict (Figure 3.1) where a country is in recovery stages. This 
would reduce financial risk and save the company from working within the means of 
conflict (Driffield et al., 2013). Countries such as Mozambique have demonstrated 
this, experiencing economic growth at the de-escalation stage of conflict (Addison, 
2003). Other countries such as Guinea-Bissau have also experienced a measure of 
political stability after conflict in late 1990s (Addison, 2003). However, these would 
be dependent upon how well a country can manage the characteristics of conflict 
(Feil, 2012). 
 
Understanding the different stages of conflict raises the notion of temporality 
particularly where the severity of conflict can range over different time periods and 
causes of events (Guidolin and La Ferrara, 2007). Guidolin and La Ferrara (2007) 
had shown in their study of the diamond industry in Angola, that a region moving 
from violent conflict to ceasefire could cause an impact on financial returns for 
certain MNCs. Within the author’s study, the diamond company had experienced a 
decline of financial income following the death of a rebel leader. Hence, 
understanding the impact of conflict zones on MNCs could be unique to differing 
stages of conflict. In a similar narrative of temporality, Bucheli and Kim (2012) had 
also shown that a MNC’s interactions with an environment could change over 
different time periods. In their study, as political risk increased, a firm’s credibility 
and legitimate status declined. Consequently, the stage of turbulence that a 
geographical area is experiencing could have differing impacts on firms that are 
operating in that region. Hence, understanding conflict zones can be a unique context 
to study due to the stages recognised in Figure 3.1.  
 
Conflict zones are prone to uncertainty due to the national state failing to uphold 




Conflict zones are commonly created by war-torn regions (Driffield et al., 2013), 
armed conflict (Berman, 2000) or geo-political tension (Henisz et al., 2010). The 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) provides an insightful example. The DRC 
has been transformed into a conflict territory due to experiencing many wars since its 
independence in 1960 (Ndikumana and Emizet, 2005). The result of governmental 
disagreement led the county into civil instability. This was further contributed with 
the rise of rebellions centralised around the country’s vast diamond and gold 
plantations (Ndikumana and Emizet, 2005). Furthermore, Addison (2003) argues 
that the lack of transparency also contributes to the growth of conflict zones such as 
with the DRC (Addison, 2003). Lack of transparency could be due to individual 
political agendas, resulting in funds being used of personal benefit rather creating 
good governances for the citizens of the country (Kolk and Lenfant, 2012).  
 
With the rise of complications within a conflict zone, MNCs operating in such 
regions have to adapt their practices to suit the situation (Boge et al., 2006). Firms 
have been known to connect with local actors within the conflict such as suppliers 
and governmental bodies to continue with their business operation (Kraemer et al., 
2013). However, before understanding business operation in conflict zones it is 
necessary to recognise the impact of conflict. When defining conflict it is essential to 
establish the costs incurred during these times. 
 
3.2.1 Costs of conflict  
 
From a macro perspective, there are three main costs of conflict: political, economic, 
and social (Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol, 2003). Firstly, the political arena can not 
only be a source of conflict but also a major cost after tension has decrease (Hoeffler 
and Reynal-Querol, 2003). It is recognised that having a strong governance of state 
can lead to economic growth (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2005). However, Maitland 
and Sammartino (2015) highlight that one main aspect of environmental uncertainly 
for MNCs is the political infrastructure of the host country. Thus, a conflict or post-
conflict zone can be slow to recover due to the lack of political stabilisation and slow 
FDI (Driffield et al., 2013). In many cases new political groups, after facing conflict, 




the high potential for conflict to break out again. International hostility could also be 
affected with certain political groups affecting international trade agreements 
(Henisz et al., 2010). For example, following the invasion of Iraq in 2003 the 
country is still seen as a high-risk investment due to the reasons mentioned (Askari, 
2012; Katsos and AlKafaji, 2017). 
 
Conversely, Henisz et al. (2010) recognise that a firm operating in a country which is 
perceived to have high risk could still be competitive in relative price. For example, 
Russia has relatively higher risk than the USA; purchasing oil from Russia was 48-
58% cheaper than USA (Henisz et al., 2010). Political risk, however, in terms of 
uncertainty can also be based on international hostility rather than internal political 
failure (Pache and Santos, 2010). With many markets expanding due to 
internationalisation, national governments must form global partnership to promote 
trade (Spoor, 2005). Nevertheless, if a political party is seen to be of high risk this 
could cost the country the ability to trade in international markets, potentially leading 
to international turmoil (Darendeli and Hill, 2016). This leads onto another major 
cost of conflict.  
 
Secondly, countries can face an economic cost of conflict. Conflict can drain 
financial resources, in turn affecting business performance and the county’s 
economic strength (Namaki, 2014). Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) conducted a 
study on the economic cost when the Basque Country experienced terrorism. At the 
time of de-escalation, the country experienced a 10% decline of GDP. Furthermore, 
the market value of stock produced by the country had also fallen. This resulted in 
losing competitiveness to identical products sold from outside of the state. In 
comparison, Dickenson-Jones, Hyslop and Vaira-Lucero (2014) noted that terrorism 
has less of an economic impact when compared to internal or external civil war. 
Nonetheless, both forms of conflict can lead to economic uncertainty. This is due to 
conflict disturbing the business trade of the host country (Mason, 2014; Berman et 
al., 2017).  
 
Conflict not only affects MNCs but also local entrepreneurs (Collier and Sambanis, 
2005). Over a period of time prolonged conflict directly interrupts the economic 




Palestine region have experienced such activity where conflict has led to both local 
business failure and loss of foreign business linkages (Nourse et al., 2007). The 
occupied region of Palestine has been recognised as a fragile state whereby due to 
on-going conflict has resulted to an unfavourable entrepreneurial environment and 
declining economy (Stevenson, Daoud and Sadeq, 2009). As a result, conflict 
directly affected the livelihood of the citizens living in such regions highlighting 
another cost of conflict.   
 
The third cost of conflict is social impact. Within any form of conflict arising there is 
a negative cost to society (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom, 2004). The lifestyle of 
citizens within conflict countries changes tremendously during and after tension 
(Pearce, 2004). Dependent on the scale of conflict, citizens can be forced out of their 
homes due to poor living conditions and become ‘internally displaced’ (Forrer and 
Katsos, 2015). Many cases have shown that conflict has led to the resettlement of 
citizens caught in-between conflict (Addison, 2003). With little support from this 
host nation, NGOs look towards the international community and MNCs for 
financial support (Kolk, 2015). Therefore, it has been argued that corporations play a 
key role in the recovery of a post-conflict zone (Kolk and Lenfant, 2012).  
 
The conflict in Afghanistan provides an example of social cost. With the ‘Taliban’ 
terror group engaged in international turmoil, many citizens became internally 
displaced (Bullough et al., 2014; Collier and Sambanis, 2005). Additionally, due to 
the unstable external environment many citizens could not gain employment within a 
company (Ciarli, Kofol and Menon, 2015). Thus, many families within Afghanistan 
turned to self-employment entering ventures in agriculture enterprise (Ciarli et al., 
2015). However, as noted, the performance of local trade would be limited due to 
economic instability (Ndikumana and Emizet, 2005). Bullough et al. (2014) concur 
adding that the rate of success would depend on social resilience as, in many cases, 
citizens have been affected psychologically with the consequences of conflict. This 
could be in the form of trauma, fear of relocating or engaging in social interaction 
(Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol, 2003). The social cost would therefore need to be 
examined on a micro level to fully grasp. As Bullough et al. (2014) state, the degree 





In summary, this section has identified that conflict zones are formed through civil or 
cross-border tension. A common theme which is linked to conflict zones is 
uncertainty due to the lack of national regulation and governance (Driffield et al., 
2013; Forrer and Katsos, 2015). Given the political, economic and social costs 
incurred through conflict, it is important to study why and how businesses operate 
within such contextual environments. This further goes to question how operating 
within conflict zones is accounted for within the strategy process. The next section 
will provide further understanding concerning business operations in conflict zones.  
 
3.3 Understanding How Conflict Zones are Accounted for Within Business 
Operation 
 
Interest has grown to understand how corporations operate within unstable 
environments (Getachew and Beamish, 2017). The term ‘turbulent’ is used in many 
fields of study. From a business perspective the term ‘turbulent’ refers to a constant 
change in the external environment (Grant, 2003). Early insight showed how firms 
can optimise profits within these environments (Ansoff and Sullivan, 1993). Ansoff 
and Sullivan (1993) created a matrix which allowed firms to direct a strategic 
movement based on selecting the level of environmental turbulence, strategic 
aggressiveness and general management capability. Though a level of political 
instability was recognised within these strategic contributions, this viewpoint 
focused on market economies such as technology and consumer trends. For example, 
the computing industry is constantly changing due to research and development, 
capital investment and increases in competition (Ansoff and Sullivan, 1993). More 
recent literature recognises how firms operate strategically within conflict territories 
(Henisz et al., 2010; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016) and how firms survive in geographical 
conflict, emerging as an important topic (Berman, 2000; Dai et al., 2013). 
 
At a macro firm level, when planning to enter a new region, MNCs need to 
understand the environmental demands and the resources required (Delmas and 
Toffel, 2008). Conflict zones can be complex contexts to study business due to 
multiple players consistently changing the environment (Jamali and Mirshak, 2010) 




zones operates differently from that of a stable external environment. Though similar 
stakeholders exist, the level of influence and power can constantly shift (Kantz, 
2008; Murillo-Luna et al., 2008). Each stakeholder party would also possess 
differing values opposing each other (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2006). With many parties 
operating within a conflict zone each holding different rationales, trade within these 
regions can be difficult (Getz and Oetzel, 2009). Moreover, not all businesses wish 
to enter a conflict zone to trade with the host country, but rather are required to enter 
to source their product, such as mineral extraction (Feil, 2012; Berman et al., 2017). 
Certain industries like mineral extraction have also been scrutinised for fuelling 
conflict within a region, raising ethical investigations (Banerjee, 2008; Berman et al., 
2017).   
 
There is a commonality between conflict zones arising in regions rich in natural 
resources (Berman et al., 2017). As a result, businesses within the trade of natural 
resources must operate in areas of conflict (Grant, 2003). For example, the oil 
industry can only operate where their product can be extracted (Grant, 2003). This is 
the same for most firms engaged in extraction of natural resources such as diamond 
and gold (Boge et al., 2006). In turn, businesses must incorporate within their 
strategy of how to work within adverse conditions. The economic rationale can be 
justified from the industry being lucrative (Sherman, 2000; Sweeny, 2011). 
However, Lujala (2010) states that it is for this reason that rebel groups arise around 
these regions. The rise of ‘black markets’ – unregulated trading environments – is 
common in regions of natural mineral extraction (Kantz, 2008). Thus businesses that 
intend to enter such environments must have a comprehensive plan within their 
strategy process (Nourse et al., 2007). How these unregulated markets are perceived 
would dictate if a company would work within them or not (Collier and Sambanis, 
2005).  
 
The political stability of a country can be a major macro influence in how firms 
formulate their strategy (Stevens et al., 2016; Jia and Mayer, 2017). Darendeli and 
Hill (2016) gained an understanding of how firms could operate within zones of high 
political risk. The study had taken insights from Libya, having experienced political 
repression. As a result, entrepreneurial activity was highly regulated, limiting how 




firms have to incorporate within their strategic plans. Angola is a land rich in oil and 
diamonds (Pearce, 2004; Boge et al., 2006). Since independence, key political parties 
have conflicted on whom should govern the state (Pearce, 2004). Furthermore, many 
have recognised that these political parties have acted upon personal interests 
(Sherman, 2000; Boge et al., 2006). These actions have been directed to gain ease of 
access to the location of natural resources. Hence, the country has suffered civil 
conflict from territorial divide by two major political parties (Sherman, 2000; Boge 
et al., 2006). Sherman (2000) suggests that the international business sector 
strategically supports a political party in these situations to pursue commercial 
interests. International diamond firm De Beers was operating within Angola to 
source their products (Pearce, 2004). Kantz (2008) states that De Beers was 
strategically advantageous due to owning a large market share of the industry. As a 
result, the firm had gained years of market knowledge and built a strong business 
network.  
 
From a meso level of analysis, Doh and Teegen (2002) also recognise that businesses 
could be pressured to change their business actions by NGOs. This is due to NGOs 
operating within the same geographical location or concerned with social regulation 
(such as corruption or human rights). If firm actions obstruct the goals of an NGO, 
the organisation would want to alter the firms’ strategic decisions (Kolk, 2015). 
Within Angola, in 1999, the NGO Global Witness recognised violation of human 
rights in De Beers’ business operations which was not being regulated by the 
national state (Kantz, 2008; Global Witness, 2010). This attracted international 
publicity and applied pressure on De Beers to change their business operation. 
Global Witness and the United Nations established the Kimberly Process in an 
attempt to regulate how diamonds are extracted and sold (Kantz, 2008; Hönke, 
2014).  
 
This example showcases how an NGO can influence the strategic operation of a 
firm. Following the action of the Kimberly Process, De Beers was forced to exit 
Angola opening the market for new firms, such as Russian-based Alrosa (Boge et al., 
2006; Kantz, 2008). Nevertheless, the relationship between firms and non-political 
institutions in conflict zones lacks clarity. Oetzel et al. (2010) have observed that 




analysis further insight is needed to understand the degree to which NGOs can gain 
influential power over MNCs’ underlying principles. It has been claimed that NGOs 
play a positive role in setting guidelines of how MNCs can operate within conflict 
zones (Bieri, 2010), such as the case with Global Witness. However, Cuervo-Cazurra 
(2016) contests that it can be difficult to identify unseen business actions. This is due 
to the characteristics of the regions being unregulated and engaged in insurgency. 
Some regions would have adapted to an informal business process which firms may 
be forced to adhere to, to enter certain markets (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016); for example, 
engaging in bribery to accelerate suppliers and lower overall transaction costs 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016; Gambardella, Birhanu and Valentini, 2016). 
 
Firms are being held accountable for their actions by the public and NGOs (activist 
groups and social regulatory bodies) (Nelson, 2000; Darendeli and Hill, 2016). Many 
NGOs are concentrating their efforts to progress less economically developed 
countries (Spoor, 2005). This is because many NGOs are driven by social cause 
(Kassinis and Vafeas, 2006). Thus, any action within a conflict zone seen to fuel 
conflict or affect the ecological environment can raise the attention of activist 
groups. For example, Greenpeace started a campaign to boycott oil products from 
companies that operated within Nigeria (Boge et al., 2006). It was seen that these 
companies were leaving a negative impact on such countries. The NGO’s pressure 
affected the strategic decision of firms. In this case the International Finance 
Corporation withdrew their funding loan, a partnered venture between the Nigerian 
government and foreign oil investors (Boge et al., 2006). Driffield et al. (2013), 
hence state that firms are more likely to invest in conflict zones with weaker 
institutions.  
 
Though NGOs can influence strategic decisions, there is an argument that their 
influence results in little change due to the nature of some industries (Ballentine and 
Nitzschke, 2005; Hiatt and Sine, 2014). Organisational influence on strategy is 
highly governed by context (Nadkarni and Barr, 2008). As recognised, firms can 
respond differently in operational environments and institutional settings (Arregle et 
al., 2013). For example, within the oil and gas industry, product demand has 
remained high given that NGOs highlight sustainability issues (Grant, 2003). 




NGO due to the necessity of the product. A thought has remained within the industry 
that if a firm were to leave the operational site, a competing firm would inevitability 
replace them (Boge et al., 2006). This was the case when Canadian oil firm Talisman 
exited a conflict zone, Sudan (Boge et al., 2006). Chinese and Indian oil firms soon 
filled the opportunity gap. As a result, NGOs that operated within Sudan had to 
begin the lengthy process to influence the strategy of the new firms’ entrance (Boge 
et al., 2006). Collier and Sambanis (2005) argue that in these scenarios, NGOs would 
have little leverage to influence the new firms’ entrance. Subsequently, Garud, 
Hardy and Maguie (2007) argue that the notion of power is connected to individual 
actors being fundamental agents of change.  
 
At a micro level, in some cases corporations would have to rely on social networks 
to overcome entrance barriers in conflict zones (Darendeli and Hill, 2016). Local 
actors would accept working with foreign firms due to negotiating a mutually 
profitable outcome (Claasen and Roloff, 2012; Scherer et al., 2013). However, this 
can become complex as building ties with a particular group of individuals can 
strengthen or weaken a firm’s legitimacy with other parties involved within the 
conflict (Darendeli and Hill, 2016). Furthermore, this competitive advantage can also 
be seen as an ethical challenge firms must face (Henisz et al., 2010). The notion of 
unethical business practices (such as corruption) can operate at an individual level 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). Hence, for NGOs to be able to influence business strategy 
requires changing the attitudes of influential firm members (Doh and Teegen, 2002). 
However within institutional insight, only certain individual actors possess the 
correct traits to build relationships and influence firms (Leca, Battilana and 
Boxenbaum, 2008; Mtar, 2010). The individual actors within NGOs that possess 
legitimacy and power to influence are not fully recognised (Den Hond et al., 2015). 
This provides rationale to empirically demonstrate which individual actors can 
influence the strategic decision-making from a micro level of analysis. Where firms 
rely on the resilience of senior management to operate in unstable environments 
(Bullough et al., 2014), it is necessary to understand how micro influences can 
equate to macro firm changes (Kouame and Langley, 2018). 
 
As recognised, institutions operating in the same environment as MNCs can 




meso level relationship between MNCs and NGOs, it is worthwhile considering why 
and how NGO institutions emerge in conflict zones. 
 
3.3.1 NGOs emerging within conflict zones 
 
Due to the complications of hostile environments NGOs can emerge in conflict 
zones for several reasons. Firstly an international NGO can emerge within a host 
country due to the necessity to facilitate a social need (Teegen, 2003). For example, 
NGO Cell Life partnered with MNC Vodacom in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo to develop specialised software for HIV patients (Kolk and Lenfant, 2012). 
NGOs can be seen as a bridge between governments, firms and society (Sun, Mellahi 
and Thun, 2010). Many NGOs work within regions of instability for educational 
purposes. Due to weak governing institutions being unable to facilitate social 
welfare, NGOs have partnered with private organisations to fulfil such needs (Kolk 
and Lenfant, 2012). Examples have been HIV awareness (Brammer, Jackson and 
Matten, 2012) or micro-financing (Bruton, Ketchen and Ireland, 2013). 
 
Teegen (2003) elaborates, stating that governmental institutions work to protect the 
public interests. As a result, citizens give up their power in exchange for security, 
economic welfare and public goods (Teegen, 2003). Additionally, Firms interact 
with the public through trade and services (Teegen, 2003). However, failure to fulfil 
positive exchanges can raise social issues. Thus, as well as providing knowledge 
resource, NGOs have been seen to play a protective role towards the public.  
 
Secondly, NGOs can operate within conflict zones to regulate commercial activity 
(Kolk and Lenfant, 2012). As seen within the literature review, some forms of NGOs 
regulate businesses to ensure unethical practices are not used (Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2016). This could be in violation of human rights or ecological damage by firms 
(Vachani et al., 2009). Both of these issues could be unregulated by the local 
government, consequently affecting the welfare of citizens (Doh and Guay, 2006). 
Furthermore, political instability would also contribute to the rise of local and 




the failure of government and firms benefitting at the cost of society, NGOs act in 
the public interest (Teegen, 2003).  
 
Thirdly, a most common reason for NGOs emerging within conflict zones is for 
humanitarian aid (Pache and Santos, 2010). Local interest groups seek intelligence 
from the international community due to the lack of resources and skill set (Teegen, 
2003). As a result, international NGOs entering a conflict zone possess special 
expertise and experience (Kolk and Lenfant, 2012). This could be in resources or 
knowledge of a specific field (Kolk and Lenfant, 2012). Known as transnational 
institutions, international NGOs are usually centralised and managed within a stable 
environment, planning operations to enter unstable situations (Feil, 2012; Marano 
and Kostova, 2015). Humanitarian aid could be in the form of medical assistance as 
well as management of displaced refugees (Askari, 2012; Williams and Shepherd, 
2016). 
 
A relevant example of how NGOs operate in practise can be demonstrated with the 
Kyangwali refugee settlement. Uganda had established the Kyangwali refugee 
settlement for 20,000 refugees (Werker and Ahmed, 2008). The refugees were 
displaced from Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo due to conflict and 
humanitarian crisis (Werker and Ahmed, 2008). The Ugandan government provided 
housing and security while the United Nations Refugee Agency took responsibility 
for welfare. To assist the United Nations, NGOs were funded as partners to carry out 
day-to-day operations directly with the refugees. As Werker and Ahmed (2008) 
showcase, one of the NGOs was ‘Action Africa Health International’ specialising in 
food distribution, environmental management and HIV awareness. This example 
highlights that NGOs are influential institutions due to their knowledge and resource 
factor (Teegen, 2003; Vachani et al., 2009). 
 
NGOs aspire to connect with international governments and firms to seek support in 
financial resources (Galbreath, 2010; Jamali and Mirshak, 2010). Marano and 
Kostova (2015) found that firms could enhance their brand image by working in line 
with NGOs. The notion of firms building relationships with NGOs for strategic gain 
raises questions concerning NGOs’ ability to influence the strategy process. 




officials within developing countries, frequently, financial aid has not reached the 
intended need. The notion of corruption further highlights the necessity to recognise 
how NGOs and MNCs perceive each other in a contextual conflict environment 
questioning legitimacy (Arregle et al., 2013; Darendeli and Hill, 2016). 
 
It has been seen that firm strategy can be influenced by NGOs when operating in 
conflict zones (Kolk and Lenfant, 2012; Teegen et al., 2004; Vachani et al., 2009). 
NGO influence is due to their ability to gain wide support of their social objectives 
(Soule, 2012). However, the degree to which a firm will change its strategic action 
would be dependent on the level of legitimacy and characteristics of industry 
(Claasen and Roloff, 2012). Furthermore, given the nature of this topic, the concept 
of ethics in business has grown beyond industry level becoming of interest to the 
wider community (Kolk, 2015; Land et al., 2014). Therefore, this review must also 
recognise the meaning of ethics when examining businesses in conflict zones.  
 
3.3.2 Ethical considerations when businesses operate in conflict zones 
 
Business ethics has reached a wide spectrum in reviewing what is regarded as correct 
practice in commerce (Oetzel et al., 2010). The essence of ethics has remained to 
recognise what values that firms hold in integrity and responsibility to stakeholders 
(Joyner and Payne, 2002). As Joyner and Payne (2002) elaborate, ethics in strategy 
has particularly been investigated in numerous studies placing importance on moral 
considerations in how firms gain competitive advantage and financial growth. How 
firms define ethics can be questionable particularly in strategic implementation and 
relationships with stakeholders in differing environments (Miles, 2012). As 
recognised above, firms that operate within conflict zones have to make strategic 
decisions concerning how they intend to operate given the complexities and costs of 
conflict.  Similar to cases such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, some 
conflict zones have conspired within countries rich in national resources (Lujala, 
2010). The example of Sierra Leone has shown how conflict can progress into 
international publicity with the on going concern of mineral extraction (Askari, 
2012). The media attention on the diamond industry in Sierra Leone has highlighted 




infrastructure within this country, many have questioned if these diamonds have 
been extracted in an ethical manner, concerning armed rebel groups and violation of 
human rights (Nelson, 2000; Claasen and Roloff, 2012; Berman et al., 2017). For 
this reason, more in recent years, NGOs have been able to influence companies that 
operate within conflict zones understanding the firm’s strategic motive (Kolk and 
Lenfant, 2012). 
 
Land et al. (2014) argue that in some cases firms prefer to stay within the ‘grey area’ 
for ease of return on investment. In other words, some firms would prefer to operate 
within an unclear area of what is regarded as acceptable trading behaviour and 
misconduct raising an ethical contradiction. It is for this reason that many institutions 
such as international governing bodies and activist groups are motivated to change 
the attitudes of businesses (Teegen et al., 2004). Cuervo-Cazurra (2016) argues that 
firms must contemplate upon their strategic intervention when deciding to operate 
within adverse conditions. Studies have shown that ethical considerations within the 
strategy process of firms are governed by individual principles, where actors define 
their sense of responsibility (Branzei et al., 2004). Moreover, it has been seen that 
the social behaviour of senior members in the firm can influence the formation of the 
strategy process, in turn dictating the degree of ethical considerations and social 
responsibility (Bromiley and Rau, 2015). Branzei et al. (2004) and Bromiley and 
Rau’s (2015) findings suggest that ethics needs to be incorporated from a micro 
perspective to be categorised into macro firm level processes. NGOs’ collaborative 
activities with firms would hence benefit on a multilevel platform, encouraging 
partnership values with influential firm actors (Kolk and Lenfant, 2012). This further 
highlights the need to understand the multilevel phenomena of organisational 
influence, where micro level activities are fundamental to change macro level 
processes (Kouame and Langley, 2018).  
 
Given the external pressures, companies have incorporated socially aware values 
within their organisational ethos (Husted et al., 2015; Idemudia, 2010). However, it 
has been argued that firm’s social initiatives are to save brand identity rather than 
benefit society (Claasen and Roloff, 2012). By engaging in socially responsible 
activities a firm can reduce the risk of buyers switching to competitors (Namaki, 




to the positive reinforcement the brands will gain. Subsequently, studies have also 
emphasised firms have a responsibility to positively influence the environments in 
which they operate (Branzei and Abdelnour, 2010; Hönke, 2014; Oetzel et al., 2010). 
From these standpoints, terms such as ‘peace through commerce’ have entered the 
management literature (Driffield et al., 2013; Ford, 2015). Commercial activity has 
the ability to eliminate the economic and social costs of conflict (Katsos and 
AlKafaji, 2017). Katsos and AlKafaji (2017) elaborate that given the economic 
importance to a region firms can also promote peace through informal diplomacy. 
This would be in the interests of the firm, given the complexity of strategy planning 
in turbulent environments (Grant, 2003). However, firms would have to engage with 
ethical intentions for peace through commerce to be successful (Ford, 2015). 
 
To summarise this section, business in conflict zones increases strategic complexity 
due to multiple players and constant change. In some cases, firms have to build a 
social network to overcome high political regulation (Darendeli and Hill, 2016). 
Firms within certain industries are also required to enter conflict-prone regions to 
extract their product. Due to the lucrativeness of natural minerals, conflict of 
ownership can arise, exposing commercial activity to rebel groups and political ties. 
This has raised questions of legitimacy and ethics. Business operation in conflict 
zones has subsequently attracted NGOs, questioning firm integrity. NGOs have also 
requested support from businesses in social welfare due to the costs incurred through 
conflict. Local interest groups and NGOs have therefore influenced firm strategic 
decisions. Context can change how firms approach their operational environment 
and incorporate the institutional setting (Arregle et al., 2013). The complications of 
operating in conflict zones and institutional pressure subsequently question the 
contextual impact on the strategy process. The next section will review the strategy 
process in conflict zones. 
 
3.4 Integrating Conflict Zone Planning to the Strategy Process 
 
Chapter two highlighted the underpinnings of the strategy process and developed a 
conceptual framework. From understanding the meaning of conflict and how conflict 




strategy process from a macro perspective. Fragmenting the macro firm level process 
can provide understanding of where and how NGOs can influence at a meso level of 
analysis. Successively, it is possible to examine the micro phenomena of individual 
actors who can change the process. Contextualising the strategy process begins with 
the first step.   
 
3.4.1 Step one - Situational Analysis 
 
Within the first segment of the process, a firm would carry out a situational analysis. 
Given the environmental context of conflict zones, Grant (2003) emphasises the 
necessity of planning. Planning can prepare a firm for what to expect when operating 
within different external environments (Phadnis, Caplice, Sheffim, and Singh, 2015). 
When considering business operation within a conflict-prone region, it can be 
beneficial to first assess at what stage the conflict is positioned (Woocher, 2009). As 
recognised earlier in Woocher's (2009) curve of conflict, a region can experience 
different degrees of turmoil. Therefore, when conducting an analysis of the 
environmental context, assessing the stage of conflict would support consideration of 
whether to enter a region (Driffield et al., 2013).  
 
In similar discussion, at this stage a firm would also need to understand the demands 
of the external environment they are considering to enter (Grant, 2003). For conflict 
zones, firms would need to understand how business operates differently, as 
recognised earlier within the review; for example, understanding how firms can gain 
access to certain locations and fulfilling regulations (Sherman, 2000). Oil and gas 
firms give thorough attention to this part of the strategy process (Grant, 2003). 
Additionally, firms also need to balance the local demands from the host country 
within their organisational goals (Hitt, Li and Xu, 2016), particularly where firms 
want to avoid external pressure from the local community (Kraemer, Whiteman and 
Banerjee, 2013) or ecological interest groups (Bowen, Bansal and Slawinski, 2018). 
 
Sarkis et al. (2010) state that in these planning stages, a firm would also need to 
assess external stakeholders and the impact they could have upon the business’s 




suppliers (Delmas and Toffel, 2008; Dai et al., 2013). Additionally, firms would 
need to forecast reaction from global and local competitors (Claasen and Roloff, 
2012). Entering a new region could prompt not only competing firms to respond 
(Meyer and Thein, 2014) but also local organisations associated with the conflict 
(Ramos and Ashby, 2013). However, it can be difficult to predict the impact of 
stakeholders due to the constant change of events in turbulent environments (Abadie 
and Gardeazabal, 2008). Unable to fully assess stakeholders can increase business 
risk for firms (Murillo-Luna et al., 2008). It is for this reason that firms conduct 
scenario planning within their situational analysis stage (Grant, 2003; Phadnis et al., 
2015).  
 
Scenario planning allows a firm to remain adaptable in turbulent environments by 
drawing upon several potential outcomes (Phadnis et al., 2015). Whittington et al. 
(2017) state that strategy teams are making more use of scenario planning. This is 
due to the expansion of the firm’s organisational locations and working in adverse 
conditions. Jamali and Mirshak (2010) support this notion through their qualitative 
research with MNC managers operating in Lebanon. By incorporating the risks of 
political instability in different regions of the country, managers were able to 
strategically plan their course of action. Although many managers admitted that their 
planning had not prepared them for when the country experienced war in 2006. 
Analysing and planning to enter the environmental context could highlight an 
increase of resources (Husted et al., 2016). Failure to recognise the necessary capital 
and infrastructure needed could result in losing vast amounts of investments (Ansoff 
and Sullivan, 1993; Whittington et al., 2017). Consequently, a thorough assessment 
needs to be carried out concerning whether a firm can withstand the increase of not 
only financial cost but also social cost due to conflict (Anderson et al., 2010). 
 
As recognised earlier in the chapter, operating within a conflict zone increases the 
need for ethical considerations (Lujala, 2010; Berman et al., 2017). As Idemudia 
(2010) expresses, firms must be cautious when selecting their strategy to insure that 
they do not contribute to the conflict. Therefore, a consideration of ethics is a 
necessary contribution to the strategic context when firms review the direction in 





3.4.2 Step two - Formulation 
 
Following a situational analysis, the formulation of strategy can be based on industry 
experience. Farjoun (2002) states that strategy formulation is exposed to external 
influences. Which external influence that can affect a firm’s strategic decision is 
dependent upon the degree of legitimacy (Henisz and Zelner, 2005; Scherer, Palazzo 
and Seidl, 2013). As Drori and Honig (2013) highlight, firms form a cognitive filter 
as a method of legitimisation. The nature of conflict can attract external influences 
different to those of a stable economy, such as human rights regulatory organisations 
(Desivilya and Yassour-Borochowitz, 2008). Thus, within the formulation stage, a 
firm would need to recognise the strength of an external influence prior to 
implementing strategy, incorporating their views beforehand. Kassinis and Vafeas 
(2006) highlight that a firm would be forced to change its actions if certain external 
influences are underestimated. This could potentially cost time (Galbreath, 2010), 
finance and brand image (Kantz, 2008; Meyer and Thein, 2014).  
 
Kraemer et al. (2013) demonstrate a meso level of analysis, reviewing the change of 
influential power in strategic decision-making due to NGOs. MNC Vedanta 
Resources had begun operations to extract bauxite in Niyamgiri, North India. Plans 
were created without including the views of local stakeholders. Sharing the same 
region as a small tribal habitat, business operation was harming their lifestyle by 
contaminating their source of water and damaging their ecology. As a result, local 
residents, local government and NGOs Action Aid and Survival International created 
an anti-corporate social movement. Despite the consistent attempt to change the 
firm’s strategic decision, business operations carried on for many years. Action Aid 
was able to bring awareness of the situation to the international community by 
designating a key spokesman to report their findings. This contributed to Vedanta 
Resources losing a large investment, which had a negative impact on their brand 
image.  
 
In further examination, from a micro level of analysis it has been seen that individual 
activism can influence firms’ decisions, particularly when mobilised into social 
movements (Rao, Morrill and Zald, 2000). This is because an individual can become 




2012; Kraemer et al., 2013). Individual activism was also shown to influence 
Vedanta Resources with the rise of a local tribal youth activist named Jika (Kraemer 
et al., 2013). Studies have recognised however, that firms can strategically react to 
such external pressures by engaging in ‘astroturfing’; the ability to disguise actions 
with social initiatives and appear to have gained local support organically (Soule, 
2012; Kraemer et al., 2013). With the case of Vedanta Resources, after many years 
speaking against the firm, Jika had suddenly taken a change of action siding with the 
company. Jika had started speaking positively of the firm’s actions. The study could 
not establish a reason as to why Jika had changed sides (Kraemer et al., 2013). 
Nevertheless, Cuervo-Cazurra (2016) highlights how this context of study can be 
difficult to fully understand due to the sensitivity of the matter and corporate covert 
practices. Research is limited into which individual actors within NGOs can 
influence firm strategy (Galbreath, 2010; Oetzel and Getz, 2012) providing further 
rationale to understand the micro level phenomena. 
 
The importance of NGO collaboration within the formulation of strategy has been 
recognised (Kolk and Lenfant, 2012). If NGOs can gain an understanding of the 
firm’s need to enter a conflict zone they can positively engage (Teegen et al., 2004). 
As firms possess the ability to create sustainable peace in conflict zones, NGOs can 
work in line sharing resources and knowledge (Oetzel et al., 2010). However, as seen 
earlier within the review many cases show NGOs disagreeing with the actions of 
firms and thus they tend to change their actions. Additionally, the way firms respond 
to conflict can also change dependent upon the scenario (Oetzel and Getz, 2012). 
Therefore, a contextual application is needed to comprehend a specific phenomenon 
(Cordeiro and Tewari, 2014). 
 
3.4.3 Step three and four - Implementation and Evaluation 
 
As recognised in chapter two, the way in which firms implement their strategy would 
involve undertaking a set of activities to execute their plan (Wheelen and Hunger, 
2012). The Implementation step of the strategy process can be a standalone field of 
study due to the need of precession (Lee and Puranam, 2015). Jamali and Mirshak 




conflict. These could be taken into consideration during the implementation of 
strategy. Table 3.1 highlights possible engagement strategies. 
 
Table 3.1: Forms of business engagement in conflict zones 
 
Engagement Strategies Description 
Advantage strategy 
Taking advantage of the economic 
opportunities of war 
Withdrawal strategy Exiting the conflict location 
Business as usual strategy 
Abiding by the new social constructs and 
fluctuations in legal regulation 
Proactive engagement strategy 
Contribution to public security, peace 
building and social initiatives 
 
Adapted from Wolf, Deitelhoff and Engert (2007). 
 
Table 3.1 provides a basic overview of options available for a firm within a conflict 
zone. Nevertheless, Jamali and Mirshak (2010) and Wolf et al. (2007) recognise that 
these strategic choices do not fully reflect strategy-in-practice. This is due to many 
factors that would contribute to the strategic decision such as the degree of conflict 
and available resources. Nevertheless, research has contributed to some of these 
basic strategies (Boge et al., 2006; Meyer and Thein, 2014; Nelson, 2000). Each 
study highlights how firms change their strategic implementation within conflict 
zones. For example, American oil firms Texaco and Arco decided to withdraw from 
Myanmar (formerly Burma) due to economic instability (Nelson, 2000). However, 
Boge et al. (2006) emphasise that some firms withdraw from a conflict zone 
unwillingly due to external pressure from interest groups. Arco was forced to leave 
Myanmar after facing strong pressure from activist NGO ‘Free Burma Coalition’ 
(Meyer and Thein, 2014). As a result of this external pressure, Arco’s business 
declined, not being able to regain their $55 million investment on the project (Meyer 
and Thein, 2014). 
 
Oetzel and Getz's (2012) study recognises the high cost incurred for firms to 
withdraw at the break of conflict. The findings from the study suggest that it would 
be in the firm’s best interest to proactively engage in and contribute to peace-




and hosting negotiations with conflicting parties. An American oil mining company 
utilised this strategy to bring together two political parties, African National 
Congress and the South African government, between 1984 and 1990. Negotiations 
were eventually agreed in Zambia (Oetzel and Getz, 2012; Oetzel et al., 2010). 
These examples show that firms would need to assess which engagement strategy 
works best in responding to the external environment, whether being caught amidst 
the reason of conflict or institutional pressure. These decisions would need to be 
incorporated alongside the firm’s strategy implementation activities.  
 
Following an implementation of strategy it was seen that firms move to Evaluation, 
examining their performance and stakeholder review. From a meso level of analysis, 
within conflict zones firms are exposed to institutional pressures from NGOs, 
thereby questioning firm integrity (Kolk and Lenfant, 2012). Hence, firms need to 
prepare for external interruption from multiple stakeholders (Sarkis et al., 2010). 
Some reasons as to why an NGO would want to intervene have been recognised, 
such as disputes (Feil, 2012) or peace-building activities (Hönke, 2014; Katsos and 
Forrer, 2014). An evaluation of the stakeholder review would support a firm in the 
earlier planning stages, enhancing their strategy (Farjoun, 2002; Grant, 2003). Other 
external groups that operate within a conflict environment would also threaten the 
business activity (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008).  
 
Groups such as terrorist organisations can increase business risk (Chen and Siems, 
2004). Guidolin and La Ferrara (2010) state that these risks could evolve within the 
Evaluation stage of the strategy process, forcing the firm back to the planning stages 
to re-formulate. Though many firms within conflict zones are not direct targets of 
conflict, operating in close proximity can lead to a change in strategic decision 
(Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008). Research by Dai et al. (2013) suggests that a firm’s 
decision to ‘stay or exit’ from a conflict zone would be dependent upon the level of 
threat they would receive. Thus, a firm needs to evaluate the impact of specific 
stakeholders (Husted et al., 2016). These insights in turn could inform different 
stages of the strategy process, such as deciding an engagement strategy in response 
to an external demand (Jamali and Mirshak, 2010). In gaining feedback from the 





It has been argued that the firm’s capability to absorb sudden shocks such as terror 
attacks is linked to the firm’s extensive experience in such environments (Darendeli 
and Hill, 2016). Research has also shown that the negative effects of terrorism can 
span wide geographical areas (Oh and Oetzel, 2017). Czinkota et al. (2010) show 
how international business has become a more attractive target, affecting business 
operations directly and indirectly. During conflict, firms’ ability to prolong their stay 
is dependent upon firm resilience (Dai et al., 2017). Though the degree of conflict 
may vary by area, it is possible that a whole region can be affected. Thus, firms are 
more cautious when investing in conflict-prone regions such as the Middle East and 
North Africa (The World Bank, 2011). Hitt, Li and Xu (2016) argue that research on 
how MNCs respond to terror attacks still lacks sufficient insight. Nonetheless, due to 
the constant change of conflict zones firms would have to re-evaluate their position 
several times in order to survive (Jamali and Mirshak, 2010). As a result, with real-
time information gained in the evaluation stage, firms would need to repeat the 
strategy process more frequently (Farjoun, 2002). Bullough et al. (2014) state that by 
continuous learning of how to operate within adverse conditions firms could 
eventually build entrepreneurial resilience to a region. 
 
To summarise this section, Figure 3.2 illustrates the development to the conceptual 
strategy process framework seen in chapter two. The macro level of analysis focuses 
on the firm, understanding changes to the strategy process. By setting this macro 
platform, it was possible to understand the impact of NGO influence at a meso level 
and individuals involved at a micro level of analysis. Within the Situational analysis 
step of the process, the literature has shown the impact of a conflict zone, 
represented as the environmental context. A firm would first benefit by recognising 
the stage of conflict that a region is experiencing (Woocher, 2009). Assessing the 
stage of conflict would support consideration concerning whether to enter a region 
(Driffield et al., 2013). A firm would also need to understand the demands of the 
external environment (Grant, 2003) as well as assessing external stakeholders that 
could impact business operations (Sarkis et al., 2010). To assist organisations to 
prepare for the constant change of events in turbulent environments, firms conduct 
scenario planning (Phadnis et al., 2015). Due to these considerations in the 
environmental context, firms need to ensure that they can withstand the increase in 




ethics is a necessary contribution to the strategic context when firms review the 
direction in which they intend to move.  
 
Subsequently, the Formulation step of the strategy process recognises external 
influences on strategic decision-making. However, the degree to which this affects 
strategic decisions would be dependent upon firm-based legitimacy (Henisz and 
Zelner, 2005; Scherer et al., 2013). Firms are not only subjected to influence from 
NGOs (Kolk and Lenfant, 2012), but also local demands (Gimbert et al., 2010) and 
terror groups (Czinkota et al., 2010). Therefore, firms have an internal legitimacy 
filter to weigh importance and threat levels against firm strategy. Additionally, the 
literature has contributed to the Implementation step showcasing different 
engagement strategies a firm could use in response to conflict arising. Given these 
insights, the literature has partially informed an understanding of how a conflict 










3.5 Limitations in the Strategy Process Literature 
 
In understanding the underpinnings of the strategy process, it was evident that 
contextual application was necessary (Shepherd and Rudd, 2014). This is because 
several functions of the strategy process are governed by the environmental context 
(Nadkarni and Barr, 2008). Therefore, to gain clarity this chapter has attempted to 
integrate insight of how businesses operate in conflict zones into the strategy process 
framework. In conclusion, three keys areas remained unclear, which this thesis aimed 
to address. 
 
Firstly, there was a limitation on the macro perspective in contextualising a firm’s 
strategy process for conflict zones. It was noted that conflict zones could complicate 
business operations due to instability increasing risk for investment (Driffield et al., 
2013; Berman et al., 2017). As a result Floyd and Lane (2000) argue that firms need 
to create a comprehensive plan within the strategy process. However, there appeared 
to be an empirical limitation to understand how the strategy process changes within a 
conflict zone. The literature was vague in describing which key indicators firms 
utilise when considering entering an area of instability. The business management 
literature shows how firms react to violent conflict (Jamali and Mirshak, 2010; 
Oetzel and Getz, 2012) and respond to institutional demands (Delmas and Toffel, 
2008). However, these contextual findings have been ignored within the strategy 
process narrative with regard to how the process changes. Additionally, within 
unstable geographical environments, strategy planning is increased due to 
sustainability arguments (Kolk, 2015), regulation (Desivilya and Yassour-
Borochowitz, 2008) and pressure to engage in social aid (Oetzel et al., 2010). 
Therefore, when contextualising the strategy process to conflict zones, literature had 
also not acknowledged the placement of institutions. Where the literature had 
partially informed a conceptual strategy process framework for conflict zones, 
further empirical enquiry was necessary to ascertain which indicators firms use in 
planning.  
 
Secondly, on a meso level of analysis there appeared to be limitations in recognising 




strategy process. The literature shows that NGOs possess the ability to influence firm 
strategy and, in certain scenarios, MNCs benefiting by partnering with NGOs (Doh 
and Teegen, 2002; Henisz and Zelner, 2005; Stevens et al., 2016). However, it was 
vague as to how external organisations could pass the legitimacy filter shown within 
the conceptual framework and gain power to obstruct the firm’s underlying 
principles. Institutional theoretical explanation was required to understand these 
external influences on strategy (Whittington, 2007; Den Hond et al, 2015). 
 
Finally, the strategy process literature needed further development to understand 
individual actors at a micro level of analysis (Burgelman et al., 2018). It can be seen 
that external influences can affect strategic decision-making within the Formulation 
and Evaluation phases. Individual actors, who possess differing values to the firm, 
have the ability to mobilise social movements in turn influencing firm strategy (Rao 
et al., 2000). However, it was not clear as to which individual actors within NGOs 
have the ability to pass firm legitimacy filters and enter strategy-making discussions. 
Institutional theoretical dimensions were therefore also needed to provide direction 




The purpose of this chapter was to gain an understanding of the impact conflict zones 
have on business and the strategy process. A conflict zone was defined as an area of 
war, insurgency or lawlessness (Anderson et al., 2010). From a macro perspective, 
the main costs of conflict were economic, political and social (Hoeffler and Reynal-
Querol, 2003). The business narrative has associated the term ‘turbulent’ to an 
external environment that possess consistent change and instability (Grant, 2003). To 
overcome instability, firms have had to adapt their business practices (Darendeli and 
Hill, 2016). This raised questions of legitimacy and ethics (Kantz, 2008; Bieri, 2010). 
To integrate the insights of business operations in conflict zones, the conceptual 
strategy process framework had been developed.  
 
Within the Situational analysis step of the process, the literature shows the impact of 




by recognising the stage of conflict a region is experiencing (Woocher, 2009). 
Furthermore, a firm would also need to understand the demands of the external 
environment (Grant, 2003) as well as assessing external stakeholders that could 
impact business operations (Sarkis et al., 2010). Additionally, scenario planning was 
included as firms plan for potential events (Phadnis et al., 2015). Given these 
considerations, firms need to ensure that they can withstand the increase in costs due 
to conflict. Furthermore, ethical considerations were shown necessary to be included 
within the strategic context. The Formulation step of the strategy process illustrates 
that external influences have to pass a firm legitimacy filter. Firms are not only 
subjected to influence from NGOs (Kolk and Lenfant, 2012), but also local demands 
(Gimbert et al., 2010) and terror groups (Czinkota et al., 2010). Therefore, firms have 
an internal legitimacy filter to weigh importance. Moreover, the literature shows the 
different engagement strategies firms could use in response to conflict arising, 
represented within the Implementation phase.  
 
Three limitations of literature were articulated. Firstly, though the business 
management literature has partially informed the conceptual framework, it was not 
fully clear as to how the strategy process changes within a conflict context; 
particularly when understanding which key indicators firms utilise when considering 
to enter an area of instability and placement of institutions. Secondly, there was a 
limitation in the strategy process narrative to recognise how non-political institutions, 
such as NGOs, can pass the legitimacy filter and gain power to join the strategy-
making discussion. Finally, further development was needed to recognise micro 
actors that influence the strategy process. Institutional theoretical insight is needed to 
understand the phenomena of organisational influence on strategy (Peng, 2003; 
Whittington, 2007; Den Hond et al., 2015). The next chapter introduces the 









AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE:  




This chapter introduces the theoretical lens, which can be applied to NGOs’ 
influence on firm strategy. The aim of this study was to understand how the strategy 
process is influenced by social institutions within an unstable context. The previous 
two chapters of this literature review have analysed the strategy process, which is 
further applied to the context of conflict zones. As recognised, theoretical insight is 
needed to understand the phenomena of organisational influence (Delmas and Toffel, 
2008; Banerjee and Venaik, 2017). With regions becoming increasingly crowded 
with organisations, firms are constantly influenced by stakeholders (Askari, 2012; 
Cordeiro and Tewari, 2014). It is therefore important to understand the complexity of 
organisational influence with the use of a theoretical framework that can explain this 
phenomenon.   
 
Institutional theory has been identified as an appropriate theoretical lens to 
understand NGO influence on business strategy (Teegen, 2003; Vachani et al., 2009; 
Zald and Lounsbury, 2010). North (1990: 3) states that institutions can be understood 
most generally as “the rules of the game”. This adds relevance to the study of NGOs 
due to their ability to set guidelines to a wider community within an operational 
environment (Werker and Ahmed, 2008); for example, social movements 
encouraging mutually beneficial trade deals with suppliers in developing countries 
(Dahan et al., 2010) or regulating corruption (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). Key concepts 
within institutional theory can facilitate an understanding of a NGO’s ability to 
influence firms such as legitimacy and power (Bitektine, 2011; Hudson et al., 2015). 
Examining these concepts is important in order to comprehend how organisations 






From macro level analysis, it is seen that firms establish an internal cognitive 
legitimacy filter within the strategy process (Drori and Honig, 2013). In fragmenting 
the strategy process, the meso level of analysis recognises a link between firms and 
institutional organisations (Jackson and Deeg, 2008). This is particularly the case 
where firms are exposed to external influences in the Formulation and Evaluation 
stages. Hence, the objective of this chapter is to highlight the theoretical literature 
that informs this study by reviewing how institutions can pass firm filters at the meso 
level phenomenon. In connection, the review progresses to understand the impact of 
individual actors within organisations at a micro level (Battilana et al., 2009).  
 
Understanding the nature of organisational influence requires an assessment of key 
institutional theoretical concepts and the link between them (Suddaby et al., 2017). 
This chapter will begin by establishing a definition of institutional theory followed 
by a theoretical understanding of NGOs as institutions. The subsequent section will 
then review theoretical concepts of legitimacy, power and actors to explain 
organisational influence. The chapter closes by articulating the limitations of 
institutional theory.  
 
4.2 Defining Institutions and Understanding Institutional Theory  
 
The terms ‘institutions’ and ‘institutional theory’ have grown within the strategic 
management literature (Ang et al, 2015; Berrone et al., 2013). The theory has gained 
attention, particularly over the past three decades, as an approach to understand 
organisations. Recent literature has seen that organisations have interacted with one 
another more frequently (Rodríguez-Pose, 2013). Organisations include trading 
firms, governmental bodies, and interest groups (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). 
Furthermore, Teegen et al. (2004) state that these organisations connect more within 
complex contextual environments, such as conflict zones. This highlights the 
importance of understanding why and how organisations influence one another.  
 
Selznick's (1948) study of organisations recognises the formal rules created by 
groups within society. These formal constructs include legal systems aimed to 




given responsibilities, directed to achieve a collective agreed purpose (Selznick, 
1948). The term ‘institutions’ within organisational studies became more apparent in 
later literature (North, 1990). This was because the field of study initially did not 
account for the social setting (Selznick, 1996). Successfully, the past three decades 
have advanced in the study of organisations into institutional theory (Doh and Guay, 
2006). 
 
North's (1990: 3) simple analogy of institutions as “rules of the game” provides a 
basic but clear explanation. This statement has been interpreted as a setting of rules 
and regulations which ‘players’ of the game – such as firms – would have to abide by 
(Peng, 2003). North (1991) further progresses to highlight how institutions create 
both formal and informal constraints, which determine social behaviour. For 
example, institutions can create constitutions and laws (formal constraints) as well as 
taboos, customs and codes of conduct (informal constraints) (North, 1991). This 
coincides with Oliver’s (1991) understanding of institutions as regulatory structures, 
such as governmental bodies and legal systems. These characterisations suggest that 
institutions are structured bodies initiated by social intervention.  
 
Given the themes demonstrated in these perspectives, an appropriate definition of 
institutions is “regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that 
provide stability and meaning to social behaviour” (Scott, 1995: 33). Hence, 
institutions play an influential role in determining what is accepted as social 
behaviours (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Scott’s (1995) definition argues how 
institutions have three ‘pillars’. The first regulative pillar describes institutions as 
enforcement mechanisms, establishing formal rules such as laws (North, 1990). 
Examples of a regulative institution include national government bodies, each setting 
rules as per their country’s economic and social requirements (Bruton et al., 2010). 
The second normative pillar is based on morality and ideal social norms (Scott, 
1995). Normative institutional influences can derive from professional organisations 
aiming to set standards for a certain group of members (Scott, 2005). For example 
NGOs encouraging firms to reduce their pollution, in return gaining an 
environmental accreditation (Berrone et al., 2013). The third cognitive pillar refers to 
taken-for-granted beliefs (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). A cognitive stance describes 




could therefore be different between individuals, questioning relevance and need for 
compliance (Abdelnour, Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2017). These three pillars 
demonstrate how institutions can operate. Analysing institutions can provide a 
clearer perspective of an institutional setting, which can dictate strategic behaviour 
for firms (Martin, 2014). An assessment of how institutions operate has therefore 
contributed to the development of a theoretical framework.  
 
The early review of organisations focuses on the regulation of society through formal 
systems (Selznick, 1948). Selznick (1996) later categorises these insights as old 
institutionalism. The beginning of modern institutionalism arose by questioning how 
these formal organisations work in line with social rules (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) attempt to explain this, depicting an understanding where 
by organisations have become ‘institutionalised’. Institutionalisation involves “social 
processes, obligations, or actualities that come to take on a rule-like status in social 
thought and action” (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 341). In other words, organisations 
have generated a systematic approach to administration with orderly, stable processes 
(Selznick, 1996). This coincides with North (1990), who states the term ‘institution’, 
referring to a set of formal rules. These rules such as regulatory structures and laws 
can administer conformance pressures within an organisation (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983). However, Selznick (1996) reiterates that institutions also possess informal 
norms in the way they operate, highlighting the social intervention of new-
institutionalism. This can be seen particularly with an individual’s power relations 
(Tolbert and Zucker, 1996) and internal or external relationship building (Ang et al., 
2015; Oliver, 1991). To gain a comprehensive understanding of institutions, further 
empirical enquiries can benefit from a multilevel assessment understanding the 
macro, meso and micro phenomena of influence (Hitt et al., 2007; Bitektine and 
Haack, 2015).  
 
New or Neo-institutional theory suggests that organisations are influenced in their 
strategies by their institutional setting (Doh and Guay, 2006). An institutional setting 
establishes the rules and norms by which organisations have to abide (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1983). Scott (2014) reiterates showing that institutional theory is centralised 
around how institutions provide an authoritative guideline for social behaviour. 




interest groups such as NGOs (Zald and Lounsbury, 2010). Organisations such as 
firms would therefore have to operate within the means set by the institutions. 
However, in an environment with many organisations each can be influential to one 
another (Vachani et al., 2009).  
 
Baur and Arenas (2014) argue that some organisations would be more influential 
than others. Given the nature of this thesis, it is important to also recognise that 
countries with weak government institutions cannot fully regulate activity within 
their country (Addison, 2003). As a result, the rise of unethical business practices 
such as corruption have risen (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). NGOs have become social 
regulatory bodies in such situations (Hudson, 2001). This example raises the 
discussion of how institutional theory has developed concepts to understand how 
firms recognise and respond to organisations such as NGOs. However, prior to 
examining a theoretical perspective of influencing firm strategy, is can be beneficial 
to understand a theoretical perspective of NGOs as institutions. Contextual 
applications can provide platforms to support discussion of theoretical concepts 
(Michailova, 2011; Welter, 2011).  
 
To summarise this section, institutions are systems which dictate social behaviour 
through formal and informal constructs (North, 1991). Organisations that operate 
within the institutional setting have to abide by the rules established by institutions 
(Oliver, 1991). Scott (1995) categorises institutions into regulatory, normative and 
cognitive pillars. Each pillar represents how the institution operates either through 
legal mechanisms, ideal social norms and accreditation or internalised values. 
Institutional theory has grown within strategic management narratives, recognising 
some complexities between firm strategy and NGOs (Ang et al., 2015; Berrone et al., 
2013). The institutional setting for MNCs has become complex due to the rise of 
non-market external pressures (Vachani et al., 2009). These external pressures could 
have risen due to firms overseeing rules and norms set by institutions (Baur and 
Arenas, 2014). To understand this phenomenon of organisational influence, further 
empirical enquiries can benefit from a multilevel analysis (Hitt et al., 2007). The 
developed concepts within institutional theory can support an understanding of how 




However, prior to examining a theoretical perspective of organisational influence, 
understanding NGOs as institutions can provide a contextual background.  
 
4.3 Theoretical Understanding of NGOs as Institutions  
 
NGOs can be seen as institutions (Doh and Teegen, 2002; Hollensbe et al., 2014) 
because they possess the ability to set a social rule (Zald and Lounsbury, 2010) and 
bridge the public and private sectors together (Teegen, 2003). For different causes, 
NGOs favour societal objectives rather than commercial interests (Werker and 
Ahmed, 2008; Hollensbe et al., 2014). Werker and Ahmed (2008) elaborate, stating 
that NGOs operate for a social service. This is aligned with Teegen’s (2003) 
understanding that NGOs facilitate exchanges to add value within society. With 
reference to Scott’s (1995) institutional pillars, NGOs can therefore be seen to take a 
normative or cognitive approach. As NGOs are non-political institutions, a normative 
approach would aim to regulate activity through professional accreditation and 
education such as the World Bank, World Trade Organisation or the Fair-trade 
movement (Dacin, Goodstein and Scott, 2002; Porter and Kramer, 2011). 
Alternately, cognitive NGOs would function with culturally-based beliefs and social 
expectations such as promoting standards in business ethics or humanitarian work 
(Rauh, 2010; Baur and Arenas, 2014). These social expectations are fundamentally 
targeted to an individual level of activity (Cordeiro and Tewari, 2014). Hence, NGO 
influence on firms can be recognised at the meso level, as well as the impact on 
individuals at the micro level. Recognising these two classifications of NGOs 
(normative and cognitive) can provide direction to which types of organisations 
could influence firm strategy. However, Kantz (2008) also shows that some NGOs 
aim to influence governmental bodies (regulative pillar) to achieve their goal. Hence, 
empirical investigations on organisational influence would need to take into account 
NGOs’ motives and recognise the different methods to influence firm strategy.   
 
Recognising the increasing strength of NGOs, firms are becoming more cautious in 
their strategic action and selecting their institutional setting (Arregle et al., 2013). 
Den Hond et al. (2015) show that firms have been provoked by NGOs to cooperate 




trusted by society, they can represent social movements (Hollensbe et al., 2014; 
Friedland, 2018). These social movements have the ability to influence business 
operation as well as change the brand image of organisations through their 
investigations (Vachani et al., 2009; Lu et al., 2013). Therefore, firms have started to 
recognise the efficiency to utilise the NGO’s resources within their strategic 
implementation rather than ignoring the NGO’s cause (Den Hond et al., 2015).  
 
The concept of social movements has emerged within neo-institutionalism 
(Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2008). Schneiberg and Lounsbury (2008) have 
attempted to showcase how institutions such as NGOs have been classified as 
infrastructures of change. In other words, social movements are institutional forces, 
which aim to regulate how other organisations operate, for example, environmental 
interest groups (Baur and Arenas, 2014). Battilana et al. (2009) suggest that social 
movements gain authority through collective mobilisation, where many individuals 
share the same interests. Prior studies attempt to examine the impact of collective 
power gained through social movements on business functions (Rao et al., 2000). For 
example, Suddaby, Cooper and Greenwood (2007) show how NGOs, though not 
being able to enforce legal restrictions, could influence international trade deals. It 
was recognised that socially based influences would benefit operating at multiple 
levels. Influencing governmental authority could change macro firm level processes, 
further benefiting challengers to stimulate change at an individual level (Davis and 
Greve, 1997; Vogus and Davis, 2005). Hence, NGOs can be recognised as operating 
at the meso level, bridging macro and micro activities.   
 
In showcasing the advances in the institutional literature, Greenwood et al. (2008: 
24) still advocate that institutional work has remained “stubbornly silent” on social 
power. Therefore, further investigation into NGOs as a research subject would 
develop theoretical understanding on influencing firm strategy; particularly where 
interest has grown to understand the complex relationship of organisations and their 
institutional context (Greenwood et al., 2017). 
 
As seen within a conflict context, NGOs enforce a social expectation upon firms who 
may be seen to violate international expectation (Claasen and Roloff, 2012). This has 




human rights) (Claasen and Roloff, 2012; Idemudia, 2010). Institutional theory has 
explored transnational institutionalism within globalisation (Fremeth and Shaver, 
2013). It has been argued that institutions take on the responsibility to govern 
activity, which may breach social expectation (Hudson, 2001). The motive to 
regulate is seen with NGOs, particularly due to their socially driven objectives. 
Berrone et al. (2013) argue that governmental bodies must exert regulatory pressure. 
Conversely, Meyer and Thein (2014) contest highlighting governments can only 
enforce a certain level of regulation. Other interest groups would need to also apply 
pressure to set the social expectation (Den Hond et al., 2015). For example, the 
energy firm Enron faced challenges when building their electricity factory in India, 
as they did not incorporate the views of local stakeholders (Cummings and Doh, 
2000). Through external pressure and change of government, Enron had to revise 
their building plans in line with governmental regulations, working with 
representatives of farmers and ecologists. This example provides further rationale to 
apply institutional theoretical concepts to NGOs due to their strength as an external 
influence on firm strategy. An institutional setting can be created by legal systems 
(regulative pillar) and NGOs, which could take a normative or cognitive approach 
(Scott, 2005). These institutions regulate some aspect of society (Teegen, 2003). 
Peng (2003) articulates that institutions therefore would shape the strategic entry for 
FDI. NGOs could influence firm strategy by questioning business operations, which 
may not be in line with social expectations.  
 
Within conflict zones, it has been seen that due to weak governing bodies, firms and 
governments have been able to operate against social expectation, engaging in 
unethical business practices such as corruption (Alesina and Weder, 2002; 
Gambardella et al., 2016). NGOs have therefore attempted to regulate in such 
situations (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016), which can foster negative publicity for those 
being assessed (Meyer and Thein, 2014). Alternatively, within the same operational 
environment, other NGOs have attempted to influence firms to finance social 
projects (Pache and Santos, 2010) which has been seen to benefit a firm’s brand 
image (Marano and Kostova, 2015). These two scenarios raise the question of how 
firms’ select the NGOs with which to respond and how NGOs gain power to 
influence firm strategy (Hudson et al., 2015). To comprehend the phenomena of 




(Bitektine and Haack, 2015). Understanding legitimacy within context would further 
support how NGOs can gain power to influence strategic decision-making and the 
role of individual actors (Abdelnour et al., 2017). The next section reviews a 
theoretical perspective of influencing firm strategy. 
 
4.4 Theoretical Perspective of Influencing Firm Strategy 
 
A firm’s strategic decision-making is governed by several factors (Fredrickson, 
1986; Mitchell et al., 2011). The literature shows both internal (Ahearne et al., 2014) 
and external (Vachani et al., 2009) influences on firm strategy. However, more 
recent discussions within management have enquired further into institutional 
contexts (Arregle et al., 2013; Balogun et al., 2014). This is beyond the political 
institutional framework commonly referred to (Mtar, 2010), assessing the importance 
of social institutions such as NGOs, entrusted by society (Hollensbe et al., 2014; 
Greenwood et al., 2017). 
 
Zald and Lounsbury (2010) discuss how firms must operate with the local ideologies 
of the wider society. By not working in line with social trends, firms can be 
challenged by institutions (Den Hond et al., 2015). For example, an organisation 
must pay salaries to its employees which meet citizens’ expectations and 
governmental taxes (Oliver, 1991). This common understanding of what is an 
appropriate behaviour must be in line with both firms and institutions. However, 
Seyf (2001) stresses that internationalisation and an expansion of open media sources 
have further subjected firms to organisational influence. Hence, firm’s strategic 
actions must not only follow the local norms but also international expectations 
(Dacin et al., 2002). 
 
Circumstantially, firm’s strategic decisions are directed to change by institutions due 
to the firm not understanding the social expectation (Cummings and Doh, 2000). By 
not abiding to social expectation, firms willingly or unwilling comply with 
institutional pressures. Along with economic constraints, firms are subjected to work 
within an institutional setting (Peng, 2004). Furthermore, Peng et al. (2009) explain 




firm-specific resources and institutional constraints. Consequentially, the institutional 
setting can be a major influencer in strategic action (Lu et al., 2013). When 
examining NGOs’ influence on firm strategy, there are three key theoretical 
components of institutional theory that need to be understood in relation to the 
context of this study. These include legitimacy, power and actors. Understanding 
these theoretical constructs is necessary to comprehend how NGOs could influence 
firm strategy (Greenwood et al., 2017).   
 
4.4.1 Legitimacy to influence 
 
The existing literature has shown that firms are influenced within an institutional 
setting (Marano and Kostova, 2015). However, as recognised from a macro 
perspective, firms have set an internal legitimacy filter within their strategy process 
to screen external influences (Drori and Honig, 2013). The extent to which an 
external influence can affect a firm’s strategic decision-making is dependent on 
legitimacy (Dacin et al., 2008; Peng et al., 2009). Suchman's (1995) review on the 
concept of legitimacy states that many studies refer to the concept but fail to justify 
its meaning. Being central to the institutional literature and studies on organisations 
(Hudson et al., 2015; Stevens et al., 2016), it is important to understand what 
legitimacy means and how it is used within a study of MNCs and NGO relationships. 
Suchman (1995: 574) defines legitimacy as “a generalized perception or assumption 
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”. If an organisation is 
therefore perceived as legitimate, they would possess importance (Baur and Arenas, 
2014). In turn, this would strengthen their ability to influence, demonstrating 
relevance to understand legitimacy within this study. Wry et al. (2013) further state 
that legitimacy can only be recognised by the assessor having a higher standpoint 
than the organisation or action being assessed. This builds on the notion that 
legitimacy can be subjective when organisations seek to gain or maintain a legitimate 
status (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). 
 
Legitimacy is an important concept within institutional theory as it explains why 




Oliver, 1991). Any external force attempting to influence a firm must provide 
relevance to their aims and objectives (Kostova et al., 2008). Consequently, only if 
an external force is perceived as resourceful, could they affect the workings of an 
organisation (Zald and Lounsbury, 2010). Meyer and Rowan (1977) concur, 
suggesting that organisation can increase their legitimacy by following the social 
procedures and practices. If an external influence does not comply with such social 
rules they would be seen illegitimate and have little relevance to a firm. To 
understand how NGOs can gain legitimacy from a meso level of analysis there are 
three areas, which can be approached to gain further clarity. These are to understand 
the subjects of legitimisation, types of legitimacy and sources of legitimacy 
(Greenwood et al., 2008).  
 
Subjects of legitimisation are organisations, objects or actions that are being assessed 
for acceptability (Suddaby et al., 2017). As not all institutions operate in the same 
manner, firms can legitimise subjects differently (Rodríguez-Pose, 2013). For 
example, a governmental body would enforce legal obligations (Selznick, 1996); 
therefore, firms become the subjects, having to incorporate legal structures within 
their plans (Stevens et al., 2016). Conversely, NGOs can operate in both 
collaborative and activist ways aiming to influence business operations (Vachani et 
al., 2009). Therefore, NGOs could become a subject of legitimisation when firms 
assess the motive of influence. Subsequently, as recognised earlier, firms can also 
gain legitimacy by collaborating with NGOs, as NGOs are entrusted by society 
(Darendeli and Hill, 2016). This is however based on the assumption that NGOs 
operate in a professional manner, as cases have shown NGOs becoming illegitimate 
due lack of competence (Rauh, 2010). The scandal case of Oxfam provides a clear 
example, whereby the charitable organisation was accused of sexual misconduct 
during an operation in Haiti (BBC, 2018). As a result, understanding the relationship 
between MNCs and NGOs can be complicated, as both organisations could become 
the subject of legitimisation. When studying organisations, particularly within the 
context on conflict zones, it is therefore necessary to gain both MNC and NGO 
perspectives. This would aid understanding as to why firms would engage with some 
NGOs and not others. Uncovering the typologies of legitimacy would provide greater 





Suchman (1995) argues the concepts of strategic legitimacy and institutional 
legitimacy. The first type implies that organisations can influence actors in a strategic 
sense to achieve an organisational goal. The second type refers to how organisations 
can gain legitimacy through applying social and cultural expectations. These 
divisions become further categorised to pragmatic, moral and cognitive types of 
legitimacy (Suddaby et al., 2017). A pragmatic approach offers a mutual benefit, 
where by both constituents would gain favourable exchanges (Bitektine, 2011). 
Dahan et al. (2010) argue that for NGOs to collaborate with MNCs this practical 
approach would be successful to influence the business model. Moral legitimacy 
suggests that organisations gain credibility through promoting social values which 
are recognised to benefit a society (Deephouse et al., 2017). For example, firms 
would legitimise NGOs engaged in promoting ecological accreditation on moral 
grounds (Doh and Guay, 2006). Consecutively, a cognitive form of legitimacy 
describes symbolic language and cultural beliefs (Lounsbury, 2001), such as what is 
regarded as ethical business in the mining industry (Gifford et al., 2010). 
Nevertheless, operating within complex environments, firms are subjected to 
multiple influences (Maitland and Sammartino, 2015). It can be difficult to access 
which types of legitimacy are being applied when multiple organisations are 
attempting to influence the strategy process (Henisz and Zelner, 2005). To gain 
further clarity on the authority of influence, understanding the sources of legitimacy 
also needs to be approached (Suddaby et al., 2017).  
 
Sources of legitimacy imply how authority can be gained to make assessments and 
influence decisions (Ruef and Scott, 1998). Additionally, Meyer and Scott (1983) 
suggest that the source of legitimacy would be linked to those that can confront 
organisations with cultural authority. In this sense, the groups that can influence 
would be dependent upon the organisation themselves and the individuals concerned 
(Bitektine, 2011; Deephouse et al., 2017). Hence, an empirical enquiry would not 
only need to review the source of legitimacy for NGOs to pass firm filters (meso 
level), but also further examine which type of individuals are involved (micro level).  
 
Greenwood et al. (2008) showcase that the basic forms of sources are those that 
possess social standing and licence (e.g., government bodies) or collective authority 




ability could be gained through collective social movements (Kraemer et al., 2013). 
Equally Battilana et al. (2009) demonstrate the importance to investigate individual 
actors who could gain a legitimate status and become agents of change. These 
standpoints suggest the sources of legitimacy are context-driven operating at multiple 
levels. However, given the complexities of adverse environments (such as conflict 
zones), firms have become cautious towards all external influences, tightening the 
process of legitimisation (Scherer et al., 2013). From a macro firm perspective, the 
previous chapter recognised the placement of a legitimacy filter within the strategy 
process. Within a conflict context it is vague as to what source of legitimacy NGOs 
need in order to pass firm filters. Further empirical enquires would need to recognise 
the source of legitimacy for NGOs within a conflict zone to pass firm filters at a 
meso level of analysis. In further examination, institutional legitimacy must also be 
recognised from a micro perspective interlinked to the theoretical concept of actors 
(Garud et al., 2007). As Deephouse and Suchman (2008) elaborate, a central issue 
with legitimacy research is to understand who can provide collective authority in 
different situations and contexts (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). 
 
The conceptual strategy process framework for conflict zones, seen in chapter three, 
illustrates that external influences are filtered through legitimacy, to be considered by 
decision-makers. A case with Starbucks Coffee Corporation facing issues with an 
NGO provides an insightful example of legitimacy, explained from a theoretical 
perspective (Shropshire, Bundy and Buchholtz, 2013). Starbucks was criticised by 
animal rights NGO PETA for use of a controversial ingredient. Starbucks rated the 
level of legitimacy based on their main customer base, which was unaffected by the 
issues raised by PETA. Therefore, Starbucks initially ignored PETA’s actions due to 
the NGO possessing low legitimacy. Starbucks later changed their ingredient source 
as a symbolic statement. This example suggests that NGOs must acquire legitimacy 
in line with firm interests to successfully influence change. Lu et al. (2013) coincide 
stating that firms will strategically respond to institutional pressure to maintain firm 
performance and protect their reputation with customers. 
 
Activist NGOs campaign in order to generate public support (Soule, 2012). By 
gaining support from the firm’s target market, NGOs raise their influential power 




gain legitimacy with their customer base. By collaborating with NGOs, firms can be 
seen to be operating within social means (Teegen et al., 2004). Nestlé is a firm that 
has been scrutinised for damaging the ecological environment as well as using child 
labour to produce their goods (Aragón-Correa and Rubio, 2007; Christie et al., 
2003). As a result, the company has lost the trust of many global consumers 
(Aragón-Correa and Rubio, 2007). Nestlé’s cocoa activity in Africa aimed to ensure 
legitimacy was felt with the brand image due to the loss of consumer trust (Aragón-
Correa and Rubio, 2007).  Nestlé had collaborated with NGOs in West Africa 
creating initiatives for sustainable farming and improved labour conditions. 
Consequently, both parties gained value by fulfilling their objectives. This example 
reinforces the notion that MNCs and NGOs can become assessors of legitimacy. 
Both parties would evaluate each other depending on what is required (Dahan et al., 
2010; Den Hond et al., 2015).  
 
Vachani et al. (2009) share a similar thought, highlighting that firms need to gain 
legitimacy by collaborating with NGOs. However, there can be different motives for 
firms that want to adopt social practices (Marano and Kostova, 2015). Marano and 
Kostova (2015) note that firms would be enticed by NGOs if partnerships could help 
avoid negative publicity or raise their reputations with socially concerned consumers. 
For NGOs to influence the strategic decision of a firm, therefore, they must be able 
to offer a social incentive (Marano and Kostova, 2015). Otherwise, they would have 
to apply external pressure by threating their corporate image (Lu et al., 2013). Hence, 
to fully understand how firms legitimise NGOs it can be beneficial to identify why 
NGOs want to influence business within a conflict context.  
 
In connection, Boxenbaum and Jonsson (2008) highlight that it may be difficult to 
understand firm change in heterogeneous environments; a region exposed to multiple 
institutional pressures. Ambiguity could arise due to legitimacy issues or conflicting 
institutional demands (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008). The context of conflict zones 
can be classed as a heterogeneous environment due to the complexities in strategic 
planning, being subjected to multiple demands (Delmas and Toffel, 2008; Scherer et 





Ang et al. (2015) argue that though the cognitive institutional pillar aims to stimulate 
a mimetic behaviour in organisations, heterogeneous environments are yet to be 
explored. For example, sports brands Nike, Adidas and Puma have been known to 
mimic each other when their supply chain has been criticised by civil society 
(Scherer et al., 2013). Likewise, it has been seen that McDonald’s and Nespresso’s 
decision to work with NGO Rainforest Alliance to improve their coffee production 
was also a strategic move to work in line with institutional expectations (Scherer et 
al., 2013). However, in a conflict environment it is not clear if a firm changes due to 
social pressure or competitor imitation. Understanding why firms change due to 
institutional pressure would support the meso level of analysis in legitimacy 
(Suddaby et al., 2017).  
 
Gaining legitimacy is one aspect within institutional theory; however as Dacin's 
(1997) insight indicates, power is needed to enforce change. Munir (2015) stresses 
that, in more recent reviews on institutional theory, power has become a downplayed 
factor. With a critical lens, power can be a difficult topic to study due to its moral 
philosophy (Munir, 2015). Nevertheless, as power is interlinked with legitimacy it is 
necessary and beneficial to gain an understanding of the construct (Abdelnour et al., 
2017).  
 
4.4.2 Power to enforce change 
 
An institution’s lifecycle is based on its power to enforce change (Rao et al., 2000). 
Oliver (1991) responds to an early limitation of institutional work showcasing that 
institutions can possess power and gain conformity by setting rules and beliefs. 
However, Fligstein (2001) argues that though legitimacy and power are often linked, 
new institutionalism lacks attention to institutional power. The notion of power 
dictates the strength that can enforce change (Peng, 2003). As Lawrence (2008) 
explains, institutional power would be based on the ability to influence the beliefs, 
behaviours and opportunities of individuals. In other words, power describes how 
change is accomplished (Goodstein and Velamuri, 2009). Mtar (2010: 1102) defines 
power within business as “the capacity of acquiring management to fulfil its strategy 




legitimacy filters, the question remains of how NGOs can enter the discussion with 
strategic decision-makers. The main argument which could partially inform this 
question is linked to institutional control (Goodstein and Velamuri, 2009).  
 
Institutional control is not understood by capacity, but rather how institutions can 
change the behaviour and beliefs of individual actors (Lawrence, 2008). Abdelnour 
et al. (2017) suggest that institutions can maintain control by influencing the correct 
type of actors. Therefore, the NGO’s power would be reliant on influencing the 
belief and behaviour of individual strategic decisions-makers (Phillips and Tracey, 
2009; Maclean et al., 2014). Hierarchical positions have often been cited to play a 
role in power dynamics (Bamiatzi et al., 2016; Maclean et al., 2014). Generally from 
an internal perspective, a hierarchy would determine who would have the authority to 
direct organisational change (Zald and Lounsbury, 2010). Nonetheless, institutional 
power has commonly been observed at a micro level, where key individual actors 
have defined the institutional setting based on their interests (Pacheco et al., 2010); 
for example, social movements influencing government policies (Pacheco et al., 
2010) or exerting power through expertise and control of resources (Belanger and 
Edwards, 2006). 
 
NGOs can maintain institutional control where firms lack knowledge resource 
(Dahan et al., 2010). This can explain why firms are compelled to work with local, 
individual actors when entering uncertain environments such as conflict zones. For 
example, firms that wish to gain access to a diamond mine (Kantz, 2008) or gold 
mine (Henisz et al., 2014) would need to operate with local territorial groups who 
manage the resources or have a connected social network. This corresponds with 
Kristensen and Zeitlin's (2005) thoughts, further stating that power can be gained 
through links with external and internal constituents. Hence, firms would be limited 
unless they can connect with resourceful individuals, having access to a wider 
community. The literature has shown that firms are more likely to respond to 
legitimate claims by stakeholders that possess power (Scherer et al., 2013). Where 
power has been linked as a micro phenomenon (Friedland, 2018), institutional insight 
is vague in describing how actors can influence macro firm level processes. 
Particularly, with the complexities of strategy-making in a conflict environment 




strategic decision-makers. Understanding power at a meso level of analysis would 
support the link between macro firm processes and individual agents of change at a 
micro level (Rao et al., 2000; Kozlowski et al., 2013). 
 
From a meso level, Vachani et al. (2009) argue that NGOs enforce social expectation 
on firms in an attempt to form partnerships. Hence, it can be argued that NGOs 
possess social power to direct strategic change, as they are able to question firm 
actions (Rao et al., 2000). Through a collective action, NGOs usually represent the 
interests of many individuals, allowing them to exert greater pressure (Den Hond et 
al., 2015). In cases were firms may not legitimise an NGO, they could still possess 
institutional control to direct change due to external support. Where firms could be 
resistant to this form of institutional control (Lawrence, 2008), the social movement 
of an institution would enforce particular beliefs and behaviour (Vogus and Davis, 
2005). Hudson et al. (2015) explain that some institutions possess the power of 
emotion to stimulate a collective social force; for example, within the clothing 
industry some firms have been caught violating human rights (Soule, 2012). As a 
result NGOs have been able to mobilise collective support from concerned 
individuals to exert pressure, forcing the company to change their operation. The 
aspect of emotion can be a major factor of institutionalisation and source of power 
(Friedland, 2018). However, where NGOs can gain collective power from emotion, a 
question remains as to how this can disturb a firm’s underlying principles. As 
Suddaby et al. (2007) recognise, there are cases where NGOs have been unsuccessful 
in changing firm action. Hence, where NGOs can gain collective support, further 
institutional assessments are needed to review why firms would respond to only 
certain NGO pressure.  
 
In similar narratives to power, Cummings and Doh (2000) argue that perseverance is 
needed by stakeholders to influence a firm. The level of ‘urgency’ would describe 
“the degree to which stakeholder claims call for immediate attention” (Mitchell et al., 
1997: 867). As firms are subjected to multiple stakeholders, for NGOs to influence 
strategic change they must possess legitimacy, cultural power and/or urgency (Dahan 
et al., 2010; Doh and Guay, 2006). The essence of power is linked to an institution’s 
ability to endorse certain beliefs and behaviours to the correct actor who can 




previous two chapters, one of the complexities of strategy making was the power 
dynamics of multiple individuals internal to the firm (Papadakis and Barwise, 2002; 
Herrmann and Nadkarni, 2014). Hence, there is a need to understand how NGOs can 
gain institutional control over the underlying principles of the firm; particularly 
where it has been seen that firms strategically respond where an external influence 
impacts firm performance (Farjoun, 2002). Lawrence (2008) argues that 
understanding how firms resist institutional control has been neglected within 
institutional studies. Therefore, discussions of how NGOs can gain power needs to 
be contextualised understanding the relationship of MNCs and NGOs at a meso 
level. Subsequently, the question arises as to which individual actors within 
institutions possess the ability to influence change (Skaggs and Youndt, 2004; 
Abdelnour et al., 2017).  
 
4.4.3 Actors within institutions 
 
Reviewing the theoretical concepts of legitimacy and power raises the notion of 
individual actors from a micro level of analysis (Bitektine and Haack, 2015; 
Abdelnour et al., 2017); particularly where power is linked to the importance of 
individual actors in driving institutional change (Lawrence, Winn and Jennings, 
2001). As the theoretical concepts are connected, it is important to further examine 
the impact of actors within institutions who possess legitimacy and power (Battilana 
and D’Aunno, 2009). To explain the phenomena of individual actors, institutional 
theory has developed the concept of agency (Abdelnour et al., 2017).  
 
Agency refers to the individuals who “create, transform and disrupt institutions” 
(Lawrence, 2008: 181). Understanding the different levels of interactions is essential 
to fragment organisational influence and process (Bitektine and Haack, 2015). From 
understanding the macro phenomena of the strategy process (Hutzschenreuter and 
Kleindienst, 2006), reviewing agency can uncover a micro level of analysis (Tost, 
2011). Social movements such as NGOs are dependent upon the interests of agency 
to drive mobilisation (Munir, 2015). As NGOs operate on value-based approaches, 
the correct agency is required for the success of organisational influence (Vachani et 




they operate. Abdelnour et al. (2017) review of agency states that individuals are not 
social actors by default. Rather, “individuals participate in social life as actors by 
assuming roles and the positions to which roles are usually tied” (Abdelnour et al., 
2017: 15). Therefore, actors use techniques of control when assumed within a 
particular role (Abdelnour et al., 2017). Battilana et al. (2009) elaborate stating that 
actors who have designated roles and placement within institutions inevitably 
become ‘embedded agency’. The key micro level question within institutional theory 
is a need to investigate the impact embedded agents have in the institutional change 
process (Battilana et al, 2009). 
 
From a critical lens, Seo and Creed (2002) raise a contradiction for institutional 
actors being able to create or transform. The concern being that, if institutional 
settings shape the way individuals and organisations operate, then how can actors 
influence change within the institutional setting which conditioned them (Battilana 
and D’Aunno, 2009); as actors who are truly embedded within an institutional setting 
are subjected to regulative, normative and cognitive pressures (Hardy and Maguire, 
2008). Seo and Creed (2002) label this contradiction between institutions and actors 
as the ‘paradox of embedded agency’. Hence, there is a need to understand how 
embedded agency, who are also institutionally conditioned, can influence other 
organisations sharing the same environment (Garud et al., 2007). The paradox is 
relevant within the strategy process insight where it has been recognised that NGOs 
have been both successful and unsuccessful in influencing firms. Hence, from a 
micro perspective this suggests that there are some embedded agents that possess 
influential acumen over others (Maguire et al., 2004). 
 
DiMaggio's (1988) early arguments suggest that organised actors with sufficient 
resources establish institutions. Furthermore, institutional actors pursue interests 
which they value (DiMaggio, 1988). Battilana et al. (2009) suggest that where 
embedded agency operates in their own interest institutions need to have actors who 
possess differing traits. This is because agents who intend to influence and change 
processes would have to overcome the institutional pressures themselves (Garud et 
al., 2007). Thus, the argument considers how actors can reach their goals by 
intentionally altering the institutional setting in which they are embedded (Phillips 




institutional setting is reliant on the characteristics of the actor and the environment 
(Battilana et al., 2009). In similar discussion, Maguire et al. (2004) recognise that an 
agency embedded within regulative or normative NGO institutions has a high chance 
of becoming legitimised, in turn possessing institutional control over other players. 
However, it is noted that NGOs also use a cognitive institutional approach based on 
individual values and ideology (Rauh, 2010). Cognitive-based embedded agency 
(such as human rights activism) would need to utilise certain characteristics in an 
attempt to influence firm values and beliefs (Doh and Guay, 2006).   
 
Peng, Sun and Markoczy's (2015) review of influential characteristics outline human 
capital as an individual’s skill set, knowledge and social ties. These characteristics 
would raise the value of an individual increasing their capability to conduct tasks 
(Peng et al., 2015). The management literature has applied human capital to CEOs, 
with their ability to maximise firm performance (Peng et al., 2015). This occurs, 
particularly during institutional transitions; formal and informal changes of rules and 
norms within an institutional setting (Peng, 2003). CEOs that possess high human 
capital have been seen to form political ties (Sun et al., 2010) and gain access to 
difficult markets (Dahan et al., 2010). The notion of relationship-building suggests 
how embedded agency can influence other actors within the same environment to 
influence certain activity (Leca et al., 2008). 
 
In the same respect, actors within NGOs can also possess human capital to build 
relationships and influence firms (Teegen, 2003). International NGOs have been seen 
to operate in similar administration as businesses (Sarma, 2011). Thus, many 
characteristics can be seen within both organisations. However, the motive of the 
individuals that operate the organisation differ (Teegen, 2003; Brammer et al., 2012). 
There is therefore an importance to study embedded agency within organisations, 
particularly where an actor’s social position can dictate their relationship with their 
environment (Battilana et al., 2009). Battilana et al. (2009) elaborate whereby social 
status could prove important to influence change. Social status must be shown by 
individual position as well as the organisation’s global status. Some studies have 
shown this where high-status organisations have initiated change due to their social 
authoritative position (Sherer and Lee, 2002; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). 




downplayed the question of which actors and which roles can become agents of 
change. Where institutions are slow to change, individuals who desire change need to 
be flexible in their emotions, attitudes, behaviours and technical skills (Abdelnour et 
al., 2017). Frynas, Child and Tarba (2017) reiterate the need for further empirical 
enquiries to explore the microelements of businesses and NGOs’ interactions.  
 
Institutional theory justifies the impact an organisation can have on an environment 
as well as the stakeholders involved (Bruton et al., 2010; Tolbert and Zucker, 1996). 
Rauh (2010:31) suggests that individuals within organisations are “rational actors 
who weigh out the costs and benefits of choices and behaviours to maximize their 
own benefits”. Conversely, it can be seen that NGOs are led by individuals who 
possess a wider social agenda (Werker et al., 2008). Therefore, the actions of 
individuals would aim to fulfil the overall organisation’s objectives, sharing a 
commonality. Additionally, it is individual actors within NGOs who are driven on 
social cause and set agendas to influence other organisations to achieve their goals 
(Vachani et al., 2009). Taking this into account, there is a lack in institutional 
literature to review which embedded agents within NGOs can influence and form 
relationships with firm actors.  
 
Within the strategy process research, the previous two chapters have shown a macro 
understanding of how firms formulate strategic direction, taking account of internal 
and external influences. However, ultimately the success of understanding processes 
and directing strategic change is at an individual level (Kauppila, Bizzi and Obstfeld, 
2017; Ma and Seidl, 2018). To fully comprehend how institutions can enter strategic 
decision-making, a micro level perspective needs to be included within a research 
design; as only specific embedded agency would be able to pass firm legitimacy 
filters and represent the influential power of an institution (Lawrence, 2008). As a 
result, the review from Burgelman et al. (2018) on the strategy process research has 
called for further insight into individual actors and power dynamics. Thus, 
researching the type of actors at an individual level proves to be relevant in both the 
business field and theory, particularly where there is a relationship.  
 
Further examination of embedded agency is important, as only specific actors 




(Rao et al., 2000; Pacheco et al., 2010). As recognised, NGOs operate with the aim to 
promote their values and beliefs to all players that share their institutional setting 
(Vachani et al., 2009). However from a meso level, not all NGOs can pass firm 
legitimacy filters due to the complexities of a conflict zone (Kolk and Lenfant, 2012) 
and increased external influences (Delmas and Toffel, 2008). Hence, a question 
remains from a micro perspective as to which embedded agency within NGOs can 
pass firm legitimacy filters and influence MNC actors (Abdelnour et al., 2017). With 
reference to the conceptual strategy process, further insight is needed to understand 
which embedded agents within NGOs can gain recognition from firm executives and 
members of the strategy team.  
 
To summarise this section, formal regulative institutions (legal bodies) dictate how 
firms can operate within an institutional setting (Doh and Guay, 2006). Normative 
and cognitive institutions (NGOs) attempt to influence the institutional setting with 
their values and ideologies; in certain scenarios enforcing informal social regulation 
on firms (Teegen, 2003). There are three key theoretical concepts that can inform the 
phenomena of organisational influence: legitimacy, power, and agency. 
Understanding the typologies and sources of legitimacy can provide further clarity in 
how NGOs can influence the strategy process (Bitektine, 2011; Suddaby et al., 
2017). Subsequently, in gaining legitimacy entering the strategic decision-making 
dialog would be a question of institutional control to gain power (Lawrence, 2008; 
Goodstein and Velamuri, 2009). The essence of organisational influence would 
operate at a micro level; therefore, institutions would need to take into consideration 
the arguments of embedded agency (Battilana et al., 2009; Abdelnour et al., 2017). In 
examining the link between these three concepts, theoretical limitations have been 
identified.  
 
4.5 Limitations of Institutional Theory 
 
Institutional theory has developed key concepts which when applied, can support an 
understanding of how organisations can influence. In reviewing appropriate 
institutional narratives some aspects remained unclear. By highlighting current gaps 




theoretical contribution. In relation to the aim of this thesis, three areas of 
institutional theory needed to be addressed.  
 
The first theoretical limitation is not being able to understand the source of 
legitimacy for NGOs within the context of conflict zones. Legitimacy is a central 
concept within institutional theory (Suddaby et al., 2017). The concept has entered 
management insight to support an understanding of the relationship between firms 
and institutions (Darendeli and Hill, 2016; Stevens et al, 2016). Within the literature 
review, a macro firm level legitimacy filter has been recognised to all external 
influences due to the increase of external demands (Henisz and Zelner, 2005; Scherer 
et al., 2013). However, a central issue in legitimacy insight has lacked the attention 
to understand who has collective authority over legitimisation within specific settings 
(Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). The literature has provided an in-depth knowledge 
of the necessity to gain legitimacy for external organisation to influence (Suddaby et 
al., 2017). From a meso level of analysis, legitimacy insight needs to be extended to 
understand the sources for non-political institutions such as NGOs within 
heterogeneous environments. Accordingly, Deephouse et al. (2017: 47) suggest that 
legitimacy research can advance within the empirical settings of “natural disasters, 
epidemics and wars” that generate crises. Given the nature of these contexts, further 
insight would benefit to understand the source of legitimacy for activism as well as 
collaborative organisations, where firms could legitimise the type of NGO differently 
(Oetzel and Getz, 2012). These advancements would support Scott's (1987) initial 
view suggesting that institutional arguments are better understood when 
contextualised.  
 
Secondly, within heterogeneous environments, if NGOs can pass firm legitimacy 
filters inherently questions how NGOs can possess institutional control to influence 
strategic decision-making. Theoretically, social power can be based on influencing 
the behaviour and beliefs of individual actors (Lawrence, 2008). However, given the 
complexities of conflict zones and strategy-making (Grant, 2003; Berman et al., 
2017) it is vague as to how NGOs can gain the attention of key strategic decision-
makers. Succinctly, Fligstein (2001) argues that new institutionalism lacks attention 
to power. Some studies have attempted to advance the concept of institutional control 




(2017) argue, actors within organisations also play a representative role to achieve 
organisational goals. Institutional power has commonly been associated as a micro 
phenomenon (Pacheco et al., 2010). However, prior to exploring key actors there is a 
need to understand how NGOs can gain institutional control over the firm’s main 
objectives. This is due to the complex dynamic between actors internal to a firm 
involved in the formulation of strategy (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988; Mueller et 
al., 2013). Understanding power at a meso level would support the link between 
organisational objectives (macro) and individual agents of change (micro) (Rao et al., 
2000; Kozlowski et al., 2013). Insight into institutional control can advance by 
understanding how a NGO’s social power (behaviour and beliefs) can equate to 
influencing the underlying principles of strategic decision-making. As Munir (2015) 
elaborates, there is a need to understand how power functions within institutional 
theory. 
 
In connection to power, a third limitation is a need to further understand the role of 
embedded agency within context at a micro level of analysis (Abdelnour et al., 
2017). Only certain external agency would be able to influence the formulation of 
firm strategy (Drori and Honig, 2013). Hence, there is a need to uncover which type 
of embedded agency within NGOs can form relationships or influence firm actors. 
Abdelnour et al. (2017: 7) review in agency and institutions summaries that power is 
derived from “purposeful activities of actors in ways that are independent of 
institutions”. Studies have referred to the impact of actors in terms of corruption and 
illegal legitimacy (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016), stakeholder pressure (Sarkis et al., 2010) 
or social movements (Soule, 2012). However, institutional insight has overlooked the 
interaction between actors and how they can influence intentions and behaviour 
(Lawrence, 2008). Powell and Colyvas (2008) elaborate, stating that institutional 
forces can influence individuals’ interests and desires. Nonetheless, institutional 
theory needs a richer understanding of how actors place themselves in social 
relations and how individuals interpret their context (Powell and Colyvas, 2008); 
essentially, to understand which embedded actors and which roles can become agents 
of change (Abdelnour et al., 2017). 
 
Furthermore, understanding the micro phenomena which could lead to macro 




Langley, 2018). Hence, Burgelman et al. (2018) call for further insight in the role 
both internal and external actors play in strategic decision-making. North (1991) 
states, institutions are made of a collection of individuals who share a common goal. 
Understanding which embedded agents within an institution possess the ability to 
influence and enforce strategic change can advance theoretical concepts. Berrone et 
al. (2013) concur stating that insufficient research has been done on these internal 
processes. A micro perspective on actors within institutions would strengthen the 
understanding of NGOs’ ability to influence firm strategy, particularly where there is 
a theoretical link of actors within power (Abdelnour et al., 2017) and need for 
legitimisation (Kolk and Lenfant, 2012). 
 
In highlighting three theoretical limitations, Phillips and Tracey (2009) state that 
researchers need to incorporate new institutional concepts with old ideologies, as 
they remain relevant in management understanding. Boxenbaum and Jonsson (2008) 
further reiterate that, due to a strong link between the institutional theoretical 
concepts, the gap within institutional theory can decrease if further empirical 
enquiries use a multilevel approach; such as understanding the macro and micro 
elements within the same review (Bitektine and Haack, 2015). These considerations 
can support theoretical advancements.  
 
4.6 Conclusion  
 
Institutional theory has evolved in the study of organisations (Selznick, 1996). 
Institutions shape both informal constraints (traditions, taboo) and formal rules (law) 
within an institutional setting (North, 1991). Consequently, institutions are known for 
governing social expectation taking regulative, normative and cognitive approaches 
(Scott, 1995). From a theoretical perspective, NGOs can be seen as institutions (Doh 
and Teegen, 2002; Hollensbe et al., 2014). Recognising the increasing strength of 
NGOs, firms are becoming more cautious in their strategic action and selecting their 
institutional setting (Arregle et al., 2013).  
 
Three interlinked theoretical components prove relevant in organisational influence: 




external influences set at a macro firm level. Legitimacy assesses organisations, 
forces and actions considering their relevance to the assessor (Suchman, 1995). At a 
meso level, understanding the typologies and sources of legitimacy can provide 
further clarity in how NGOs could influence the strategy process (Bitektine, 2011; 
Suddaby et al., 2017). Once gaining legitimacy, NGOs need power to enter strategic 
decision-making discussions. Institutional control needs to be explored from a meso 
level to understand what gives NGOs power over the firm's underlying principles 
(Lawrence, 2008). In connection, a question is directed to which actors at a micro 
level within NGOs can gain power over the firm’s objectives. A review of embedded 
agency has shown that key actors are needed to represent agents of change (Battilana 
et al., 2009; Abdelnour et al., 2017).  
 
Three limitations of institutional theory have been recognised. Firstly, there is a need 
to understand the sources of legitimacy within the context of conflict zones 
(Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; Deephouse et al., 2017); particularly, how NGOs 
can pass firm legitimacy filters within the strategy process. Secondly, there is 
ambiguity of how NGOs can gain institutional control to influence strategic decision-
making, given the complexities of conflict zones and strategy making (Grant, 2003; 
Lawrence, 2008; Berman et al., 2017). Finally, insight into embedded agency needs 
to advance by understanding which roles within social relations have the ability to 
influence (Powell and Colyvas, 2008). This limitation has been extended to the 
strategy process narrative calling to understand the role of micro actors (Burgelman 





















RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss and justify the methodological rationale of this 
study. The chapter begins by reviewing the research questions, which had provided 
direction. Subsequently, the methodological process is shown starting by 
understanding research philosophy. Understanding philosophy is an important 
aspect, setting an ontological and epistemology standpoint. The research philosophy 
highlights the most appropriate research paradigm for this study and justifies the 
philosophical assumptions underpinning the research. Subsequently, the chapter 
progresses to review data collection. Qualitative and quantitative research types are 
evaluated followed by an explanation of the chosen research method. Additionally, 
the importance of carrying out a pilot study is described, further showing how this 
took place and improvements made in the research design. This section will then 
progress into presenting the sampling technique and sample size used in the study. 
Next, the chapter presents the data analysis highlighting the rigorous process used. 
Finally, ethical considerations are recognised, concluding the chapter by reviewing 
the validity and reliability in this research.  
 
5.2 Research Questions  
 
The strategy process narrative has been vague in understanding institutional 
influences within specific contexts (Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst, 2006). From 
the literature review, it became clear that further insight is needed to conceptualise 
external influences. Thus, the aim of the research was to understand how the strategy 
process is influenced by social institutions within an unstable context. Drawing on 
institutional theory, three research questions were designed to achieve this research 
aim. Furthermore, it was noted that organisational influences can operate at multiple 




incorporated both key theoretical constructs and a multilevel method of analysis. The 
research questions are as follows: 
 
1) What indicators are used in the strategy process for firms entering a 
conflict zone? 
 
The first research question was aimed to comprehend a macro perspective of MNCs. 
Setting a foundation for the research; the purpose of this question was to understand 
the contextual change in the strategy process. The literature was vague in explaining 
how an adverse operational environment could change the strategy process and 
where institutions are accounted for within the process. This research question was 
therefore necessary to gain a comprehensive perspective of what indicators firms 
take into account when placed within a conflict territory and how this is reflected 
within the strategy process. The intention of this question was to develop the 
conceptual strategy process framework derived from the literature review. 
 
2) How can NGOs as institutions possess legitimacy and power to 
influence a firm’s strategy process in conflict zones? 
 
The second research question focused on the influence of NGOs operating at the 
meso level. As recognised within the literature, interactions between MNCs and 
NGOs can be placed between the macro and micro level. Hence it was beneficial to 
understand a meso level of analysis, bridging the upper and lower perspectives. The 
literature has shown that the degree of influence from an external organisation was 
dependent on their level of legitimacy and power. Where firms have set an internal 
cognitive filter as a process of legitimatisation, both of these theoretical constructs 
are needed for NGOs to be recognised and influence strategic decision-making. This 
question was therefore used to analyse how firms legitimise NGOs and if influential 
power exists due to the complexities of a conflict environment.  
 
3) Which external individual actors are involved in influencing strategic 





A subsequent argument within organisational influence referred to embedded agency 
from a micro level of analysis. Therefore, the third research question was directed to 
understand individual actors within NGOs and their ability to gain legitimacy and 
power. The literature showed that individual actors are instrumental in organisational 
change and influence. However, it was recognised that further insight was needed 
within both strategy process and institutional narratives to understand which 
embedded agency are involved. The third research question was therefore designed 
to understand, specifically, the type of individual actors that can influence strategy. 
This question was aimed to access the micro phenomena of organisational influence, 
adopting the theoretical construct of actors.  
 
5.3 Research Philosophy 
 
When conducting any academic research, the methodology first begins with a 
discussion on philosophy (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2012). It is 
important for researchers to recognise their philosophical stance and understand 
which paradigm to adopt for their study (Mir and Watson, 2000). This is because the 
research philosophical assumptions can set a framework underpinning any empirical 
enquiry. Fleetwood (2005) suggests that the term philosophy relates to the 
development and nature of knowledge. The adopted philosophy assumes how an 
individual views the world. Hence, the researcher’s particular philosophical 
viewpoint would influence how the collected data are interpreted (Fleetwood, 2005). 
Furthermore, Chia (2002) argues the importance of understanding which 
philosophical stance should be taken, particularly within management and social 
science research. Justification of an adoption would support the researcher in 
research design and how they intend to pursue answering the research questions.  
 
The essence of research is to produce new knowledge (MacIntosh and Caldwell, 
2015). The philosophy within management research is linked to understanding the 
nature of what reality is (Bartunek, Rynes and Ireland, 2006). However, how reality 
is perceived raises different standpoints that can be adopted in a chosen 
methodology. Burrell and Morgan's (1979) understanding of philosophical 




the nature of being, reviewing whether reality is subjective or objective (O’Gorman 
and MacIntosh, 2015). Consequently, epistemology reviews a particular school of 
thought on how reality is perceived and how knowledge is generated (Fleetwood, 
2005). The following two sub-sections evaluate both of these philosophical strands.  
 
5.3.1 Ontological considerations 
 
The nature of research is influenced directly or indirectly by how a researcher 
interprets phenomena (Crotty, 1998). The question that arises within ontology is the 
assumption of what is ‘real’ and how a researcher can examine what is being 
perceived. As Crotty (1998: 10) explains, ontology is the study of being “concerned 
with ‘what is’, with the nature of existence, with the structure of reality as such”. 
Bhattacherjee (2012) simplifies stating that ontology refers to how individuals see 
the world. Within management research, there are two foundational positions 
dependent upon a researcher’s perspective.  
 
The first is based on whether a researcher considers social entities as ‘objective’, 
existing indifferent to any external social interaction (Smircich, 2012). The second 
position suggests that the social entity is constructed by the actions and perceptions 
of social actors (Mir and Watson, 2000). These positions are commonly referred to as 
objectivism and subjectivism (also known as constructivism).  
 
This study aimed to identify the relationship between NGOs and firms, specifically 
on NGOs’ ability to influence the strategy process. According to an objective 
ontological standpoint, what individuals perceive as reality is formed by social order 
(Bhaskar, 1997; Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Thus the workplaces within 
organisations would operate based on law and regulation. These would operate 
independent to any social actor such as employees that work within firms. An 
objective perspective would, therefore suggest that the strategy process of firms is 
governed entirely through structured procedures. However, in reality it has been 
identified within the literature review that this is not the case in strategic 
management (Farjoun, 2002). As recognised, strategic decision-making within the 




Pettigrew, 2007), company executives (Song et al., 2015) and legitimate forces 
external to the company (Delmas and Toffel, 2008). Studies have shown the 
formulation of strategy to be considered ‘organic’ in nature (Farjoun, 2002; 
Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst, 2006). For example, findings from Grant's (2003) 
study show that international oil companies had to revisit the planning stages of 
strategy several times dependent upon the turbulence of their operational 
environment. Therefore, to understand the essence of external influence upon the 
strategy process a researcher cannot take an objective ontological position. To gain 
in-depth understanding of influential change this study needed to consider an 
opposing position.  
 
The second key standpoint considered in ontology is ‘subjectivism’. Foss et al. 
(2008: 74) explain this notion “that research in social science, including 
management, must take account of the facts that individuals hold different 
preferences, knowledge, and expectations, and more specifically the pre-supposition 
that the contents of the human mind, and hence decision making, are not rigidly 
determined by external events”. Hence, a subjective ontology is based on the 
assumption that reality is shaped by individual perception (O’Gorman and 
MacIntosh, 2015). Furthermore, it was noted that subjectivism is a continual process 
where, through social interaction, these social phenomena are constantly perceived 
differently (Fleetwood, 2005). Therefore, to comprehend NGOs’ ability to change 
MNCs’ business practises, it is necessary to view social interactions and each party’s 
perception of the relationship. An investigation of the social interaction would need 
to be observed within a particular research context.  
 
Taking a subjective or constructivist standpoint seemed appropriate for this research 
due to the informality and nature of external influences. For example, within the 
study of Driffield et al. (2013), a company’s decision to invest into conflict regions 
was reliant on the level of external influence they received. Newly formed companies 
seeking to explore oil and gas reserves received negative publicity for intending to 
set up base within Sudan. This scenario could be perceived differently if research 
variables changed such as industry or economic zone. Therefore, by taking a 




et al., 2007). Individuals’ understandings of phenomena are formed by what their 
interpretation is at a given time within context.  
 
Comparing objective and subjective ontological positions in management can be 
explained using organisational culture. Smircich (2012) recognises that objectivists 
would acknowledge the culture of an organisation as an entity they already possess. 
However, from a subjectivist point of view culture is something that an organisation 
‘is’ due to a connection with their social setting. According to Smircich (2012), 
management insight has shown organisational culture as something which can be 
changed at the desire of managers. A subjective position would state that culture 
possesses more complexity than an objective view due to social interactions 
changing individual understanding (Mir and Watson, 2000; Smircich, 2012). 
Furthermore, from general organisational culture, this notion can be applied 
specifically to strategic management. Mintzberg and Lampel's (1999) reflection on 
strategy process research showcases a cognitive school of thought where strategy 
formation is governed by an individual’s mental construction. Thus, when 
researching strategy a study can benefit by taking a subjective standpoint to 
understand the thought process that leads to strategy formation. Moreover, adopting a 
subjectivist ontological standpoint in research would influence the epistemological 
consideration. 
 
5.3.2 Epistemological considerations 
 
A researcher’s ontological consideration will reflect upon what epistemological 
position they take (Kuhn, Cheney and Weinstock, 2000). Both considerations are 
linked. Where ontology looks at the nature of reality, epistemology is concerned with 
what is acceptable knowledge within a study. Jonker (2010: 61) describes 
epistemology as the “philosophy of knowledge, especially with regards to its 
methods, validity, nature, sources, limits and scope”. For some researchers, objects 
represent the nature of reality (Jonker, 2010). They consider objects to be real and 
therefore base their data on the analysis of facts. For example, an operations manager 
understands information through quantifiable information such as machinery and 




contributing to resource-based theories and models (Mir and Watson, 2000; Starkey 
and Madan, 2001). In these cases, feeling or attitudes are not the source of data. On 
the other hand, opposing an objective position, subjective researchers aim to 
understand social phenomena that cannot be quantified (Kuhn et al., 2000). 
Fundamentally, the argument within epistemology lies with what the research aims 
to achieve.   
 
There are two key positions within epistemology: positivism and interpretivism. 
Positivism is a position that states knowledge is exactly the phenomena that we 
experience (Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Wicks and Freeman, 1998). Astley's (1985: 
497) insight into positivism states that it is “a conventional model of scientific 
progress as a cumulative discovery of objective truth”. A positivist standpoint within 
management suggests that social sciences should be considered and studied in the 
same way as natural sciences. For example, data should be collected with a definitive 
and predictable set of results. The meaning of this phenomenon would be impartial to 
that of the social setting, opinions and attitudes (Wicks and Freeman, 1998). Lee 
(1991) states that researchers who take a positivist philosophical stance prefer to see 
observations, using hypothesis testing and mathematical analysis. Positivists would 
claim to be external during the data collection process where they neither affect nor 
are affected by participants (Meckler and Baillie, 2003). In this sense, research is 
taken without attaching a value. There has been much debate on how to study 
organisations, questioning whether phenomena are objective or socially constructed 
truths (Al-Amoudi and Willmott, 2011; Astley, 1985; Kwan and Tsang, 2001). 
Nevertheless, Meckler and Baillie (2003) proclaim that there could be a possibility 
for ‘middle ground’ where both standpoints are correct, being positivist or the second 
standpoint, interpretivist. 
 
In recognising the nature of a positivist epistemological stance, the aim focuses on 
gaining true facts. However, as identified earlier, to understand the reality of 
organisational influences, it is necessary to gain meaning. Meaning to situations – 
such as an NGO influencing the strategy process - is constructed through social 
integration (Collis and Hussey, 2013). Where a positivist standpoint focuses on facts, 
an interpretivist paradigm aims to achieve meaning from relationships (O’Gorman 




phenomenon of organisational influence would not be able to take a positivist’s 
standpoint. This is due to a need to gain meaning from an unstructured situation. 
Understanding social relationships and organisational influence can only be sought 
by gaining meaning from opinions and attitudes (Collis and Hussey, 2013). 
Therefore, to match a subjective ontological position, a researcher would need to 
take an interpretivist epistemological position.  
 
Interpretivism advocates the link to how society constructs their social setting and 
consistently reviews understanding through social interaction (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2012). To comprehend the social science of management and business strategy it is 
necessary for researchers to understand humans as actors within society (Pozzebon, 
2004). For this research enquiry, these were individual actors in both NGOs and 
firms that operate within conflict zones. Lee (1991) suggests that from an interpretive 
approach, methods of natural science are inadequate to comprehend social reality. 
Lee (1991: 347) elaborates, sharing “the same physical artefact, the same institution, 
or the same human action, can have different meanings for different human subjects, 
as well as for the observing social scientist”. Therefore, it is necessary to gain an 
interpretivist view, studying actors from within firms and NGOs. 
 
Following the evolution of debate on positivism and interpretivism, Bhaskar (1997) 
introduces ‘critical realism’ as a school of thought commonly attached to the post-
positivist strand. Bhaskar's (1978) school of thought is rooted in the notion of 
‘realism’ as an ontological alternative. This position suggests that the information 
individuals’ gain from their senses must be regarded as the truth (Fleetwood, 2014). 
Critical realism has developed as an epistemological standpoint derived from both 
objective and subjective ontologies (O’Gorman and MacIntosh, 2015). The critical 
realism argument in post-positivism states that the reality of what is experienced is 
dependent upon the understanding of the individual researcher (Zachariadis, Scott 
and Barrett, 2010). Therefore, critical realism philosophy within strategic 
management acknowledges potential fallibility with contributions to knowledge 
(Miller and Tsang, 2010). As O’Gorman and MacIntosh (2015) share, this position is 
‘realist’ in recognising the external reality beyond the individual’s perception, but 
‘critical’ of the ability to access it. Consequently, this debate on epistemology is 




Kwan and Tsang (2001) contribute to the critical realism philosophy stating that once 
an object has been recognised from the senses, there could be simultaneous events 
that cannot be seen. Thus, the observer’s interpretation may not be the complete truth 
where other factors may have influenced a certain situation. Mir and Watson (2001) 
contest Kwan and Tsang (2001) on an ontological level where perception of reality is 
socially constructed; hence, theoretical assumptions are completely based on context. 
Though a debate exists in the similarities and differences of critical realism with 
other philosophical positions, a notion remains that critical realism has the potential 
to inform strategy research (Mir and Watson, 2001). Particularly, Mir and Watson 
(2001: 1173) state that “reality is as much a manifestation of our own social 
construction as it is of natural forces beyond our control and understanding”. This 
has been considered important within the management narrative due to consistent 
change happening on many levels from organisational to individual (Mingers, 2006). 
Nonetheless, although critical realism recognises the influence of events beyond the 
study, the post-positivist position also seeks explanation for contingent relations 
(Miller and Tsang, 2010); in other words, reasons as to why a specific external 
influence can change strategic direction.  
 
Mutch (1999) shows that within reality, there are multiple layers. Each layer has the 
ability to influence or emerge from each other. As a result, the study on organisations 
can only be perceived from an understanding of the layers that can be observed. In 
attempting to conceptualise management and strategy formulation, an assessor is 
bound by the research subjects (Kozlowski et al., 2013). Critical realism identifies 
these situations when researching organisational influence. Particularly, when a 
research aim is based on the extension of existing literature, a critical realist 
standpoint is favourable due to various conditions, contexts and different levels of 
perception (macro, meso and micro) (Fairclough, 2005; Fleetwood, 2014). A 
researcher’s perception can be both physically and ideologically limited (O’Gorman 
and MacIntosh, 2015). Hence this research enquiry was bound only by what could be 
interpreted at a set given period in a specific context. As a result, a critical realist 
standpoint was seen as an appropriate modern ideology for the study of 
organisations. Additionally, a consideration of critical realism seemed applicable 




complexities (Henisz et al., 2010) usually associated with conflict environments, 
occurring beyond the research objectives. 
 
Studying organisations from a subjectivist paradigm raises questions on validity, 
particularly where studies are based on a critical realist philosophy. Al-Amoudi and 
Willmott (2011) recognise that within management, organisational structure needs to 
be understood beyond social relationship. However, theory development through 
studying organisations needs judgement rationality in sense making (Al-Amoudi and 
Willmott, 2011). Seeing phenomena as an objective truth therefore would not assist 
in understanding a situation. The way in which an assessor understands a 
phenomenon can be based upon different modes of analysis and recognising the 
socio-culture of a situation (Lawson, 2003). Miller and Tsang (2010) highlight that a 
critical realist philosophy can operate within strategic management research if 
interpretations can be translated into understanding organisational mechanisms.  
 
This section has evaluated both the ontological and epistemological considerations. 
Reviewing the arguments, it was appropriate for this study to take a subjective 
ontological position and interpretivist epistemology position. As Mir and Watson 
(2000) summarise, both of these considerations in philosophy are interlinked. 
Additionally, an interpretivist position has been adapted for modern organisational 
analysis particularly within adverse conditions, recognising a critical realist 
standpoint. The next section will review data collection. 
 
5.4 Data Collection  
 
An important aspect of methodology is concerned with how data is collected (Berg, 
2001). This research studied organisational influence by interacting with social actors 
within MNCs and NGOs. Data was collected from August 2016 to February 2017. 
The process of how data was collected is reflected throughout this section beginning 





5.4.1 Research methods 
 
There are two types of research methods that can be considered: quantitative and 
qualitative. Quantitative research is often regarded as statistical research tools based 
on numerical calculation and accurate facts (Echambadi, Campbell, and Agarwal, 
2006; Shook et al., 2003). To gain further insight into a situation qualitative tools are 
needed, particularly to comprehend meaning and reasoning (Shah and Corley, 2006). 
A researcher must be able to use a method that allows a comparison of opinions and 
attitudes. Qualitative research is a useful method to understand individual processes 
(Bluhm et al., 2011). Additionally, a qualitative approach would further support 
understanding the multilevel phenomena of organisational influence (Hitt et al., 
2007). Thus, it can be argued that taking a qualitative approach would be more suited 
to answer the research question, understanding the nature of influence and attitude 
(Fleetwood, 2005). 
 
Cassell et al. (2005) suggest that using qualitative methods allows a researcher to 
view phenomena from the perspectives of individuals’ experiences. Collecting 
experiences was applicable to this research, aiming to understand which individuals 
within NGOs possess power and legitimacy to influence change. This study also 
sought to understand from an MNC perspective how actors within firms legitimise 
NGOs. This could only be understood by speaking with key individuals within a firm 
and learning about their business experiences.  
 
It has been noted that studies of similar nature have also benefited from using a 
qualitative research method. Oetzel and Getz (2012) used a qualitative approach to 
gain in-depth information on firm responses when operating within a conflict zone. 
Similarly, Branzei and Abdelnour's (2010) study on enterprise resilience under 
terrorism in developing countries utilised a qualitative method. This approach 
informed both studies by connecting with and understanding the individual 
experiences of research subjects. Furthermore, Darendeli and Hill's (2016) study on 
firm legitimacy in Libya gained key insights from social conversations using 
qualitative means. Legitimacy is one of the main theoretical constructs within this 




necessary to use qualitative research methods, where legitimacy cannot be 
understood from quantifiable means (Bitektine and Haack, 2015).  
 
The main types of qualitative research include interviews, focus groups, ethnography 
and observations (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). To achieve what was required to 
answer the research questions, interviews was the most appropriate research tool. 
Interviews can provide the ability to gain in-depth understanding of the influences on 
the strategy process (Grant, 2003; Kraemer et al., 2013). Being able to present 
questions, an interview can collect participant interpretations on an individual basis 
(Delmas and Toffel, 2008). Gaining participants’ interpretations was necessary to 
engage on an individual level, understanding the nature of influence from both MNC 
and NGO perspectives.  
 
5.4.2 Pilot study  
 
In order to ensure that the research tools are most efficient, it is necessary to carry 
out a pilot study prior to collecting data (Silverman, 2016). This would ensure that 
the fieldwork is verified before scaled out to the selected sample. Within social 
science a pilot study is a small-scale trial, to check the feasibility of the study (Kim, 
2011). Results of the pilot study can be useful to ascertain any confusion and adjust 
the research material. The intention of a pilot study is not to collect data but to 
improve the tools and techniques (Guthrie, 2010a). In this research, a pilot study was 
used to ensure that the interview questions were appropriate.  
 
A pilot study was undertaken with one participant from a UK based MNC and one 
participant from a UK based NGO. Both participants had gained experience 
operating within turbulent environments and had informed subsequent firm strategy. 
The two interviews adhered to a structured question guide to assess the clarity of the 
wording used in the questions. The pilot interviews identified two issues. Firstly, the 
participants were confused on the phrasing of questions. This was in relation to the 
meaning of ‘strategy process’ (being referred to as ambiguous) and ‘successful in 
influencing’ (not being precise). Secondly, the pilot study was designed to present 




participant responses opened a new avenue of thought and discussion. It was also 
necessary to probe for examples to clarify what the participant was sharing.  
 
From this pilot study, the research question guide was refined before conducting 
further interviews. Furthermore, a choice of using a semi-constructed interview 
method appeared to be most appropriate allowing the discussion to be flexible. 
 
5.4.3 Semi-constructed interviews 
 
Semi-constructed interviews are a qualitative method to collect data. Interviews are 
important as they allow a researcher to probe, uncovering any hints in order to 
understand a situation from multiple angles (King, 2004). The structure of the 
interview during data collection was on a one-to-one basis; with the researcher being 
the interviewer and the participant being the interviewee. A benefit of using 
interviews allows the participant the freedom to express their thoughts and showcase 
their experiences in reality (Galletta, 2013). 
 
The main aim of an interview is to gain an understanding from the respondent’s 
perspective (Shah and Corley, 2006). Semi-constructed interviews were seen to be 
more suited to gauge how NGOs intend to influence MNCs with the possibility to 
probe the interviewee (Elbanna and Child, 2007). Using a semi-constructed interview 
structure, the interviewer started with a question from the question guide but let the 
interview session be flexible depending on the interviewee’s responses. By using 
open-ended questions the researcher could gain more information on particular 
topics, probing where necessary (Collis and Hussey, 2013). This method of data 
collection proved successful in Grant's (2003) study on strategic planning in 
turbulent environments. Furthermore, Delmas and Toffel's (2008) use of interviews 
gave insight into institutional pressure on strategic decision-making. Both of these 
studies provided further rationale to utilise semi-constructed interviews proving 
effective for this study during data collection. Additionally, feedback from a pilot 
study highlighted a need to utilise a semi-structured approached, discussed further in 





This study carried out face-to-face interviews with participants based within the UK. 
Easterby-Smith et al. (2012) state that researchers must be prepared to carry out 
interviews via telephone; this may suit those that work in business. Managers may 
feel more relaxed knowing that they do not have to host the interviewer. 
Furthermore, given the context of this study, many participants were based outside of 
the UK. Therefore, use of telephone or Internet-based communication such as Skype 
was used to conduct the majority of the interviews. To avoid participants feeling less 
important in the study (given the physical separation) it is important for the 
researcher to build a good rapport prior to the interview taking place (Guthrie, 
2010a). This ensures that not only the participant feels at ease, but also importance is 
drawn towards the questions (Guthrie, 2010a).  
 
This study conducted a total of twenty-one interviews. The duration of each 
interview was between forty-five minutes to one hour. To ensure consistency 
throughout the interviews, two interview question guides were used (Appendix 1 and 
2). The guides were useful to assist the interviewer to provide direction. Tables 5.1 
and 5.2 show a list of participants, highlighting their organisational position and 
current location. Furthermore, as noted in chapter three (Figure 3.1: The curve of 
conflict), geographical conflicts can be experienced at different stages illustrating a 
temporal dimension. Consequently, it was important to map at which stage of 
conflict each participant had gained experienced. Within the participant lists a label 
is attached to each participant highlighting the conflict stage experience. These labels 
are in referenced to the conflict stages seen in chapter three, Figure 3.1 All 
participants were selected having gained experience within the Middle East and 
North Africa economic zone. This was important to ensure experiences were shared 
within the same context. Within Tables 5.1 and 5.2 participants were assigned a 
number to protect their anonymity (discussed further in research ethics). 
Furthermore, each organisation was labelled with a Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) code (Companies House, 2018) followed by a description. A SIC code 
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5.4.4 Sampling technique and size   
 
When planning to conduct a research study it is important to choose which 
participations are needed to gain data (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2008). Due to time 
restraints and impracticalities, many researchers cannot study the entire population of 
interest. In theory, a sample should represent the population of interest enough to 
validate the answers to the research questions (Cassell et al., 2005). The sampling 
techniques fit into two groups: probability and non-probability. Probability sampling 
technique is a systematic statistical method to select participants for a research 
sample (Maxwell, 2008). As this research was not using quantitative tools, this 
technique was inappropriate. Hence a non-probability method was required.  
 
Non-probability or purposive sampling techniques involve selecting individuals from 
the population of interest based on specific purposes rather than random selection 
(Teddlie and Yu, 2007). This method is used in qualitative research due to the ability 
to select participants more appropriate to the study. In order to achieve the aim of 
this research, it was necessary to interview both MNCs and NGOs. To efficiently 
select participants, the sampling technique used was convenience and snowball. 
Convenience sampling allows the researcher to select participants that are easily 
accessible and willing to take part within the research study (Teddlie and Yu, 2007). 
It can be argued that this method could create researcher bias towards the findings 
(Guthrie, 2010a). Nevertheless, it is useful to also ensure the correct criteria is sought 
to maximise interview efficiency. Selecting the most appropriate participant is 
particularly important given the short time period to collect data. Cassell et al. (2005) 
recognise that accessing large organisations can be time consuming. This is 
particularly the case with individuals who are busy within business activities. In 
management research, individuals can face challenges concerning lack of interest 
from potential participants or firms not wanting to speak about sensitive topics 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). Selecting a context such as conflict zones can become 
problematic due to participants avoiding the study on sensitive grounds. 






Within the study two types of sampling were employed. Firstly, convenience 
sampling was used in this research by connecting with key individuals within a 
personal network. Use of a researcher’s personal network is a fortunate method to 
collect data (Silverman, 2016). Personal networks can remove entrance barriers due 
to existing rapport and trust factors (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Silverman, 2016). 
Individuals within a network could act as a bridge to an organisation and also 
facilitate a connection with the most appropriate candidate to interview. During data 
collection, this study managed to gain access to organisations within the industries of 
oil and gas, aviation, banking, mining and international development charities. These 
were based on utilising a series of personal networks. Hoang and Antoncic's (2003) 
study showcases this, as they gained access to their participants through existing 
relationships. Additionally, research access was also gained by contacting 
appropriate organisations and associations directly within this field of study.  
 
Secondly, snowball sampling was applied as it is frequently used when it can be 
difficult to identify and reach ideal candidates (Teddlie and Yu, 2007). This method 
recommends asking participants to connect the researcher with or identify further 
contacts (Corley and Gioia, 2004). Bullough et al. (2014) found snowball sampling 
effective to guide their search for participants due to limitations of access. At the end 
of each interview with both MNC and NGO participants, the researcher requested if 
the participant could introduce ideal candidates to the study. Snowball sampling 
proved useful for connecting with partnering organisations, linking NGO operations 
with MNCs to understand the relationship. From the twenty-one conducted 
interviews, eleven were gained from a personal network, five from direct contact and 
five from participants. 
 
During data collection, saturation sampling was taken into account where findings 
started becoming of a repetitive nature. Commonly referred to within Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) and Strauss and Corbin's (1998) subsequent literature, saturation 
within data will be evident where themes and categories within participant responses 
become repetitive. This will provide an indication that enough data has been 
collected. This research study interviewed twenty-one participants: ten MNCs (group 
1) and eleven NGOs (group 2). Repetition of findings was acknowledged after 




were conducted to validate the findings. The data collection stage concluded at 
twenty-one interviews, providing enough data for qualitative rigour and contribution 
to the literature.  
 
Previous studies with MNCs and NGOs in conflict zones similar to this research 
selected a sample size of eight (Grant, 2003), twelve (Delmas and Toffel, 2008), and 
twenty-five (Darendeli and Hill, 2016). Kolk and Lenfant (2012) interviewed five 
NGOs as part of their mixed methods approach. Other studies (Branzei and 
Abdelnour, 2010; Dai et al., 2013; Oetzel and Getz, 2012) used quantitative means 
and observations, with a sample size into the hundreds. These all differ on research 
time and scale. This comparative review shows that a research sample of twenty-one 
interviews was successively working within the current literature.  
 
The chosen research participants in both MNCs and NGOs possessed extensive 
management experience. Project managers, members within the strategy team, and 
executives were identified as organisational positions to acquire knowledge of the 
themes being researched (Delmas and Toffel, 2008; Oetzel and Getz, 2012). As 
Darendeli and Hill (2016) explain, it is necessary to identify the correct individual to 
interview to ensure answers are given to the research questions. Furthermore, these 
roles mentioned would be able to provide a clear understanding of the reality of 
institutional influence and strategy making.  
 
To gain further specifics in the research context, the conflict zone chosen was the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA). This economic group not only operates a 
high level of commerce but is also exposed to instability through conflict (Bullough 
et al., 2014; Spiess and Felding, 2008). The MENA region was selected due to the 
high concentration of recent conflict identified by the Nobel Prize (2016), Council on 
Foreign Relations (2016) and Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research 







5.5 Data Analysis  
 
This section aims to explain the process of how the collected data were analysed and 
interpreted to answer the research questions. Within the strategic management field, 
prior studies highlight the benefit the both inductive and deductive approaches in 
analysis (Echambadi et al., 2006). A deductive approach to develop theory is based 
on using hypotheses and quantitative means (Shah and Corley, 2006). As this study 
was conducted using an interpretivist, qualitative framework, data analysis was 
therefore based on an inductive approach to theory development (Locke, 2007). 
Inductive reasoning is based on making sense of observations (Bhattacherjee, 2012). 
Researchers would interpret certain scenarios and from these generalisations, extend 
existing theory (Echambadi et al., 2006).  
 
Hitt et al. (2007) recognise that most management experiences involve multilevel 
perspectives. However, generally, studies only focus on a single point of view (Hitt 
et al., 2007). Therefore, to gain further clarity on the subject, this study has 
incorporated a multilevel perspective in analysis. The three distinctive levels (macro, 
meso and micro) can support not only in structuring the analysis but also advance 
academic fields (Kozlowski et al., 2013). For example, the literature has shown how 
a multilevel perspective can provide greater understanding of theoretical concepts 
such as legitimacy (Bitektine and Haack, 2015) and agency (Tracey et al., 2011). The 
strategy process literature also recognises the need to understand the impact of micro 
actors on macro firm processes (Burgelman et al., 2018; Kouame and Langley, 
2018).  
 
Within social science research authors have questioned the validity of interpretivism 
and qualitative research methods (Shah and Corley, 2006). Qualitative research has 
been conducted and analysed in various ways over several decades (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). To ensure qualitative rigour within analysis, this study took a 
grounded theory analytical approach based on the Gioia method (Gioia et al., 2012). 
 
The Gioia method of grounded analysis is a practical methodology which allows 
researchers to focus on the interpretive process (Gioia et al., 2012). Glaser and 




phenomena should not been seen or reflected as an independent truth external from 
reality. Rather, grounded theory recognises that reality is “both the act of observation 
and the emerging consensus within a community of observers as they make sense of 
what they have observed” (Suddaby, 2006: 633). Hence, uncovering new insights 
continuously builds on what is already known (Kreiner, Hollensbe and Sheep, 2009). 
The emphasis of this methodology compared to others used in qualitative approaches 
is theory development (Strauss and Corbin, 1994). The Gioia method is designed to 
provide qualitative rigour in inductive research based on the articulations of 
grounded theory (Gioia et al., 2012). This form of methodology has shown to be 
useful in both stages of data collection and analysis. The process design can be 
beneficial by simultaneously collecting and analysing data, in turn finding new 
participants when needed to answer the research questions (Gioia et al., 2012). Gioia 
et al., (2012) further argue that this methodology of analysis can prove useful to 
develop new concepts, instead of diverting the original meaning of former concepts 
with new insight. Williams and Shepherd's (2016) use of the Gioia method 
demonstrated this, forming new dimensions within their analysis of emergent 
ventures in Haiti.  
 
It is necessary for a researcher to explain each step of the analysis process to 
highlight rigour of the inductive analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Several 
stages were involved. The first step of the analysis process was to transcribe each 
audio-recorded interview. Appendix 4 shows a full transcription for participant MNC 
1 as an example. Transcribing interviews was beneficial to remind and familiarise the 
researcher of the discussions in the interview. Each interview transcript was read 
through in detail to ensure key factors had been understood. To ensure validity of the 
collected data, a copy of the transcript was sent to the participant for any 
amendments or additional comments. Next, the researcher could begin to analyse the 
data making initial codes on each transcription. Coding can be seen as labels attached 
to common phases across the data set (Furrer, Thomas and Goussevskaia, 2008). 
 
Coding can be a time consuming task if carried out manually (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2012). Therefore, this research used NVivo software (version 11). Use of computing 
software can aid in the analysis stage, viewing and grouping common codes 




second stage of analysis compared the initial codes across all transcriptions to 
generate a set of first-order categories. These first-order categories were informant-
centric providing a basis of general understanding of participant responses (Gioia et 
al,. 2012).  
 
The third stage of analysis required finding links between the first-order categories to 
develop second-order themes. This entailed discovering patterns and establishing 
meaning behind the common categories. The researcher employed axial coding, 
useful to find relationships among first-order categories (Tracey et al., 2011). Axial 
coding would allow the researcher to relate initial codes with each other, in turn 
collapsing first-order categories to form second-order themes. These second-order 
themes were theory-centric (Gioia et al., 2012). Appendix 5 showcases two images 
of the coding undertaken within NVivo to generate common themes across the 
twenty-one interview transcriptions. NVivo terminology labels first-order categories 
as ‘child nodes’ and second-order themes as ‘parent nodes’. During the analysis 
stage, eighteen parent nodes and forty-three child nodes were recognised as 
important across the collected data. Appendix 6 and 7 shows two tables presenting 
the overarching categories and themes derived from the MNC and NGO interviews. 
Within the tables, the sources column signified the number of interviews linked with 
the theme and the references column indicated the number of times the theme was 
referred to by participants. Computer aided software can only assist to some extent in 
grouping common data. A large degree of interpretation requires mental processing 
and sense making (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Establishing the first-order 
categories and second-order themes required manual understanding by the 
researcher. Nonetheless, the researcher’s findings have been justified with reference 
to the representative data (Kreiner et al., 2006). 
 
The final step involved formulating relationships between the second-order themes. 
By collapsing the second-order themes, six aggregate theoretical dimensions were 
formed. Each of these six overarching results contributed to the strategy process and 
theoretical narratives. To showcase the development from first-order categories to 
second-order themes and aggregate theoretical dimensions, three data structures were 
formed. These data structures have been placed within the subsequent finding 




derived from the collected data are presented in these diagrams. Figure 5.1 illustrates 
a blank data structure, highlighting where key themes are placed and linked.  
 












5.6 Research Ethics 
 
An important aspect of methodology is ethical considerations in business research 
(Fletcher, 1992; Aluwihare-Samaranayake, 2012). Ethics can be defined as righteous 
actions and principles that govern the behaviour of individuals and their relationships 
with others (Badham and Zanko, 2014). Within the business academic field it is 
becoming more important that researchers consider ethical practice within their 
methodology (Brand, 2009). 
 
There are several factors, which a researcher needs to take into account prior to 
starting fieldwork. Starting the study with an ethical structure would also increase the 
validity of findings (Berg, 2001). Firstly, it is important that the participants are 
informed about the research rationale. Manipulation or providing misinformation is 
considered highly unethical (Berg, 2001). This is because the participant would join 
the study being given inaccurate information and hence misled. In order to fulfil this 
ethical consideration, an information sheet was provided to the participant. The 
content contained background information and the purpose of the study, informing 
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the participant prior to the interview. The researcher also offered to answer any 
questions the participant may have at any time.  
 
Secondly, researchers must allow the option of voluntary participation and exit to 
their participants (Qu and Dumay, 2011). This would ensure freedom for the 
participant, thus removing any anxiety prior and during the interview stage. A 
researcher should be prepared and allow for a participant to leave. Nevertheless, a 
benefit of briefing the participant prior to the interview can limit the chances of 
withdrawal during an interview (Guthrie, 2010a). To ensure the participant was 
aware of their voluntary rights, a consent form was used (Appendix 8). A consent 
form is a written documentation signed by the participant and researcher agreeing 
that they have understood what they are giving consent for (Qu and Dumay, 2011). 
The consent form highlighted the participant’s rights to withdraw from the study at 
any time and to offer to answers any questions. Furthermore, the form requested 
consent from the participants to be audio recorded. Audio recording was necessary to 
ensure that any part of the discussion was not missed and that all findings could be 
recalled at a later stage. 
 
Thirdly, a strong ethical consideration is based on protecting the identity of the 
participant. It is in the researcher’s highest interest that privacy is maintained for the 
participant, thus ensuring anonymity and confidentiality (Qu and Dumay, 2011). 
Protecting a participant’s identity not only plays a key role in gaining consent from 
the participant but also ensures that the participant cannot be tracked after the study 
is completed. Any invasion of the participant’s privacy due to this study would raise 
an ethical dilemma (Badham and Zanko, 2014). The researcher, therefore, needs to 
ensure that key factors such as names are not used in writing up the findings. The 
participant would also be more open to speak within the interview knowing that their 
response would be anonymous (Guthrie, 2010a). To ensure confidentiality, 
participants have been referenced using their assigned number (e.g., MNC 1 & NGO 
1). It is also important that both audio recorded files and written transcripts are safely 
stored. These files were stored on an external digital storage with password 





Finally, the researcher must ensure that there is a power balance between both parties 
(Qu and Dumay, 2011). The participant must not feel pressured or influenced to 
answer any questions. Bell and Bryman (2007) highlight that the researcher’s prior 
understanding of the topic could generate a sense of power over the participant. A 
power balance was set during interviews, ensuring a neutral environment and placing 
the participant at ease prior to starting. A neutral environment would also advocate 
an open atmosphere where the participant feels free to speak without feeling 
intimidated.   
 
The overall requirement for a researcher to be able to carry forth fieldwork would be 
to gain ethical approval from their host institution. Heriot-Watt University had 
approved this study.  
 
In summary, to ensure research ethics, this study provided an information sheet and 
consent form to certify that participants were informed of their rights. Confidentiality 
of the participants was maintained with the use of assigned numbers and safe storage 
of collected data. Finally, the researcher ensured a power balance removing 
intimidation.  
 
5.7 Qualitative Validity  
 
The strength of any research is based on its validity and reliability (Bartunek et al., 
2006). Qualitative research in particular, has been questioned in methodological 
reliability generally based on interpretivism (Shah and Corley, 2006). Therefore, this 
study ensured ‘qualitative trustworthiness’ through three criteria: credibility, 
confirmability, and transferability (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
 
With regard to the first criteria, Locke (2001: 59) states that credibility has become a 
broad topic, referring to “the practices in which the researcher can engage during the 
analytic process, the rhetorical issues involved in crafting a credible publication, the 
relationship between the composed concepts and readers' experience, and 
researchers' own belief”. However in a general sense, credibility within methodology 




(Shah and Corley, 2006). Where interpretive methodology can raise concerns about 
researcher bias, it is important to ensure internal validity (Bhattacherjee, 2012). 
Internal validity certifies that the researcher has accurately understood phenomena 
gained through the data source. Member checks was utilised to ensure the credibility 
of the collected data (Birt et al., 2016). This entailed e-mailing a copy of the 
interview transcript to the participant. Participants were asked to validate the 
recorded transcripts or clarify any misunderstanding. This process ensured that the 
researcher recorded and interpreted the participant’s responses correctly. 
Additionally, a breach of ethics in research methodology can also raise questions 
concerning credibility (Guthrie, 2010b). Hence, ethical considerations were observed 
within each stage of the research methodology such as participant anonymity. 
 
Secondly, ‘confirmability’ refers to the degree to which findings from the study 
could be approved by others (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Jonker, 2010). Shah and 
Corley (2006) suggest that a researcher can achieve confirmability through 
meticulous data management and recording. During the interview stage, participants 
were prompted to provide examples in their responses. Use of examples can provide 
clarity and enrich descriptions of events (Bartunek et al., 2006). The researcher also 
prompted for further explanation if there was lack of understanding in the response 
provided. Verbatim transcriptions were then scripted from audio-recorded files. This 
ensured that the response from the participant was written exactly as per spoken 
(Berg, 2001). The researcher could then gain further clarity from verbatim 
transcriptions within data analysis, forming inferences from the participant’s 
response (first-order categories). Comparing the transcribed interviews can therefore 
ensure that subsequent themes and categories were derived from the data eliminating 
researcher bias.    
 
Thirdly, ‘transferability’ refers to the extent to which the research findings are 
universal in other settings (Bhattacherjee, 2012). To ensure this form of external 
validity, a thorough description of the categories formed needs to be shown (Shah 
and Corley, 2006). The grounded approach used in this research methodology 
developed a data structure for each research question, shown above. The data 
structure highlighted how the representative data formed first-order categories and 




dimensions (Gioia et al., 2012). Each of these categories was further elaborated with 
reference to the collected data and pre-existing literature in the subsequent findings 
chapters. This variation of grounded theory can ensure qualitative rigour, validating 
theoretical contributions established in the findings (Gioia et al., 2012). To further 
support transferability of findings, when repetition of themes was acknowledged 
after sixteen interviews, a further five interviews were conducted. As a result, data 
satisfaction was achieved through saturation.  
 
5.8 Conclusion  
 
The methodology first started by identifying the philosophical standpoint. A 
subjective ontological position was chosen, followed by an interpretivist 
epistemology position. It was necessary to choose these standpoints to gain meaning 
from social interactions (Collis and Hussey, 2013). The notion of critical realism was 
also recognised, understanding that a researcher’s interpretations cannot be the 
ultimate truth due to unseen simultaneous events (Bhaskar, 1997; Kwan and Tsang, 
2001). Following a pilot study, semi-constructed interviews were the method chosen 
to collect data. This form of qualitative research was recognised as most appropriate 
due to its ability to gain in-depth understanding yet remain flexible in interview style. 
To select the most appropriate participants for interviews, convenience and snowball 
sampling techniques were used. This ensured that the study benefitted from 
participants that best fit the research criteria. The sample size was twenty-one 
candidates. This research gained access to participants by utilising personal 
networks, approaching key organisations directly and snowball sampling.  
 
Data analysis was based on a grounded (Gioia et al., 2012), inductive, interpretivist 
approach. This chapter progressed by highlighting the ethical consideration within 
the methodological design. To ensure participants were fully aware of the research 
aim and their rights, an information sheet and consent form was provided. 
Throughout the research, all participants remained anonymous to protect their 
identity and maintain privacy. Qualitative validity was seen within methodology 





CHAPTER 6  
THE STRATEGY PROCESS FOR CONFLICT ZONES  




This chapter presents the first of three empirical chapters. Each chapter focuses on a 
specific level of analysis linked to a research question. The purpose of this chapter is 
to explore the first research question: What indicators are used in the strategy 
process for firms entering a conflict zone? Setting a platform for subsequent insight, 
this analysis was conducted from a macro perspective. In comparing several strategy 
processes within the literature review, four keys steps were highlighted within the 
conceptual strategy process framework; that what had been understood in literature 
was included within these steps. However, from a macro level there was contextual 
limitation in the strategy process narrative to showcase, which key indicators firms 
use to operate within a conflict zone. It was particularly necessary to understanding 
how firms plan to enter adverse environments and where institutions are accounted 
for within the strategy process. This chapter will present the findings from the 
conducted research to address the gap, contextualising the strategy process to conflict 
zones. A macro level analysis required understanding the complex nature of a 
conflict environment and assessing how MNCs account for such changes within the 
strategy process. 
 
This chapter begins by illustrating the data structure formed during data analysis. 
Subsequently, the chapter will present its findings in a sequential order to the themes 
highlighted in the data structure beginning by how firms contextualise the strategy 
process. Furthermore, institutional dialog is reviewed, recognising how MNCs and 







6.2 Macro Data Structure  
 
The presentation of findings follows a data structure seen in each of the finding 
chapters. Key themes derived from the research are presented in these data 
structures. The three empirical chapters will showcase representative data collected 
from MNC and NGO participants by highlighting how each core theme was 
formulated. A label has been attached to the data shared within the three chapters to 
indicate which first-order category and second-order theme the data refers to. This 
chapter will focus on the macro data structure seen in Figure 6.1. The data will then 
be compared with existing literature previously reviewed, contributing to the strategy 
process narrative.  
 



















First-order categories Second-order themes Aggregate theoretical dimensions 
 J. NGOs do not fully understand the 
business strategy process 
 K. NGO seeking recognition in early 
stages of strategy planning 









 A. Scoping feasibility to enter conflict 
areas 
 B. Strategic planning for potential 
crisis 
 C. Learning from previous experience  
 D. Reviewing several indicators 
within planning stages 
 E. Reviewing potential reputational 
issues  
 
 F. Showcasing key members involved 
 G. Highlighting who has greater 
influence within the strategy process 
 H. External organisations have little 
influence in beginning stages 
 









4. Limited authority 







6.3 Contextualising the Strategy Process  
 
Participants from MNCs were asked how their strategy differed when they had 
planned to enter a conflict setting. A variety of codes were initially established. 
Nevertheless, five main first-order categories became apparent, recognising a 
repetition when more participants were interviewed. The first two common 
categories recognised firms assessing the feasibility to enter a conflict zone and 
planning for potential crisis. As seen in Table 6.1, a major aspect for contextualising 
a strategy process for conflict zones is feasibility. The early stages of planning for 
MNCs beyond commercial interest would need to assess local issues such as security 
(MNC 1), movement of goods (MNC 2), immature regulatory regimes and 
corruption (MNC 3), infrastructure (MNC 4) and personal safety (MNC 6). Previous 
strategy models have reviewed environmental threats (Digman, 1990); however, this 
was on a commercial level. More advanced models, which take into account 
environmental context (Farjoun, 2002; Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst, 2006) have 
been recognised; however, these do not consider reviewing the feasibility to enter 
conflict areas seen in the responses in Table 6.1. Discussions of feasibility further led 
to review how firms plan for potential crisis.  
 






Participant Representative data 
1.A MNC 1 
“Feasibility is needed…We are not even allowed to travel to Turkey 
from a security point of view”. 
 
1.A MNC 2 
“You first need to look at the market, the demand. Then products. This 
would all be done in the first feasibility study. What share we can take, 
competitors. Then location we can operate…We didn’t think about this 
in depth. In Iraq there’s some good areas, some bad areas, you can’t 
move goods in some areas. A lot of restrictions. And they (local 
governance) can come and tax you at any time”. 
 
1.A MNC 3 
“When you get into difficult areas whether it be because of conflict or 
immature regulatory regimes or insecure government, corrupt 




opportunity…how feasible it is. We think is there enough part of an 
opportunity”. 
 
1.A MNC 4 
“Counties are trying to rise after years of conflict. Really struggling to 
emerge after and some still on-going conflict. I was setting up the air 
traffic control bases in these places...Need to check infrastructure but 
more importantly air traffic management and air traffic control”. 
 
1.A MNC 6 
“It is necessary to see if it is feasible to operate within certain markets 
in the Middle East, particularly when it is concerns of safety…It is a 
complex risk matrix. Many areas you would need to consider”. 
 
1.B MNC 1 
“Within the first stages of our strategic forecasting we need to plan for 
any potential crisis which could arise”. 
 
1.B MNC 2 
“Political stability, it matters a lot. Any day it can change. We will not 
go back to Iraq. Total risk prone. When you rent a place it is for some 
period, so you can’t pull out quickly. It is a sunk cost”. 
 
1.B MNC 3 
“I wouldn’t actually call it strategy; I would just call it planning. 
Strategy is a long-term game. I would call working in these areas, 
planning to an extremely sophisticated level. Considering every single 
contingency that is likely to arise. Need a plan B and a plan C”. 
 
1.B MNC 5 
“It’s not that we go looking for conflict countries. But unfortunately we 
need to extract from counties surrounded by conflict. So we must 
incorporate this within our plan when entering…this is needed at 
multiple stages of strategy”. 
 
 
MNC 5 extended their thought providing a different perspective on feasibility. The 
participant suggested how the firm could utilise resources to make a situation 
potentially viable.  
 
“At times, it is not a matter of feasibility, but rather how best we can utilise 
our knowledge and partners to make the situation work” (MNC 5).  
 
Subsequently, the responses given by participants planning for potential crisis 
(Category 1.B) echoes what studies have mentioned within the business literature 
(Grant, 2003; Bullough et al., 2014). As it can be difficult to predict the constant 




their situational analysis stage (Grant, 2003). These findings are similar to that of 
Jamali and Mirshak's study (2010) researching MNC managers operating in 
Lebanon. It was reassuring to observe that the participant responses have resonated 
with the importance of planning and situational analysis as noted within the 
conceptual strategy process framework. This shows that key elements from the 
literature remain relevant when applied within a conflict environment.  
 
The next two first-order categories formed from the participant responses were 
learning from experience and having to review several indicators. Participant MNC 2 
and MNC 4 both shared experiences, which had aided their strategic decisions. 
Particularly, within complex environments such as conflict zones in the Middle East, 
firms needed to utilise experience to formulate strategy. Dai et al. (2013) suggest that 
a firm’s decision to ‘stay or exit’ from a conflict zone would be dependent on the 
level of threat they would receive. Additionally, Darendeli and Hill (2016) argue that 
the firm’s capability to absorb sudden shock such as terror attacks is linked to the 
firm’s extensive experience in such markets. Thus, MNC 2’s negative experience in 
Iraq and Egypt shows that the consideration to re-enter counties of similar nature 
would be limited. As mentioned by MNC 2, in the current situation the firm would 
not re-enter Iraq due to high risk and loss of investment. Subsequently, MNC 1, 3, 6 
and 7 share key indicators, which their firms use to prepare them for the adverse 
operational environment. It was also interesting to note the notion of temporality, 
linked to participants learning from experience. Participants reflected on different 
time periods which informed subsequent strategic decisions.  
 






Participant Representative data 
1.C MNC 2 
“I don’t think we’ll go back in the current situation…When we 
ventured into Iraq, external consultancy firms did checks and things 
looked ok. However with the war prolonging, it’s not been a good 
experience for us. Didn’t make money. Retention of employees was 
hard due to instability of the country”. 
 




currency restrictions. We could not transfer the money back to Kuwait. 
The only other option would be non-ethical routes. The company could 
not get the money legally out. What we earn there, we could only 
spend in Egypt”. 
 
1.C MNC 4 
“It can be a daunting experience. I went to Baghdad some 10 years ago 
having to meet with all the regulatory ministers. At a very short notice, 
having to take over what was US controlled air management back into 
the hands of sovereign control and then run it for them, using 
international staff, experienced air traffic controllers and managers. It 
is a challenge of staggering proportions especially in conflict zones”. 
 
1.C MNC 9 
“Firms need to learn from their past experiences and also what is 
happening to other firms within the industry. Then they will learn how 
to handle the situation”. 
 
1.D MNC 1 
“Within the Middle East you will find many other big markets in terms 
of population, like Turkey is there, Egypt is there which is the big 
market again and of course Levant counties which is Jordan, Syria, 
Yemen. Syria is very unstable and Syria main, and Lebanon is unstable 
as well. And Yemen, which is having a War with Saudi Arabia. So this 
is very testing times, trying times. So what we do, we start off with the 
economic indicators, population and trade, oil price estimate for next 
three four years, domestic product, you could say GDP growth, GDP 
per capita growth, surplus for people to spend, that’s specific to our 
industry probably, because people will have to spend on the food, 
education, clothes, where they stay, their cars, basic minimum”. 
 
“Conflict affects conversion rates”. 
 
1.D MNC 3 
“From an early stage we do an assessment on the local context, 
different indicators such as corruption, safety, regulatory and political 
stability, environment, social context”. 
 
1.D MNC 6 
“Banking in Middle East is profitable but only if you have your up-to-
date indicators. Conflict can change the way business is done, 
increasing political and economic risk…Due diligence has to be done 
at all times perhaps more than western countries…<company name> 
will not fall for corrupt practices which are prone in conflict areas”. 
 
1.D MNC 7 
“You pay more attention to the risks…this could be in the form of 
economic risk, micro economic risk, political risk, currency risk, risk 





“Some areas may also be known for informal, improper business 
practice, you know what I mean? You have to watch out for corrupt 
individuals that will make you think this is the only way it can be done 
or even sugar coat it, making a transaction look favourable when it is 
very much unethical”. 
 
 
Beyond contextual experiences, these responses reinforce that strategy is a ‘craft’ 
whereby processes are formed through experiences (Whittington and Cailluet, 2008). 
MNC 10 complements, showing how their firm understood the culture of the region 
from past experience.   
 
“<Business name> has understood how to operate within the Middle East 
from previous experience in different regions…we know how people think 
here and act accordingly” (MNC 10). 
 
Given the context of conflict zones, several indicators were mentioned as seen in 
Table 6.2. MNC 1 provided an insightful example that, due to an unstable 
environment, economic indicators have to be used such as gross domestic product. 
Though MNC 1 is in the banking industry, MNC 3 and MNC 7 gave similar 
responses demonstrating that some aspects of the strategy process would be uniform 
to all firms. Generally, it can be seen that firms carry out a risk assessment, which is 
extended into local issues such as corruption and political volatility. These key 
indicators would be unique for firms in conflict zones and an addition to the 
situational analysis step in the strategy process. 
 
The fifth first-order category linked to contextualising the strategy process, seen to 
have high importance, was that of firms reviewing potential reputational issues.  
Reputation was a key phrase throughout the interviews in both questions regarding 
the strategy process and NGOs. This section will focus on the strategy process but 
will revisit the link in discussion of NGOs at a meso level of analysis. Within 
conflict zones, firms are faced with the predicament that their business operations 
could indirectly be contributing to the conflict issue. As seen in the responses in 
Table 6.3 this is the issue, particularly for firms within the extraction industry where 




of human rights within industry and forming good relationships with the locals of the 
operational environment. MNC 8 and 9 further shared the risk of being accused of 
fuelling the social and economic costs of conflict. Additionally, participants brought 
up the notion of time particularly where they wouldn’t want conflict to hinder firm 
performance in de-escalation stages of conflict.  
 






Participant Representative data 
1.E MNC 5 
“In conflict zones and former conflict zones, all your business 
principles will get challenged. It is critical that you hold tight your 
business principles, things like human rights. Honouring the right to 
free speech, the right to unionise and form interest groups…follow the 
rules of law, to not give in to bribery and corruption”. 
 
“We are not a cookie factory or an ice cream vendor, we typically need 
at least 5 to 10 years between explorations to getting an oil gas field 
off stream and then we hope we can harvest an oil and gas field for 40 
to 50 years. Our kind of business is in it for the long haul. So we need 
to make sure we’re seen in a country as a force for good as we are 
going to be their neighbours for the next 15 years or more”. 
 
1.E MNC 8 
“We know that the militants and the war is being subsidised from the 
money they make from tin ore. This is one of the worst that you 
absolutely want to prevent as a company, that you are blamed for 
(pause) this is the bloody money perspective, blood diamonds, blood 
tin, blood coal etc. And it is in the hierarchy of responsibly in the value 
chain, it ranks above biodiversity, water depletion, ranks above child 
labour. This is blood, people dying because of your economic activity 
and your lack of awareness, that you are funding it with your money”. 
 
1.E MNC 9 
“Firms face risky business operating in conflict areas…if they have 
built a brand image over many years, one wrong action and they could 
lose it all”. 
 
 
Reputational risk is a similar notion to what Bieri (2010) and Kantz (2008) found in 
the diamond industry, being highly lucrative but also controversial due to the 




are concerned with firms operating within these unstable environments (Askari, 
2012; Lujala, 2010). In these cases, forms of business engagement strategy within 
conflict zones shared by Wolf et al. (2007) can be a point of reference. However, as 
noted in the literature and coined with the participant responses, both Jamali and 
Mirshak (2010) and Wolf et al. (2007) recognise that these strategic choices do not 
fully reflect strategy-in-practise. This is due to many factors that would contribute to 
the strategic decision such as degree of conflict. Nevertheless, these factors have not 
previously been approached within the strategy process narrative, which needs to be 
factored in. This is particularly within the Situational analysis step. 
 
Subsequent to the comments in Table 6.3, MNC 10’s honest perspective shows how 
firms could overlook the risk of reputation if there are financial gains to be made.  
 
“For an outside firm to come to this country they would be concerned about 
the reputation risk, as the media can portray this region to be very bad…But 
in reality there is money to be made. <Business name> saw a market and 
came to expand their footprint” (MNC 10). 
 
This comment highlights that MNCs are willing to take reputational risk in entering a 
conflict zone to exploit commercial opportunity. In turn, the interviews were directed 
to recognise which internal firm members can make the executive decisions and if 
external organisations can influence strategic direction.  
 
6.4 Hierarchical Importance in Influencing Strategy 
 
In highlighting several areas of concern when planning to enter a conflict zone, 
participants also revealed a hierarchical importance when influencing strategy. As 
recognised within the Formulation stage of the strategy process, there is a 
negotiation between executives, strategy teams and internal/external influences.   
 
In Table 6.4, MNC 1, 2 and 7 highlighted the chief executive officer and chief 
financial officer as the key members who can dictate strategic direction. 




also been seen to play an important role in formulating strategy. These findings are 
aligned with the management literature (Carter, 2013; Fredrickson, 1986; Herrmann 
and Nadkarni, 2014). It was interesting to identify within MNC 2’s firm, the senior 
positions were allocated to family members. However, these senior members would 
take into account expert employees’ analysis. In MNC 2’s case, a level of internal 
influence would be highly regulated on what value they could provide to the senior 
members. On the other hand, MNC 3’s level of influence would be through internal 
training. Though MNC 3 feels that they do not have direct control of the corporate 
strategy, they claim their team has an impact in influencing decisions due to working 
with the company executives. Within the conceptual strategy process framework, 
MNC 3’s response can be shown by the internal influence within the Formulation 
stage. However, even internal influences would have to be recognised as a legitimate 
force to make any impact (Ahearne et al., 2014). 
 






Participant Representative data 
2.F MNC 1 
“It’s pretty much the CEO, the CFO which is myself, we will have 
head of IT, head of compliance governance to tell us what are the 
new trends, head business development to keep a tab on where the 
business growth is possible”. 
 
“Head of Marketing and other departments…They take lead but that 
is more on implementation side”. 
 
2.F MNC 2 
“CEO, deputy CEO, chief strategic officer, division director, CFO”. 
 
2.F MNC 7 
“CEO and CFO are the main bodies”. 
 
2.G MNC 1 
“It’s pretty much done locally, a bottom up approach …Each country 
would have a local director…Negotiation with the headquarters when 
setting targets”. 
 
2.G MNC 2 
“It’s a family-run business, family members have higher influence. 
The heads are all family members. The professionals (employed 
staff) would be the managers…They are open for discussions and 




2.G MNC 3 
“To be honest, in a big company like this, I would have little 
influence in corporate strategy. This would mainly be the executive 
council and the board of the company”. 
 
“We train all levels of leaders in sustainability. That way we could 
influence senior leadership in applying sustainability. I can claim that 
my team have an impact in early and proactive engagements with our 
external stakeholders”. 
 
2.H MNC 1 
“We don’t have any external pressure as such in Saudi Arabia”. 
 
“The government control which NGOs can operate here”. 
 
2.H MNC 5 
“NGOs, government’s external stakeholders are more considered in 
the implementation stages. The NGOs that we work with are not 
really involved before we enter the country”. 
 
2.H MNC 7 
“You first have to see if it is profitable internally. External 
organisations like NGOs are not needed for this. It is more an 
analysis of strategic positioning and expansion”. 
 
2.H MNC 10 
“You won’t find external pressure groups in Saudi”. 
 
“The government will provide most things for society, the need for 




Category 2.H identified that within the early stages of the strategy process, external 
influence has little consideration. This was the case particularly within regions of 
high governmental regulation such as Saudi Arabia, where pressure groups cannot 
operate. Both MNC 1 and MNC 10 showcased limited external pressure and tight 
governmental control. MNC 5 also highlighted that NGOs are not considered in the 
early stages of strategy and more within the implementation stage of the strategy 
process. This has given an early insight into recognising where NGOs sit within the 
process, though their value has been acknowledged. MNC 3 elaborates this notion of 






“NGOs don’t make it to the initial planning Table. Only if they are needed to 
enter a new region and have specialties. It’s people like me that come in later 
in the process to work with external organisations. Especially in the Middle 
East where there is less threat from activism. This is of course varied in 
different areas of the Middle East. NGOs are not needed to understand if 
there is profit to be made or not” (MNC 3).  
 
In acknowledgment, MNC 7 further shares that NGOs could gain recognition if they 
are seen as a risk. In such situations, NGOs could be recognised within early stages 
of analysis and strategy formulation. This highlights an area where NGOs could gain 
power to influence the strategy process, explored further within the meso and micro 
empirical chapters.  
 
“Only if NGOs are seen as a risk factor, they could be considered” (MNC 7). 
 
The two second-order themes, ‘contextualising the strategy process’ and 
‘hierarchical importance’ in strategy making have formed the first macro aggregate 
theoretical dimension as feasibility indicators. At a macro level perspective, the 
strategy process has increased in complexity when designed for conflict zones due to 
several areas of concern. The concerns are with regard to the feasibility to enter such 
geographical areas. As a result, firms focus on planning for potential crisis by 
reviewing key indicators linked to the conflict. As well as commercial opportunity, 
feasibility indicators assess political stability, corruption, reputation and safety. 
Participant responses showed how experience could support in these assessments. 
Additionally, it had been recognised that NGOs have lower hierarchical importance 
in the early stages of the strategy process due to firm objectives being the forefront of 
concern. This in turn, questions where institutions are placed within the conceptual 
framework.   
 
6.5 Recognising Institutional Agendas 
 
During the interview process with NGO participants, it was apparent early in the 




be seen that the majority of the NGO respondents wanted to work with MNCs in 
friendly collaboration. NGO 8, as the exception, was an activist NGO who had set an 
agenda to work against MNCs. It can be useful to identify at an early stage what the 
institutional agenda is to recognise their method and ability to influence strategy. The 
literature has provided examples of activist NGOs changing strategic direction in the 
forestry industry (Kraemer et al., 2013) and raw material extraction (Eesley and 
Lenox, 2006). However, within the Middle East and North Africa, using an activist 
approach could be difficult, as identified, governments can have tighter control.  
 






Participant Representative data 
3.I NGO 2 
“We have the desire to collaborate but we don’t have the authority to 
make anything happen”. 
 
3.I NGO 4 
“We want to work with businesses not really to name and shame”. 
 
3.I NGO 6 
“We campaign for beneficial ownership, we campaign for payment 
transparency. In the extractive industry, companies in oil and mine 
should disclose all the payments they make, down to the project level. 
We campaign for supply chain diligence”. 
 
3.I NGO 8 
“Our main agenda is to make sure citizens do not purchase from these 
brands”. 
 
3.I NGO 9 
“We work in education, so we want to work with companies with the 
department that looks into social work and NGOs. We have partnered 










“We are not a so called activist organisation. We are professional in our 
approach. That also does not mean that we let unethical business practise go 
amiss…our organisation works to regulate, making sure that firms know what 
they are getting into…ultimately we want to eliminate corruption in practise” 
(NGO 4).  
 
NGO 4 provides a preview of how a social regulative body can operate. Though they 
are not seen as a direct threat to private business, the participant has shown that the 
organisation does not approve of unethical business practise. This highlights another 
area, which could be of consideration when firms gauge the importance of external 
organisations.  
 
6.6 NGOs’ Limited Authority Within Macro Firm Level Processes 
 
The type of NGOs that were interviewed varied with industry. Nevertheless, they all 
operated within the Middle East and North Africa region. It was interesting to find 
that some NGOs did not understand how businesses formulate themselves in the 
early stages of strategy creation. In Table 6.6, NGO 2 showcased that by being 
excluded within the early stages of strategy, they remained uninformed of how 
businesses think and plan. NGO 3 also highlighted the issue that being within a 
conflict zone such as Syria, MNCs may have a differing culture. 
 






Participant Representative data 
4.J NGO 2 
“The early stage of (business) strategy is usually confidential. This 
could be conflicting with the transparent nature of NGOs. It requires 





4.J NGO 3 
“This business model (working with NGOs) is not really widespread in 
Syria, maybe more in Lebanon and Jordan. It was started about a 




NGO 9’s comments further reiterate these notions. 
 
“It would help if I knew how these private businesses think. I could then be 
more successful in being included in their business planning and get more 
support for my cause” (NGO 9). 
 
Subsequently, further responses showed that NGOs want not only to be included 
within MNC planning but also for their work to be valued. From Table 6.7, it is 
apparent that NGOs feel they can benefit MNCs by being involved within the early 
stages of the strategy process. Though this is not the case from the MNC responses, 
NGO 2 highlighted that patience is needed to develop trust and collaboration. NGO 2 
further elaborates stating the case that NGOs sometimes have the solution that can 
prevent an issue from arising if approached earlier. This coincides with some MNC 
responses of shared value and literature stating the importance of including NGOs 
within planning stages of strategy (Oetzel et al., 2010; Porter and Kramer, 2011). 
Nevertheless, as seen within business practices NGOs have limited power in the 
early stages of strategy planning. This could be with the increased concerns for 
MNCs when planning to enter a conflict area. Additionally, NGOs 1, 4 and 11 refer 
to the importance of their services that they feel MNCs should value, seen in 
category 4.L.  
 
Table 6.7 also builds on the notion of temporality, where NGO 2 mentioned that it 
takes a lot of time to develop a relationship with MNCs. This suggests that NGOs 
could have to work through different stages of conflict, where MNCs many respond 
dependent on what the geographical region may be experiencing in terms on conflict. 
This was the case in Katsos and Forrer’s (2015) study where businesses were more 












Participant Representative data 
4.K NGO 2 
“Well yes, it would be ideal of companies to include us within their 
planning stages as we can offer a lot”. 
 
“It takes a lot of time to develop that relationship, while you’re dealing 
with the tyranny of the immediate which is very much a part of our life 
and work. So you very much have to keep some dry powder to develop 
these strategies with the patience to develop that trust and 
collaboration”. 
 
“The really important thing is to include the NGO as early up as 
possible. As if not, things tend to fall into traditional templates even in 
the most progressive companies and the NGO when asked to 
participate, ends up having to retro fit a solution or find some options 
are blocked which could have been very fruitful”. 
4.K NGO 3 
“I would like to influence businesses for the development of our goal”. 
 
4.K NGO 4 
“We’ve seen with the new CEO a fundamental change of strategy to 
away working with stakeholders like us, to more profit-driven, never 
mind the CSR agenda”. 
 
4.L NGO 1 
“We seek though partners where we feel we can take a proactive 
approach to working together in some of the toughest environments 
around the world. We are less enthused about taking a retroactive 
approach or deem being invited to clean up”. 
 
4.L NGO 4 
“We are not here to run after any business. They will recognise our 
important services. Businesses do not have an excuse to fall into the 
pitfalls conflict areas can bring” 
 
4.L NGO 11 
“We are here to do good. By purchasing our product the multi-national 
will be creating a change…unfortunately money talks and they want 
the cheaper option”. 
 
 
Previous strategy process models have not included the placement of institutions, 
where there could be a valued benefit to overcome identified risks in planning. NGO 




“Yes we disapprove of businesses that think it is okay to make profit at the 
cost of social welfare. We will do our best to make sure regulation and 
polices are put into place to avoid these things from happening. However, we 
are also here to give value to the private sector, to recommend an ethical 
route in making profit” (NGO 6).  
 
Though it was seen that NGOs have limited authority at the macro level, the findings 
show NGO partnership can be beneficial to firms, particularly collaborative NGOs. 
The literature also demonstrates the benefits for firms utilising NGO resources to 
increase social trust and international business operations (Doh and Teegen, 2002; 
Teegen et al., 2004). By collapsing the second-order themes, ‘recognising 
institutional agendas’ and ‘NGOs’ limited authority at a macro level’, the second 
aggregate theoretical dimension was an internal institutional rank of importance. 
Based on the NGOs’ agenda, the findings show firms can rank institutions dependent 
on what value they can provide to the firm. NGOs can be valuable to firms if they 
can help to reduce the identified risks and contribute to the process outcome. For 
example, the literature shows that firms have to understand local stakeholder 
demands within their environmental context (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2006; Galbreath, 
2010). Additionally, the findings show that firms are concerned about a reputational 
risk by entering a conflict environment. Hence, the concept of an institutional rank of 
importance needs to be included within a conceptual strategy process to identify 




The purpose of this chapter was to answer the first research question: What 
indicators are used in the strategy process for firms entering a conflict zone? From a 
macro perspective, the strategy process literature has been vague in identifying 
which key indicators firms use to enter conflict zones. Furthermore, it was not clear 
where institutions are placed within the process. The macro findings formed two 






Firstly, the main implication recognised for the strategy process in conflict zones was 
feasibility. To plan for potential crisis, participants shared key indicators specific to 
MNCs planning to enter a conflict environment. Commercial opportunity, political 
stability, corruption index, reputational risk and employee safety was identified as an 
important inclusion within the Situational analysis step. Furthermore, hierarchical 
importance was identified where senior management and government regulation had 
greater control of strategic direction over NGOs in the early stages. Due to some 
regions possessing tight regulatory control, external influences would need to pass a 
host governing body filter before gaining access to MNCs. Participant responses also 
reinforced key authors in starting the importance of previous industry experience to 
conduct such risk assessments (Darendeli and Hill, 2016).  
 
Secondly, in recognising hierarchical importance, NGOs’ agendas and limited 
authority at a macro level, firms possess an institutional rank of importance. 
Dependent upon the institutions’ ability to add value in the strategy planning stages, 
MNCs can gauge how useful an NGO would be. This can be recognised as the 
institution’s ability to reduce the risks identified in the feasibility indicators and 
contribute to the process outcome in the implementation stage.  
 
In recognising how the strategy process changes from a macro firm level, it is 
possible to further analyse NGOs at a meso level and individuals at a micro level. To 
understand how institutions can influence strategic decision-making within the 
Formulation and Evaluation stages required an understanding of the theoretical 
concepts of legitimacy, power and agency. The subsequent two findings chapters will 
review the development of these concepts. Particularly, how NGOs can pass firm 












NGOS PASSING THE FIRM LEGITIMACY FILTER 




This empirical chapter presents the meso level of analysis exploring the second 
research question: How can NGOs as institutions possess legitimacy and power to 
influence a firm’s strategy process in conflict zones? The theoretical literature shows 
that legitimacy and power are needed for external organisations to influence business 
strategy (Branzei et al., 2004; Henisz and Zelner, 2005). However, the source of 
legitimacy was unclear for NGOs particularly within the context of conflict zones. In 
connection, if NGOs could pass the firm legitimacy filter inherently goes to question 
how NGOs could possess institutional control to influence strategic decision-making. 
Drawing on institutional theory, this empirical chapter demonstrates the nature of 
organisational influence developing the theoretical constructs of legitimacy and 
power.  
 
The presentation of findings follows the meso data structure shown in the subsequent 
section. The chapter begins by reviewing the NGO perspective on why firms change 
within conflict zones. Subsequently, how NGOs can pass the firm legitimacy filter is 
reviewed. This has been acknowledged as an important aspect in relation to NGOs’ 
ability to influence strategic decision-making. The chapter progresses by illustrating 
the organisational differences within NGOs and different influential channels. The 
chapter concludes by gaining an understanding of institutional power. 
 
7.2 Meso Data Structure 
 
Figure 7.1 illustrates the key themes formed from a meso level of analysis. This 
chapter expands on each of the key areas providing representative data from the 
participants interviewed. The findings show how NGOs could gain legitimacy and 











































7.3 NGO Perspective on Why Firms Change in Conflict Zones 
 
NGO participants were questioned about their thoughts on why firms change when 
subjected to institutional pressure and conflict. Aligned with MNCs’ discussions, the 
findings show a consistent understanding of profit being the key driver, shown in 
Table 7.1. When it comes to conflict arising within a country, NGO 1 echoed what 
many of the MNC participants said. The NGO participants understood that 
First-order categories Second-order themes Aggregate theoretical dimensions 
2. Passing the 
legitimacy filter 
 A. Recognition that firms are profit driven 
 B. Firms should not fall for unethical 
practices due to conflict 
 
 C. Government control external pressure 
groups 
 D. Conflict increases recognition of security 
 E. Profit must be greater than risk  
 F. Firms seeking professionalism and 
collaborative efforts  
 G. Brings no hindrance to the firm 
operations 
 
 H. NGOs highlight benefits for collaborative 
approach 
 I. NGOs have resilient profile due to 




1. NGO views on firm 




 N. Organisational credibility and regulatory 
figure 
 O. Personal network and emotional 
attachment 
 P. Influencing the legal system 
4. Highlighting an 





5. NGOs influential 
channels  
 K. Have been forced to change due to on-
going pressure from opposing groups  
 L. Recognising a need to work with NGOs 




 J. NGOs ability to get a firm’s attention  
 















businesses might exit the country if conflict hinders the monetary agenda, referring a 
‘return on investment’. NGO 3, 7 and 10 concurred stating similar objectives related 
to profit. 
 






Participant Representative data 
1.A NGO 1 
“Return on investment. Can the conflict overcome the firm’s ROI? 
This is one major reason why firms would want to leave a turbulent 
area. The second is one most seen in extractive companies where they 
have a policy where if any life is in any danger somebody can push a 
metaphorical button and the program stops…A key member would 
need to make this decision”. 
 
1.A NGO 2 
“If companies choose to stay (in conflict zones), they have to choose 
how they stay. Do they create a bastion and create a barrier of 
arms…or do they decide to stay through local partnerships, through 
creating a mutual incentive with the community that there is enough 
economic benefit flowing from those business activities…this could 
not work if you have un-logical corrupt government”. 
 
1.A NGO 3 
“I guess a reason why we have not been so successful in getting the 
business attention is we are not their main agenda. Can we increase 
their profits? Probably not”. 
 
1.A NGO 5 
“<NGO name> did a big project in Lebanon…we attract companies 
because we buy their services. We need construction companies, 
people to sort out sewage systems etc.…we had a tender and chose the 
most suitable company”. 
 
1.A NGO 7 
“For them, business comes first. We have to talk their language”. 
 
1.A NGO 10 
“It is not so easy. In Egypt the mentality to give is not too much. You 
have to use emotion…otherwise it’s always about money”. 
 
“During the crisis the companies that are more close to the Egyptian 
culture, more connected with the country were more willing to give 
when we could show how we were going to make an impact…Other 
larger companies from abroad were not prepared to talk. I think they 




Egypt…nobody really knew how long the crisis was going to last”. 
 
NGO 10 continued to state that companies with a close association to the host 
country were more willing to give financial aid during the conflict period. This 
shows that financial support to NGO causes can be linked to firm culture, increasing 
the ability to influence. 
 
“During turbulence, companies were more supportive. I think because of the 
national spirit. People want to help during crisis” (NGO 10).   
 
With a slightly different perspective, it was seen that NGO 5 possessed control, as 
their relationship with companies was to hire firm services. NGO 5 had already 
gained funding before entering the country, thus their main agenda was to set up 
refugee camps within Lebanon. This showed a shift in attitude in the way the 
participant spoke about firms. NGO 5 further elaborated the importance of NGOs’ 
work within conflict regions due to spill-over effects between neighbouring 
countries.  
 
“I guess that could be the reason why we are working with Lebanese hosts. 
There was a fear that what was happening in Syria would spill over 
especially on refugee work…It can be a huge burden for a village population 
to increase by over 25% living in tents, sometimes in unsanitary conditions. 
We wanted to make sure the services we provide limit the spread of any 
disease” (NGO 5). 
 
NGO 5’s comment coincides with studies within the management literature showing 
the importance for businesses to rejuvenate the local economy and include 
development strategies within their operations after a conflict period (Oetzel et al., 
2007; Driffield et al., 2013). Firms have the ability to support NGOs on social 
agendas (Idemudia, 2010), however, as seen the actuality of business support would 





The study of Vachani et al. (2009) on NGOs influencing business social development 
strategies, showcased how NGOs have gained the ability to apply pressure on firms 
to support social causes. The aspect of influence was based upon firms generating 
high income from the host country or firms being criticised for causing negative 
externalities within the local community. Therefore, it can be argued that a key step 
of influence is to recognise the main business objectives. The second aspect 
mentioned by Vachani et al. (2009) suggested a regulatory role, where NGOs have 
influenced by representing the community voice. This was also identified by Den 
Hond et al. (2015) and Zald and Lounsbury (2010), where NGOs questioned 
unethical business practices. 
 
Subsequently, many NGO participants further expressed their concerns for firms 
becoming unethical when operating within the nature of conflict environments. Due 
to some attributes linked with conflict such as lack of regulation and corruption, 
firms have been seen to adapt their business operations to suit the culture of conflict 
countries (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016; Gambardella et al., 2016). Table 7.2 shows 
participants’ concern for firms conducting unethical practices due to operating with 
conflict counties.  
 






Participant Representative data 
1.B NGO 2 
“We are pro on working with the business sector. However, we make 
sure that we do not work with any companies that have been known 
for giving into unethical practise, such as bribery or working with 
terror groups”. 
 
1.B NGO 4 
“If any business operates within the MENA region, this is no excuse 
for them to say that ‘oh we had no idea that it was high risk or there 
was a lot of corruption here’. We publish research, we publish the 
index. It’s not difficult to find out very quickly that if you want to sell 
cars in Egypt there is a lot of corruption in Egypt and it means you 
need to understand how you are going to set up business there to 
prevent your business to either be a subject or involved in those kind 
of businesses…In Iraq there is a lot of other issues which all get tied 




pay protection money due to security issues”. 
 
1.B NGO 6 
“There always is a reputation risk by staying, you might get caught up 
in legal roadblocks… We want companies to stay (in the country) in 
an ethical way”. 
 
1.B NGO 7 
“Being in a developing country we go through all sorts of issues. We 
have a lot of corruption, administration is slow, if people know 
someone they could use that benefit for themselves and not for the 
business”. 
 
1.B NGO 8 
“During the war in Gaza. One of the factories in Gaza was producing 
milk. It was famous as it was the only factory in Gaza that produced 
milk, yogurt and all the dairy products. During the war, Israel bombed 
this factory. Even when it was far away from any resistance…We 
think that there is a strong link between the Israeli Army, the Israeli 
government and the Israeli companies”. 
 
1.B NGO 11 




NGOs’ view on unethical business practise is well cited within the management 
narrative (Fort, 2009; Getz and Oetzel, 2009; Laureiro-Martinez et al., 2015). Within 
a conflict context unethical business has been seen to increase due to insurgency and 
lack of regulation (Anderson et al., 2010). Additionally, within these contexts 
MNCs’ actions are criticised if they are contradictory to NGO objectives (Land et al., 
2014; Kolk, 2015). It can be seen that firms change their strategic direction if there is 
an external impact upon their financial investment and profit margins. As well as 
return on investment, it was noted that if the conflict were a security risk, either to 
the brand image or personnel, many firms would withdraw from the conflict region. 
Where NGOs operated in the same environment, the concern for unethical business 
practices was shared in most participant responses. From Table 7.2, NGO 2 and 4 
highlighted a strong stance objecting to firms engaging in unethical actions such as 
bribery. NGO 4 further reiterated that MNCs need to incorporate preventive 






“It should be a big part of their (MNC’s) strategy that they plan to avoid 
corruption. We will hold companies’ account of that. And if they don’t design 
their strategy and say it’s just the way they do business to the local 
conditions, than we will not have a lot of sympathy for that” (NGO 4).  
 
NGO 4’s comment demonstrates that MNCs have been seen to fixate their operations 
with ‘the way of doing business to the local conditions’. Within the NGO bracket, 
there are different sub-sectors which seek different resources from MNCs (Werker 
and Ahmed, 2008). Participants NGO 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10 and 11 all want to connect 
with MNCs to gain financial and knowledge resource which would support their own 
social projects. On the other hand, NGO 4, 6 and 8 are focused on regulating 
business practises with the concern of social welfare as their main objective. From 
the latter group of NGOs, it can be seen that their main objective is to ensure that 
businesses do not gain financial benefit at the cost of leaving negative externalities to 
the host country. Thus, there can be a clear identification and differences in the way 
each participant gives their responses. Nevertheless, the findings show that there is 
an underlying theme throughout NGOs’ ability to influence strategic direction. 
Whether NGOs are regulating business practise (Baur and Arenas, 2014) or seeking 
resources (Meyer et al., 2009), they have become a key aspect within firms’ strategic 
dimensions. As Peng et al. (2009) articulate, an institutionally based view can help to 
understand the firm’s change in strategy.  
 
Participant responses highlighted the difficulties of operating within a conflict 
context. NGO 6 and 7 coincide with Brammer et al. (2012) and Jackson and Deeg 
(2008) showing the implications of international business in developing nations. 
From the responses, NGOs have recognised that firms are profit-driven but do not 
want them to engage in unethical practices. MNCs possess the ability to develop a 
conflict nation (Kolk, 2015), yet have been observed to operate unethically being 
criticised by NGOs (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). Additionally, as noted from a macro 
perspective firms rank institutions based on their ability to add value to the strategic 
outcome. As a result, institutions gain importance particularly if they can reduce the 
identified risks in the situational analysis stage, such as reputation. This notion 





One aspect of how firms make strategic decisions is based upon how the company 
wants to be accredited from a global perspective (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996; Den 
Hond et al., 2015). For example, though some anti-corruption NGOs cannot operate 
in certain regions of the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia (due to tight governmental 
regulation), MNCs still need to maintain an international reputation. From the 
participant responses, extractive companies faced more external pressure to change. 
Thus, these firms have had to integrate professional measures within their strategic 
direction such as including sustainability or external relations departments. MNC 3 
elaborated on this theme.  
 
“Over the last 10 years there has been an acknowledgement of the impact 
these kinds of risks that can impact our ability to deliver our 
objectives…Impact on cost, impact on schedule, impact on reputation, etc. So 
folks like me have started to now have a seat at the table”(MNC 3).  
 
“We have an organisation in <company name> that focus on NGO relations. 
They take a look at what the challenge to <company name> may be. They 
look at how respective they are with collaboration of discussions. Because 
you know, some don’t really have any interest, right. They want to make a 
point of what they are trying to make a point about. The more you engage 
with them the more it allows them to leverage that to get the publicity that 
they want. So in some cases you can engage with these folks (NGOs) and 
have good discussions and work on solutions. And in some cases we decide 
we are not going to engage at all with these folks. Just because it doesn’t lead 
to anything constructive, only just fuelling the fire, say to speak” (MNC 3).   
 
The commentary by MNC 3 shows how, through consistent pressure, NGOs have 
been recognised within strategic discussion. The social pressure from NGOs has 
developed the firm into wanting to be accredited and legitimised by the public. MNC 
6 and 7 further reiterate highlighting that sustainability is also becoming integrated 






“The industry has changed. It cannot just be about business banking. 
Business actions need to be sustainable and that’s why people like me are 
integrating pretty much a new concept. Formal discussions on sustainability 
and social development didn’t exist here, but the international community has 
spoken, changing the way our company thinks” (MNC 6). 
 
“NGOs have more and more influence because they represent the public 
opinion. And public opinion is getting more concerned about the actions that 
corporates are taking that are negatively affecting the environment and 
particularly from a reputational risk and how this is affecting in the media” 
(MNC 7).    
 
Therefore, from a meso perspective, strategic change can be governed by how firms 
assess the impact of NGOs and organisational culture. Firms that operate within a 
conflict context are faced with social expectations set within an institutional setting. 
Hence, to eliminate risk and meet social expectations MNCs have to respond to NGO 
claims. However, from an MNC perspective the findings show that not all NGOs 
could pass firm filters due to the complexity of a conflict environment and lack of 
legitimacy.  
 
7.4 Passing the Legitimacy Filter 
 
The core of the second research question was to understand if NGOs have legitimacy 
and power to influence business strategic decisions. From the literature review, it 
was conceptualised that NGOs have to pass a legitimacy filter in order to join the 
strategy-making discussions with strategy teams and firm executives. MNC 
participants shared their experience on how NGO influences could enter strategic 
decision-making. As a result five key categories were recognised, aligned with 
external influences passing the firm legitimacy filter. The first category gave 
reference to the host governing body filter within the strategy process. 
 
The conversations with MNC participants show that most countries within the 




some degree, as shown in Table 7.3. As a result, firms and governing authorities 
have become vigilant with the local indicators described in the previous chapter, 
particularly with the operation of pressure groups. Consequently, the concept of 
external organisational influence was linked to governmental control within the 
MENA region and limited pressure groups. However, MNC 2 highlighted that NGOs 
could influence ‘the world opinion’, highlighting how NGOs could gain institutional 
control where there is tight local governmental regulation. 
 






Participant Representative data 
2.C MNC 1 
“Though Saudi has trouble with some of their neighbours…we don’t 
face any particular NGO pressure...there is a tight control in this 
country”. 
 
“The local governance has more of an influence on strategy…they can 
dictate what we can and cannot do”. 
 
2.C MNC 2 
“At least in Iraq and Egypt, we don’t face any pressure from NGOs. 
They have no role…government does not allow, there is no freedom of 
speech. I don’t think they can influence in any particular way. Because 
survival of them (NGOs) is of question. There’s <international NGO 
name>, they are doing humanitarian work, but that is also difficult. 
They are not strong enough to play a threatening role”. 
 
“Middle East it is difficult for NGOs due to the current monarchy 
situation…They (NGOs) can easily be put down by the government”. 
 
“The political climate has more influence. It’s not so democratic. Only 
in democratic countries these people (NGOs) can play a stronger 
role…Of course they can influence the world opinion, but the 
government must enforce the change”. 
 
2.C MNC 4 
“We didn’t have any connection with NGOs. For example in Baghdad, 
we were very well self-sufficient…We had built our own compound 
with our own security. We didn’t need any agency to support such as 
the United Nations. When times were difficult NGOs couldn’t last, 
they were not present. I mean, it was a war zone.  Nobody could get in, 




2.C MNC 9 
“It can be hard for NGOs as governments have a tight control on who 
can operate in their country. They don’t respond to external threats 




The participant responses show that due to governmental control, it can be difficult 
for some NGOs to enter the country. The firms themselves have been restricted in 
how they can operate in particular countries as participants MNC 1 and 9 expressed. 
MNC 6’s comments further reiterate how they feel about receiving pressure from 
NGOs.  
 
“We don’t really feel pressure from NGOs. We are very sure what our 
parameters are where we operate. This goes with whom we work with and 
how they can report back to us transparently what the impact is” (MNC 6). 
 
MNC 6’s comments show how multinational organisations have a filter on which 
external organisations they work with. Thus, one aspect of how firms gauge their 
external pressure is by recognising if the governing body authorises the organisation 
to operate within the country. This finding coincides with Goodstein and Velamuri's 
(2009) recognition of national states using power to maintain control. Subsequently, 
the comments highlight the difference between the variety of institutions and their 
regulative ability (Fremeth and Shaver, 2013). Thus, it can be argued that an NGO’s 
capacity to directly influence firm actions would first start with their ability to fulfil 
local governmental regulations.  
 
Arregle et al. (2013) show how firms change due to regulation from regional political 
institutions. The study demonstrates how firms consider their institutional setting 
within their international strategy. This further reiterates how institutions can 
influence strategic direction. However, these institutions are seen as governmental 
regulators. Kolk and Lenfant's (2012) review on business collaboration with NGOs 
showcases that most partnerships in conflict zones are based on philanthropic deals. 
MNC 1 and 2’s comments indicate the same narrative where some firms have 





“In terms of sustainability, it’s pretty much an internal part…It’s more our 
internal culture. There are no regulatory requirements…we do this (work 
with NGOs) from a voluntary aspect” (MNC 1).  
 
“<Company name> is not very active in the social sector. They do charity 
because charity is there in Islam. They do charity but just financial, nothing 
else…during Ramadan they give a lot of funds…It’s all personal level, not 
company level” (MNC 2). 
 
Following the acknowledgment of governmental control, the second key category 
was the firms’ recognition of increased security within conflict areas (Table 7.4). It 
was identified that a firm’s strong concern when operating within conflict areas was 
the security resource that would be needed. This concern was considered of more 
importance than the effect NGOs could have on the company.  
 






Participant Representative data 
2.D MNC 3 
“It makes good business sense to understand and address the 
challenges being posed to us. Any profit-driven organisation isn’t 
going to change unless they feel an impact to the bottom line. I’m just 
being brutally honest, right? Shareholders expect you to make a profit 
and make a certain return. And unless the external force is going to 
challenge those, you are not going to see much change…there has to 
be an actual security risk to make a direct impact”. 
 
2.D MNC 4 
“My company did have to pull out of Erbil when the ISIS forces were 
about 70 kilometres outside of the city…With an international staff of 
around 100 people stationed there, as a company they couldn’t 
guarantee the personal safety, and if needing evacuation, they would 
have to pull out”. 
 
2.D MNC 5 
“Yes, we feel pressure always, everywhere…We have to select the 
business we want to enter and the location of the business. The 
security has to be of a certain level. If there is a risk that people will 
get killed from conflict then it is likely we will not operate. We were 




choice, that we close the operation and pull our people out. Including 
the local staff. We are not party for gangs with machine guns”. 
 
“Our decision to pull out of Libya and our decision to pull out of Syria 
was not because of pressure from any institution. That was totally 
based on the security going to the level we couldn’t control”. 
 
2.D MNC 6 
“We cannot work with some NGOs, as put quite simply we do not 
want to take a risk. What’s the point of working on a project when we 
are putting not only our reputation on the line but security measures 
also”. 
 
2.D MNC 9 
“Look, it’s always going to be a matter of risk assessment first. When 
we go into these unstable areas we have to know what security will be 
provided to us and how much we have to organise ourselves”. 
 
 
MNC 3 simply summarised what most of the participants had mentioned. MNC 3 
articulated that a firm would not change unless there was an external attribute, which 
would impact the “bottom-line”, referring to the financial gains a firm can make. 
This notion resonates with Arregle et al. (2013) showing that firms are more likely to 
respond to institutional demands if the external pressure can hinder a firm’s 
profitability. Subsequently, firms have recognised as a first liability, security is 
needed when operating within a conflict environment where the business and 
personnel could be at risk. Both MNC 4 and 5 shared cases where they had to exit 
business operations due to the potential of colliding with terrorist groups or the local 
governing bodies could not provide adequate safety due to internal civil conflict. 
However, some participants, such as MNC 6 thought that external stakeholders 
would be a hindrance in conflict regions. Conversely, MNC 5 continued to express 
how they found local stakeholders beneficial in security.  
 
“We have to use the local security... we ensure that the security take training 
in human rights…the best security are from your neighbours. If you operate 
in a village, have a good relationship with them, they would be your best 
security. Things like shared value creation, things like security come in hand. 
It’s very practical. It’s nothing to do with charity. This is all shared 






MNC 5’s thoughts coincide with Bourne and Jenkins (2013) showing how 
connecting with stakeholders can create a symbolic value which in turn can benefit 
the firm beyond monetary gains. Hence, a sense of value needs to be articulated for 
firms to legitimise NGOs. The notion of collaborative efforts with social 
organisations was also expressed in other studies whereby external groups supported 
firms within conflict regions (Branzei and Abdelnour, 2010; Den Hond et al., 2015). 
Nevertheless, where security was a key concern for firms it was seen that within 
strategic discussion, financial gain must be high enough to cover potential risk 
factors and extra costs linked to operating within conflict regions. The third category 
was therefore formed on the basis of profit forecasts.  
 
When entering into conflict zones, firms must prepare for not only scenario planning 
but also ensuring that external pressure does not intervene with business operations 
(Grant, 2003; Jamali and Mirshak, 2010; Husted et al., 2016). The responses given 
by MNC participants in Table 7.5 are reflected within management narratives. It was 
seen that though profit can be made within the Middle East for many multinational 
companies, firms have to ensure that profit margins can cover potential risk factors. 
Participants MNC 2, 3, 5 and 8 expressed these notions. However, MNC 4 elaborated 
how businesses decide their movements dependent upon the organisational ethos in 
every level within the firm. MNC 3 also succinctly shared that their firm wants to 
collaborate with external organisations but will not promote social investment unless 
it can be linked back to the firm’s project. This reflects how firms begin to gauge 
their external pressures.  
 






Participant Representative data 
2.E MNC 2 
“It is experience. What we experience in countries we apply to all. We 
learn many things in how to deal with situations. This can be applied 
to all regions, which experience similar things such as political 
instability. If there is enough gain to be made, we will use our 




2.E MNC 3 
“Everything is underlined by profit. When we work with external 
groups, we tell them straight up, we are only interested in doing good 
things in the places we operate and we want to work collaboratively. 
But in all honesty, we are not going to do a bunch of activities and 
invest a bunch of social investment dollars unless it can clearly be 
linked back to our projects”. 
 
2.E MNC 4 
“Most of the countries in the Middle East are tinder boxes…Bahrain is 
a very good example…in 2011 there was major conflict in 
Bahrain…there was major demonstrations with tear gas, shooting at 
demonstrators, people dead, international attention, curfew clamp-
down, etc. And here yet we were continuing. Many western expats left 
the country and came back once it all settled down…It’s the 
organisational ethos, if you have a culture which is embedding within 
your organisation, which is percolated finely throughout all layers 
throughout the company, then you have a motivated organisation”. 
 
2.E MNC 5 
“A key part of strategy is to make sure that there is enough profit to be 
made which can outweigh the risk analysis…If we need to extract in 
conflict areas, we have to account for certain measures. This too, will 
have a cost”. 
 
2.E MNC 8 
“What would make companies change their decisions to act within 
conflict zones is always linked to cost and financial return...This is 
beyond CSR activity. CSR is always a by-product if it does happen. 
But the company is a business. The overall goal is to make money”. 
 
2.E MNC 10 
“This is a Chinese company doing business in the Middle East. They 
would not come if they felt it would be a failure and would get caught 
up in terror attacks”. 
 
 
Within the initial discussions with MNCs on external influences, it was apparent that 
governmental control, security and profit were of greater concern. However, firms 
still faced institutional pressures from NGOs regardless of the comparative 
importance, which could impact strategic direction. Hence conversations with MNCs 
subsequently led to an understanding of how MNCs legitimise which NGOs to 
respond to.  
 
During data analysis, the fourth category linked to passing the firm legitimacy filter 




participants referred to ‘professional’ as working within their business model. Table 
7.6 shows participant responses on what MNCs seek from NGOs. The underlying 
theme shows that firms want to work with NGOs that are cooperative. MNC 3 and 8 
further elaborate describing how activist NGOs do not want to communicate within a 
business in a professional manner and, as a result from an MNC perspective, these 
types of NGOs lose their legitimacy. Most of the participants, referred to working 
with NGOs who possess good reputation and can be trustworthy within their 
operations. This was also described by Den Hond et al. (2015) where MNCs are 
more likely to collaborate with NGOs if both their interests match and NGOs are 
willing to become a partner.  
 






Participant Representative data 
2.F MNC 1 
“There are some NGOs that we work with…these are the ones that 
have been given a clearance by the government in terms of what they 
can do in Saudi Arabia and have registered…We go through their 
(NGO) charter, articles of association. We run things throughout our 
head office, making sure there is no conflict of interest…We don’t 
want any surprises later on”. 
 
“We generally find common grounds…there is a fair amount of 
information (about the NGO) on websites also these days, so we do 
that”. 
 
2.F MNC 2 
“Of course we legitimise. There are so many sources now with the 
internet...we do some background checks. We also get them checked 
by some reputational agency if required”. 
 
2.F MNC 3 
“It comes down to their willingness to cooperate and have meaningful 
conversations. I’ve had the opportunity to have conversations with 
many NGOs and many of them are just not willing to listen, no matter 
how much you talk about things. They will just continue to find ways 
to criticise and oppose working constructively and for those 
organisations, and <international NGOs name> is a really good 
example, I mean, their organisation won’t make money by 




model…Their business model, they get funding from donors for the 
type of activities that they engage in and the impact on businesses”. 
 
2.F MNC 5 
“There is a selection process. If we can meet with a matching vision 
then we can work together. That’s how you progress with partnership”. 
 
2.F MNC 6 
“We check if the NGO is involved in money laundering…being a bank 
we have easy access to these databases…we also have other internal 
measures about their track record, media coverage, how they have 
been affiliated with type of terrorism…in addition to that we also look 
at their track record of delivering projects, what their reputation is 
within the community and also what percent of funds that they raise 
goes into administrating and what goes into the community”. 
 
2.F MNC 8 
“There are NGOs that feel that they need to be listened to because they 
call themselves an NGO. If you look at NGOs, there are different 
classes of NGOs, there are activists. You got the ones that want to 
cooperate. You got the ones that respect that it is a journey and also 
you got the ones that are realists of what they can influence and what 
not. And so how do you make that selection? It is a function of the 
purpose they have, do they have the global reach, what is their 
reputation?”. 
 
2.F MNC 9 
“From the company’s point of view they look at the NGO’s reputation, 
their value worth, but also competition. There are many organisations 
that fight to be on top and connect”. 
 
 
Rodríguez-Pose (2013) states that NGOs have to be collaborative but also 
competitive. The competitive nature within NGOs will increase the chances to gain 
recognition by MNCs and would improve an NGO’s professionalism. Nevertheless, 
MNC 9 summarised the majority of the responses by describing a sense of value to 
the firm. This would be based on a strategic, pragmatic type of legitimacy offering a 
mutually beneficial option (Suchman, 1995; Suddaby et al., 2017). The external force 
would position themselves in line with the firm’s objectives, increasing the chances 
to enter the firm’s formulation stage of strategy. However, this would only be 
successful if the firm does not feel threatened by the external force (Selznick, 1996; 
Dacin et al., 2002). Participant MNC 9 continued to share that NGOs also possess the 





“From what I have seen, the NGO can bring legitimacy for the firm in terms 
of reputation but also in terms of local network…that is something that is 
quite important with the relationship with the company” (MNC 9). 
 
Given the type of business operations firms are subjected to societal pressure. The 
empirical findings show that within some industries such as the extractive sector, 
firms are equally looking for NGOs who can enhance the firm’s credibility and brand 
image.  
 
“We have discussions with various environmental NGOs to address issues 
and work on problems together…they (NGOs) are a trusted source so we 
should include them (MNC 3).  
 
This form of credibility has been described in the literature (Escobar and 
Vredenburg, 2011). Firms using NGOs as a knowledge resource or connecting for 
CSR purposes can enhance a positive image (Brammer et al., 2012; Cordeiro and 
Tewari, 2014). However, it can be debated whether firm actions are driven by moral 
or strategic principles. Nevertheless, NGO participants continued to highlight how 
external forces can gain legitimacy by not interrupting business operations. This 
notion formed the fifth category of the second-order theme. The responses shown in 
Table 7.7 show that MNCs assess external organisations ensuring that they do not 
bring any hindrance upon business operations. MNC 5 (director of sustainability) 
described that though the firm has created provisions for CSR, the participant has to 
pitch internally as to why the firm should work with an organisation. This shows that 
there is a thorough internal screening process of legitimacy before access is granted 


















Participant Representative data 
2.G MNC 1 
“We want to do some work in the society obviously, but if it is not 
acceptable to the government or not acceptable to <company name> 
then we wouldn’t do that”. 
 
2.G MNC 3 
“You can’t have constructive conversation with <international NGOs 
name> if they don’t want you to be there, period”. 
 
2.G MNC 5 
“We would screen the project first before the NGO. If the project 
makes sense then we would screen the NGO. We have an internal team 
that then have to answer to the senior management”. 
 
“Though <MNC name> has set aside a budget to work with NGOs, I 
still have to pitch as to why we should work on this project...My team 
carry out thorough screening before we even engage in any 
conversation”. 
 
2.G MNC 7 
“We can’t discriminate between the NGOs. If they have made a 
statement and it gathers public attention we must address them. The 
companies which we work with and fund only want to mitigate risk. I 
guess, the smaller the less relevant. But how can you define what is a 
small NGO. I tend to class all NGOs the same. Rather assessing the 
NGO, it’s about assessing the comments. It’s not about the quality of 
the NGO but it’s about the quality of their work”. 
 
2.G MNC 9 
“In theory it seems that NGOs are doing something good and that the 
company want to make money. But too often we forget that the NGO 
have their own agenda, their own political view, they may have their 
own intrinsic difficulties”. 
 
 
MNC 7 began to explain why firms have such control measures within their 
organisation. It can be seen that due to NGOs possessing the ability to gather public 
trust, any comments made on MNCs can affect the running of the business. Werker 
et al. (2008) and Bitektine and Haack (2015) recognise this phenomenon within 
management literature. Therefore, one method where an NGO can be accepted as a 




words the NGO would need to be of value. However, it is well recognised within the 
literature that NGOs operate in different ways. This opens discussion towards 
understanding the organisational differences between NGOs. Although MNCs prefer 
to work with a certain type of NGO, there have been cases where non-collaborative 
NGOs have gained influential ability (Doh and Guay, 2006). 
 
7.5 Organisational Differences Within NGOs  
 
It has been seen how MNCs legitimise external organisations. However, to 
comprehend the complete situation it is important to gather an NGO perspective. The 
way in which NGOs approach their relationship with MNCs differs dependent upon 
what they seek, whether financial resource or change in business operations. The first 
reoccurring category in this theme was recognising that NGOs have understood the 
benefit of taking a collaborative approach. For NGOs that possess an objective to 
fulfil a particular social project, connecting as a partner with MNCs would be 
beneficial to their cause.  
 
As seen in Table 7.8, NGO 1 and 2 have understood that in order to work 
successfully with an MNC they have to take a collaborative, professional approach. 
What MNC participants shared was well articulated by NGO 1 and 2. It was also 
understood that activist NGOs have made the legitimacy process difficult. However, 
NGO 2 defended activist NGOs stating that the actions taken by such NGOs may be 
necessary when required. Thus, there seems to be a connection and mutual respect 
between differing causes and approaches.  
 






Participant Representative data 
3.H NGO 1 
“Each one of the layers within the organisation needs to have their 






3.H NGO 2 
“We do not make any specific demands but are very encouraged when 
the company communicates the partnership internally”. 
 
“Within the NGO community there is a vast array of sub sectors and 
we are economically-driven, market-based very pragmatic through 
local partnership and through strategic partnership. That’s how we see 
our work getting done. We do not see our work getting done with full-
page ads in the New York Times or by protests. That’s not to say that 
those types of acts are not legitimate, where it can be required with 
those companies or with those activities that deserve that type of 
response. But it causes distrust with the whole NGO community”. 
 
3.H NGO 3 
“In 2011 we had some good communication with local 
businesses…but with the shift in the situation things have changed. So 
we don’t want to bring effort because nobody will recognise the 
environmental conservation. They say that there is something more 
important…This is one of the dilemmas that we are falling in”. 
 
3.H NGO 7 
“Being very transparent of the dealings with the company. How we 
handle our finances, being experts validating everything that we do. 
And then communicating our actions and communicating our impacts 
as well. There could be more things we could do but at the moment we 
are only really doing these two things”. 
 
3.H NGO 9 




NGO 3 touched upon competition between NGOs who are focused on different 
causes. NGO 3 also expressed that being within a conflict zone, firms prioritise 
importance in terms of CSR. In reference to Scott’s (1995) institutional pillars, 
NGOs could take either a normative or cogitative approach. A normative association 
would be pragmatic for a firm’s need for professionalism. However, it has been seen 
that different firm’s would connect with different NGOs that take a cognitive 
approach. Within a conflict context firms would choose an NGO that would be most 
relevant to a situation. The empirical findings show fewer cases where firms support 
an NGO on the basis of the NGO’s knowledge alone. Either there would be a social 
obligation, support during a crisis period or the firm would be gaining something in 
return from CSR. Nevertheless, for a collaborative NGO to pass the legitimacy filter, 




From the MNC responses, being of value to the company appears to be the main 
barrier. On the other hand, NGOs have also been able to sway MNCs decisions by 
possessing a resilient profile from defending societal concerns. As identified earlier, 
MNCs are concerned with NGOs as they are supported by a public opinion. The 
responses in Table 7.9 highlight a strength that NGOs possess. Each NGO has 
selected a particular cause that they support. This provides the NGO legitimacy from 
a section of the population (Vachani et al., 2009). NGO 3, 4 and 10 expressed that 
being an expert within the field has allowed them to be known for what they do. 
However, being well known would not necessarily provide value for firms where 
NGOs could regulate business actions.  
 






Participant Representative data 
3.I NGO 3 
“As we are one of the leading NGOs dealing with environment (in 
Syria) we don’t want to change our strategic focus and our goal. 
Because the situation is bad it is tough, but hopefully things will settle 
down and we can keep running”. 
 
3.I NGO 4 
“We have a fairly high profile in our sector and could be seen to be a 
leading NGO in the anti-corruption space. That means that companies 
do know who we are and do understand what our role is…so 
legitimacy is easy for us as we are well established and we have a 
good reputation”. 
 
3.I NGO 6 
“We don’t tend to sort of help companies with any other means but 
trying to make the system work better for the people of these 
countries… If you find gold in your country a fair share should be 
benefited to the people that live there, you can get private companies 
but a fair share of tax revenue should be, you know, there to build 
roads, schools etc.”. 
 
3.I NGO 7 
“We do not deal with corruption…There are some businesses that 
work in the grey area of business. We refuse to work with these 
companies. But in a developing country, a lot of business will work in 
the grey area. So this is a lot of companies you don’t want to work 
with”. 




only economy but also a matter of dignity and colonial 
regime…During the war people are more emotional against the war. 
People want to boycott Israeli goods. Many Palestinian supermarket 
chains declared that they are freeing their supermarkets of Israeli 
goods that they are with the Gaza. But this was for PR to get more 
people to buy from them. But after, they started stocking Israeli 
products”. 
 
3.I NGO 10 
“Now we are working for around 10 years, it is based on our record 
and our activities. On the conference we did, on the training we offer”. 
 
 
NGO 4 continued explaining how being within the anti-corruption sector, some firms 
try to avoid any connection. On the other hand, being connected with this NGO also 
gives credibility to the firm showing support of their objectives.  
 
“If someone wants to join our forum then we do our due diligence process, 
we don’t just let anybody in. We go through a process, that allows companies 
to join…there is also a process to expel them where our leverage comes in. 
We have conversations with companies that are not doing the right thing” 
(NGO 4).  
 
The findings show that possessing concern for the welfare of the public allowed the 
NGO to apply institutional pressure. A concern for the public can be seen as a source 
of legitimacy for the NGO to question MNC practice, even if the NGO did not pass 
the legitimacy filter set by the firm. Where NGO 7 had taken an approach to avoid 
‘businesses that operated in the grey area’, NGO 8’s approach is to intentionally 
affect a firm’s business operations. As NGO 8 stated, they use emotion, fact and 
figures to gather public interest. NGO 8 has continued to share a case study, which 
gathered support for their cause to oppose firms.  
 
“My friend had started a mushroom farm. There was no mushroom farm in 
Palestine. All mushrooms were from Israel. They invested lots of money…to 
grow mushroom you need special soil, special conditions, lots of things…they 
got loans from the bank and they started succeeding. They started labelling 




them saying, why don’t they sell the mushroom to them and they can then re-
sell it to the Palestinian people. Don’t compete with us. These young people 
refused and wanted their own brand…The second time they ordered the 
special soil the Israeli border authority prevented them from importing this 
compost and soil. They held the soil for six months for security reasons…they 
had to pay for the borders authority to hold the products and they became 
bankrupt. The farm now is destroyed” (NGO 8).  
 
This example shows how an activist NGO operates, influencing the consumer 
demand to affect MNC profit margins. This institutional influence, though non-
collaborative, made an impact on the strategic management of an MNC. This was 
also the case seen in the study of Shropshire et al. (2013), where NGOs gained firm 
responsiveness by heightening stakeholder concerns. It was interesting to recognise 
that NGO 4 and 6, though also representing social regulative organisations, used a 
professional approach that was different to NGO 8. Both approaches gain 
‘institutional legitimacy’ (Suchman, 1995) from their objectives to improve business-
consumer transactions and minimising negative externalities to the host country as a 
result. Suchman (1995) describes institutional legitimacy as cultural pressure to 
change organisations. Within institutional legitimacy, sources of legitimacy implies 
how authority can be gained to make assessments and influence decisions (Ruef and 
Scott, 1998). The empirical findings show that NGOs possess two sources of 
legitimacy to pass firm filters.  
 
The first source is based on adding value. The collected data show that firms 
legitimise collaborative NGOs who are professional in their approach and can add 
value to the firm’s objectives; for example, increasing firm reputation from CSR 
efforts or joining a local network within a conflict region. The second source of 
legitimacy is through interception. The organisational differences between NGOs 
recognise that some NGOs seek financial resource and others aim to regulate 
business practise. Therefore, legitimacy does not come solely from MNC credibility 
assessments. As NGOs question business integrity, they can gain legitimacy from 
harnessing collective consumer option, in turn intercepting firm strategic decisions. 
This indirectly gathers MNC attention, particularly where NGOs can show business 




on firm changes’, ‘passing the legitimacy filter’ and ‘organisational differences’ 
forms the first meso aggregate theoretical dimension: Institutional value or 
Institutional interception.  
 
Munir (2015) state that legitimacy alone cannot influence others players and actions. 
The notion of power needs to be addressed to see how institutions gain strength to 
influence the strategy process. The first step in understanding this phenomenon was 
to recognise how NGOs gain MNCs’ attention.  
 
7.6 Highlighting an Area of Social Concern 
 
In close connection with legitimacy, the findings show that the first step in achieving 
institutional control was to highlight an area of social concern. Table 7.10 shows 
participant responses in how NGOs began to gain recognition. NGO 1 introduced the 
concept of key actors involved in establishing a relationship with MNCs. However, 
NGO 2 mentions the challenges linked to this with organisational competition and 
the value that can be gained by the MNC taking part in such activities. Being within 
a conflict environment allows NGOs to be able to provide solutions for problems that 
could be faced by MNCs. However, the NGO must be able to address the correct 
issue where NGO 3 was not receiving the attractive attention desired. In comparison 
NGOs 4 and 6 questioned MNC business practices directly, gaining the desired 
attention. This resonates with MNC 7’s earlier comments (Table 7.7) on having to 
review each NGO’s comment regardless of the size. This is due to the NGOs’ ability 
to capture public opinion.  
 






Participant Representative data 
4.J NGO 1 
“A third party (a local representative of an NGO) is really the key for 
the long term success, and although they are challenging in a global 
partnership, they really are the local ecosystem to carry forth any work 




4.J NGO 2 
“Well I think if you are viewed as someone that is trying to alter their 
strategy, you’ve lost. You need to be viewed as a partner, as an 
advocate of your shared interest”. 
 
“The largest challenge could be getting people’s mind space to look at 
a project which may have social impact but is competing against the 
next 20 million dollar US aid or something like that”. 
 
4.J NGO 3 
“Firms in Syria are more willing to give to humanitarian aid. But with 
our goals being environmental conservation, it’s difficult to get their 
attention. It is in our culture, in our religion that if you are supporting 
the humanitarian you are supporting your friends, your family or 
community. But for other causes it isn’t the case. And with the recent 
cases, it is even harder”. 
 
4.J NGO 4 
“People know of us and it’s really down to someone within their 
(MNC) team to want to use our services”. 
 
“We do get companies that contact us because they are moving into a 
market and they would like to understand what the risks are, what the 
challenges and we put them in touch with our local representatives”. 
 
“We had published some research on government’s level of 
transparency and from that we had then been invited by many 
government officials to look into their procurement systems”. 
 
4.J NGO 6 
“A case where we have influenced company behaviour is trying to 
expose big corruption deals…they sold off many mining assets very 
cheaply, by which I mean mines to an unknown company but owned 
by a man called <name>. It was exposed that he owns these 
companies. It also happens that he is a friend of the president. He then 
sells them on sometimes a few days later many, many times more than 
what he paid for them. Stripping all assets. He then sells them on to 
‘normal’ companies who are very much aware of his corruption profile 
and a clear corruption risk…So we’ve been involved in going to 
companies’ AGMs and asking questions why they would buy this asset 
from a known middle-man who is friends with the president and high 
corruption risk”. 
 
4.J NGO 7 
“First they see us as a charitable organisation, then they see us as a 
smart way to give, charitable organisation”. 
 
4.J NGO 9 
“Some companies have a department connected with social work. This 






4.J NGO 11 
“They want to have you in their company, because of all the ethical 
benefits that comes with stocking an ethical brand. But then they want 
you to pay the same cost as their previous supplies”. 
 
 
Firms that are looking to carry out CSR activity, also look for ways that can enhance 
their brand image, as NGO 7 described a ‘smart way’ of giving. However, NGO 11 
also posed a challenge when costs are involved. Den Hond et al. (2015) described 
this challenge posed by NGOs, stating how MNCs want to benefit from CSR but 
have no desire for increased costs.    
 
7.7 NGOs’ Influential Channels 
 
Discussions with MNCs progress to highlight how legitimate NGOs could gain 
institutional control. These influential channels were placed into three mains 
categories: 1) consistent pressure, 2) a need to utilise NGO expertise, and 3) firms 
involved in CSR activities. Table 7.11 shows MNC responses to the first influential 
channel. Previous findings highlighted that within MENA there can be tight 
regulation. MNC 2 highlighted that one way to apply pressure on firms would be to 
influence governing bodies, as they possess stronger control. Other participants in 
Table 7.11 show that direct consistent pressure influences the change in business 
practise. MNC 3 further stated that institutional power could be derived from 
affecting the firm’s financial objectives. MNC 8 concurred, emphasising how open 
source media has increased the influential channel, making it easier for NGOs to 


















Participant Representative data 
5.K MNC 2 
“NGOs could have power if they can influence the government…in 
terms of the location of our plant, or environmental pollution let’s say. 
These types of business disruptions can happen…but we look at the 
track record, if we can foresee how well these NGOs have done”. 
 
“NGOs can play a strong role when it comes to land and movement of 
people”. 
 
5.K MNC 3 
“We are an organisation culturally recognised as being more sensitive 
to facing more external pressures. We haven’t always been but we 
have learnt to be, and again though we are different organisation to 
what we were 20 years ago, the change is because we have pushed 
that, because of the impact to our bottom line”. 
 
“Because of external pressure, that has shaped the way we operate 
now”. 
 
5.K MNC 4 
“There is a wide spectrum of NGOs. We meet all of them. We have 
our partner NGOs who we have a partnership and they are from the 
early days and on a collaborative basis. Of course they will challenge 
us if they don’t agree with us, but this is part of the partnership…On 
the other side of the spectrum, you meet NGOs who will beat us and 
fight us regardless of what we have to offer”. 
 
5.K MNC 7 
“We have had scenarios where NGOs have highlighted issues and we 
have corrected them…This is more from an environmental point of 
view where this topic is more of concern for those NGOs that follow 
our developments…NGOs can affect public opinion which is a high 
reputations risk which we must consider”. 
 
5.K MNC 8 
“There is a requirement for businesses to be creditable in a responsible 
behaviour. You only learn what the expectations are by reaching out to 
your stakeholders. Those stakeholder expectations are an important 
input to your strategy. Because unless you show you are creditable as a 
supplier you will lose your key customers…You will be at risk of your 
reputation and your brand. You open yourself up to the media. All you 






The following comment by MNC 5 further demonstrates the power an NGO can 
have on business operations.  
 
“The activist NGOs have been successful in opposing, that in the end the 
whole project is cancelled. Because if opposing NGOs play themselves, they 
will not be able to stop us, if we have support from the local people and the 
government. However, if the local people buy into the opposing NGOs and 
also start to oppose and then if the prohibitions involved also take over the 
argument then yes, there is a chance the people will decide that the project is 
not going to happen” (MNC 5).   
 
The case described by MNC 5 shows how NGOs, supported by other stakeholders, 
could change the strategy of a firm. These findings of NGOs gaining power through 
public support align with the neo-institutional narrative of social movements 
(Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2008). As a result, firms have had to include NGOs 
within their strategy process. MNC 8 further reiterated that they have had to reach 
out to NGOs to understand what is to be expected. This is due to institutions 
possessing the ability to set social expectations (North, 1990). Idemudia (2010) 
expresses similar notions mentioning that MNCs need to understand the ethical 
benchmark. Moreover, NGOs possess the power of emotion to stimulate a collective 
social force (Hudson et al., 2015; Friedland, 2018). Hence, there has been 
recognition from MNCs that their business practises must align with NGO 
objectives. However, MNC 5 shares that to have a balanced argument, firms desire to 
cooperate with scientific facts rather than emotional ties.  
 
“We prefer that the power comes from scientific facts and an honest 
discussion on the pros and cons. And a deep assessment of what we have set 
out to do…For example, when we operate we need access to fresh water. 
That’s not an issue. But how much water we need, how much is available and 
where we dispose of the water that we don’t use can be of question. If we can 
have a discussion based not on emotions but on facts that we can hope. 
Where we struggle, particularly with opposing NGOs is that they are not 





Therefore to make institutional power more efficient, fact-based analysis needs to be 
used to strengthen an NGO’s case.  
 
Firms have recognised a benefit for working with NGOs when operating within 
conflict regions, particularly to satisfy external stakeholder demands and connect 
with local communities. As a result, a need to work with NGOs uncovered a second 
influential channel. Table 7.12 highlights that some MNCs have seen value in 
connecting with NGOs. NGOs can be knowledgeable players strengthening their 
power in partnerships (Barley and Tolbert, 1997). Belanger and Edwards (2006) 
concur highlighting that external institutions can exert power through ‘expertise’ and 
‘control of resources’. As seen in the literature, this can explain why firms are 
compelled to work with local players when entering uncertain environments such as 
conflict zones. 
 






Participant Representative data 
5.L MNC 3 
“They can bring expertise and pre-existing relationships. We could 
bring funding and access to markets”. 
 
5.L MNC 5 
“What we have seen, the better we are with our collaborative partner, 
the less we see with the radical NGOs”. 
 
5.L MNC 6 
“Our approach to sustainability is quite holistic from the fact that yes, 
philanthropy is one arm but the scheme that runs under it of being 
open, connected or dependable that sinks into the business…While 15-
20 years ago we were a very separate department…these things that 
people didn’t like or didn’t understand and what not, but what’s been 
fantastic is that our skill set has been integrated into various parts of 
the business”. 
 
5.L MNC 8 
“We want to take responsibility. But for that responsibility to be 
effective you need to have experience, local awareness, and you need 
to have collaborative and constructive approaches…It’s how the 
NGOs approach it”. 
 




factors of stakeholder expectation are coming higher up in the ranks. I 
would wish that it could be first but that would be bullshit of 
course…sustainability-drivers (referring to NGOs) are being 
recognised as being strategically very important”. 
 
 
Conversely, MNC 4 simply stated that for their business operations, they did not 
need to seek knowledge from external sources, thus making this influence channel 
scenario specific.  
 
“No NGO in the world would have been able to aid us with delivering our 
task” (MNC 4). 
 
From the responses shown, MNC 8 shares a perspective stating that though NGOs 
have been regarded as important, they still do not have authoritative power in how 
business operates.  
 
“It’s a shame, however the honest truth is that money comes first...It’s my job 
to ensure that social responsibility is kept” (MNC 8). 
 
This comment highlights that for an NGO to have influential power, they must be 
able to impact the company’s financial flow. MNC 8 further elaborated that NGOs 
must have a complete understanding of a situation before attempting to question any 
business practise. This is aligned with other participants’ comments referring to the 
use of facts rather than emotional bias.  
 
“It’s also about NGOs that know what they are talking about. People go on 
about child labour, however you know, if for example, a company tells their 
suppliers to stop employing children, the children’s family suffer, they don’t 
eat. And inevitably the child will find another company that will employ them. 
So when an NGO comes to me and says they want to stop the ‘worst’ types of 
child labour, I know they have done their research” (MNC 8).  
 
Where NGOs have highlighted an area of social concern, it can be seen that more 




the ability to connect with firms accessing a third influential channel. Table 7.13 
shows MNC comments on carrying out CSR activity.  
 






Participant Representative data 
5.M MNC 1 
“It’s purely out of our own interest to give something back”. 
 
5.M MNC 4 
“The company has worked with various NGOs purely for our 
corporate social responsibility…Staff members can collect funds doing 
runs and hikes and we fund various projects in Africa, India. But these 
have nothing to do with business, purely as part of our corporate social 
responsibility”. 
 
5.M MNC 6 
“We are one of the biggest contributors of CSR in the Middle East 
from an international private firm. We are very proud of that”. 
 
 
Where companies have promoted CSR culture, NGOs have the ability to seek 
resources from MNCs. The responses in Table 7.13 highlight that firms are willing to 
contribute to social causes. However, as mentioned earlier these NGOs would need 
to fulfil many requirements. It can also be that CSR is not within the company 
culture, as expressed by MNC 10.  
 
“Over here there is no strong media. If you do any charity nobody will know 
about it. That’s why companies are not doing much. Nobody will come and 
say thank you. Because the government are doing charity, nobody can do like 
the government. They are paying billions of dollars just on charity, just to 
make people’s lives good” (MNC 10).   
 
This statement implies that there is a link between CSR and strengthening brand 
equity. The findings coincide with Dahan et al. (2010), recognising the enhanced 
marketing efforts and credibility when firms carry out CSR activities. Hence, to 




firms in a strategic sense. MNC 9 elaborated this notion stating the necessity for 
NGOs to build business cases, which would benefit the firm as well as the cause.  
 
“Being a consultant I work with both MNCs and NGOs…NGOs want to know 
how to connect with companies…they have a lot of enthusiasm of what is 
good to do but this is not enough. They need to establish a business case 
which will attract the companies…I know NGOs struggling with this aspect” 
(MNC 9).  
 
NGO 9 described a similar case being denied by a firm. 
 
“One of the known banks here in Beirut. We didn’t know anybody there so we 
contacted by email. We went for a meeting, myself and the other co-founder, 
and they were very honest in saying that our NGO would not benefit them in 
marketing” (NGO 9). 
 
Furthermore, NGO 11 shared a challenging experience where they could not support 
the firm’s overall objectives and desired profit margins.  
 
“When procurement have more latitude in terms of what they do. That’s 
where you create the win…for example we have a retailer. Marketing go, ‘yes 
we need to have an ethical water in our category’ and procurement says ‘ok, 
well they need to pay us £960,000 to sit on the shelf’ because the 
procurement guy who is set in generating income for that retailer can sell 
that shelf space to any other competing profit-driven firm…We understand 
that, and as much as they want to help you, unless you have physical cash to 
put down they can’t do anything” (NGO 11). 
 
“You would like to think that in CSR-driven work, it would start with CSR but 
it doesn’t. It starts with cash” (NGO 11).  
Recognising three influential channels from an MNC perspective is linked to a 





7.8 Institutional Power 
 
The findings show that institutional power was first based on NGOs possessing 
credibility and acting as a regulatory figure. Table 7.14 indicates how these notions 
can transfer to institutional control. NGO 4 showed how their social regulative status 
provided them an ability to hinder a firm’s brand image. Being a creditable source 
from the public perspective, NGO 4 gained power from producing reports, which 
questioned the integrity of businesses and governing bodies. Moreover, NGO 5 
demonstrated their ability as a mediator, eliminating conflict between stakeholders. 
Within the international business narrative, studies have shown this to be the case 
where NGOs have gained accreditation when operating within politically unstable 
environments (Darendeli and Hill, 2016). Furthermore, the aspect of temporality can 
be recognised within these discussions where NGO 2 has mentioned that they are 
still in early stages. Therefore, gaining credibility and a regulatory status would take 
time and subsequently reflect on the level of power an NGO can show at different 
conflict stages and events. 
 






Participant Representative data 
6.N NGO 1 
“In some of our partnerships we are able to influence organisational 
change with our corporate partners by our action or credibility of 
action …but many of our partners are highly decentralised and we may 
be influencing our direct partnership counterparts and there may be a 
small ripple effect”. 
 
6.N NGO 2 
“We are still in very early stages. Where we are very proud of our 
corporate portfolio, it is still a small part of our revenue. But this value 
is more than financial. We are proud that corporates have trust in our 
work”. 
 
6.N NGO 3 
“I would like to influence firms. It would help with our development 
and meeting our goals.  There is one company that is supporting some 
of our work and we pay them back with media, showing that this 





6.N NGO 4 
“If there is an issue with a business, for example appearing in court 
over some corruption-based prosecution, we have the power to kick 
them out of our forum and this leverage would allow us to demand that 
they provide policies, procedures, systems and do a number of things 
to remedy the situation. And they do often do that”. 
 
“We don’t like to name and shame, but the indexes we produce are 
very powerful and they do get people talking to us”. 
 
6.N NGO 5 
“We had to sometimes do conflict mitigation if there was any 
challenges faced by community members or the infrastructure or the 
contractor themselves, then you would have to play that mediator role. 
As you can imagine, it was quite tough. Some of the communities we 
were working in was very tough...One example was that we had a 
concrete channel running through a famer’s land which we were 
temporarily paying the farmer to use his land. However, the message 
was not clear to the community…there was theft and vandalism…We 
had to involve the local communities’ mayor to make the message 
clear that it was for the Lebanese people”. 
 
6.N NGO 6 
“We are in the board rooms, but only through institutional 
frameworks. In a way due to our creditable nature governments and 
firms can’t completely ignore us…companies have to be transparent 
with their payments or they have to declare that the buyer is actually 
the minister’s brother, for example. They wouldn’t know that it was 
the NGO that made these rules happen”. 
 
“The power comes from a persuasive power”. 
 
6.N NGO 9 
“They put in their (MNCs) ad that they put some percentage of profit 
in helping this NGO, that NGO. This will affect the people that will 
purchase their products”. 
 
 
Moreover, NGO 8’s comments show how they also play a regulatory figure to 
protect the interests of their community. Their actions have influenced a certain 
group of businesses by generating a social movement to follow their cause.  
 
“There are two levels of movement, the outside which this the bigger one and 
the local Palestinian movement…the main aim is to boycott Israel. They have 
taken our land and they are not giving the rights for Palestinians…We want 




territories. On an international level it is also not just about boycott the 
goods and the commercial aspects but also the cultural and artists and 
academic boycott against Israel” (NGO 8).  
 
Another theme, recognised as institutional power, was NGOs’ personal networks and 
emotional attachments. Hudson et al. (2015) described that institutions can gain 
power by using the emotion dynamic. This theoretical construct is identified within 
the comments made by NGO participants in Table 7.15. Particularly with activist 
NGOs (NGO 8), it can be seen that their ability to harness public opinion is derived 
with the use of emotional ties. Emotion is also linked to the organisations’ passion 
for the causes they support, as mentioned by NGO 4 to prevent firms from corrupt 
activities. In connection, NGO 3, 7 and 10 demonstrated power through establishing 
a personal network that is in favour of their cause. Power through personal networks 
is aligned with Maclean et al.'s (2014) understanding. As a result, the findings show 
that some MNCs are willing to connect with NGOs due to their ability to access local 
networks.  
 






Participant Representative data 
6.O NGO 1 
“In influencing these multinationals in some of the toughest parts of 
the world, it is very very hard...what needs to be communicated better 
is our value in functional productive market systems and market 
players…we understand the situation of the region that these guys 
(firms) operate in and the people involved”. 
 
6.O NGO 3 
“Power comes from finding the most suitable partner, and then you 
have to study what the corporates need. Then you can start to change 
their mind to a situation where they accept your situation. You have to 
understand their mission, their target of the business, their goals. Then 






6.O NGO 4 
“We have an open door policy so if they (firms) want to come and talk 
with us, we are very happy to have a conversation. Including some of 
the companies we have been very critical of. We are critical of many 
companies going into the business for wrong reasons…and we will 
certainly comment on that to the press. Sometimes ethics is not clear-
cut but morality should be the foundation of how these businesses 
work. If that company wants to call us up on it than we are very happy 
to do that. Those are not always very friendly conversations… 
unethical practises should always be questioned and changed”. 
 
6.O NGO 7 
“Usually there is a lot of networking in the beginning. The name of the 
president of the NGO brings a lot of creditability and brings a lot of 
confidence. This is really important. Our president has a good 
reputation and wide network. Then comes the track record of the NGO 
and all the things that we have accomplished”. 
 
6.O NGO 8 
“We have a union with the local Palestinian suppliers to ensure that 
their products are more popular…It is not fair competition as the 
Israeli companies dump their products in our markets. Some are 
labelled but when it comes to fruits and vegetables we are not sure if it 
is Palestinian or Israeli”. 
 
“We don’t really use force, our strategy is to convince the Palestinian 
consumers to not buy Israeli goods for many reasons…One Ramadan 
we had a campaign to stop people from buying Israeli dairy, people 
during this time consume more dairy. Our campaign was saying your 
breakfast is Halal if you don’t consume Israeli milk…Our goal is the 
consumers…If we stop consumers from buying then by default the 
trader and supermarkets will stop stocking”. 
 
6.O NGO 10 
“We just want to make companies more sensitive to the needs of their 
employees. And to change the workspace for them or the work hours. 
And also if we are trying to fund raise, to help us promote a program. 
But mental health is difficult to raise funds as a disease or as an illness 
because people are more directed towards tangible diseases, such as 
heart problem, cancer”. 
 
“What worked well was radio and working at <university name>. We 
also have support from <hotel chain name>. They give us a room to do 
an awareness conference. This is the third year. The PR lady is a friend 






In understanding how NGOs use personal networks and emotion as a form of 
institutional control, subsequent discussions lead to influencing legal systems. Where 
governing bodies have regulatory authority, NGOs can influence strategic decisions 
by influencing a stronger power. This influence can be direct or indirect as seen in 
the representative data in Table 7.16. As it has been recognised that governments can 
control business operations, a key institutional power can be gained from influencing 
the legal system. These comments were aligned with MNCs perspectives. There have 
been case studies where NGOs have been able to work with international regulatory 
bodies to change the way industries operate (Baur and Arenas, 2014). MNC 4, 6 and 
8 share examples where they have attempted to influence the legal systems to benefit 
their social cause. 
 






Participant Representative data 
6.P NGO 4 
“In Saudi Arabia we uncovered that <company name> had bribed 
governmental officials to get that contract. It went all the way up to the 
prime minister…He (the prime minister) instructed the case to be 
dropped on national security grounds…We were very strong and robust 
in our contemplation of law, so the decision was not to prosecute. We 
placed a lot of pressure on the company to ensure that they were going to 
reform and that they were going to do business differently. We continued 
to keep putting pressure on (company name) and the local 
government…the company has since then taken one of our global anti-
corruption programmes and they now work with the Saudi Ministry of 
Defence Procurement Department to make sure their internal systems 
change. In this process we have been invited to minimise the risk of 
corruption”. 
 
6.P NGO 6 
“Once we begin to grasp an issue we begin to start getting laws put in 
place…1504 which is the name of a clause which looks into the 
transparency of the payments in the extractive industry…So that’s an 
indirect way we try to change an MNC’s strategy by changing the legal 
aspects”. 
 
6.P NGO 8 
“Yes, of course! Our <NGO name> movement is in the top priority of 
the Israeli government. We are making an impact on Israeli 




actions affect companies and the government…They consider <NGO 
name> as the main enemy for Israel for the foreseen threats. This is on 
an international level. On a local level, Palestinian consumption of total 
Israeli goods is only around 3%, so we don’t make that much of an 
impact on the economic level, as Israel has a big economy. But it is very 
big on the let’s say ethical and political influence. This is number one. 
Number two I would say we have more influence on some categories of 
the Israeli economy. I mean when we talk about the food companies, the 
Palestinian share is very high. So our influence is more on the food 
producers in Israel…If we can impact the laws then they have no choice, 
but the question is if the government are with us or against us”. 
 
 
MNC 4 expanded on their comments, stating that within the MENA region, this 
influential power can be limited due to the regulatory bodies not matching the 
NGO’s vision.  
 
“In the Middle East, North Africa, it also depends on whether the government 
is allowing space for civil society to exist. This is not the case anymore in 
Egypt…they are not open to face criticism from any NGO…many of our 
colleagues had to leave the country as they were on the list of getting 
arrested” (NGO 4).  
 
Similarly, being within a conflict setting, MNC 3 shared the same thought of how it 
could be difficult for an NGO to operate within certain regions. 
 
“In some regions, it’s illegal for NGOs to operate…they would limit power” 
(MNC 3).  
 
NGO 6 also shared their example where they can find legal systems to work against 
their cause particularly within a conflict setting.  
 
“There was a case where there was <name> who was helping to set up a 
diamond company with the secret police, which he owned half and the secret 
police owned half…The government was in a power sharing group with the 




were using the diamond company to off-budget vehicles to raise money” 
(NGO 6). 
 
These examples showcase that though influencing the legal system can be a 
paramount strength for NGOs, it can prove highly difficult where interests do not 
match. Vachani et al. (2009) explain this phenomenon stating that NGOs need to 
work in reliable legal systems if they are to influence any form of firm strategy. 
Nevertheless, NGO 8’s expansion on their case articulates the benefit of applying 
pressure on local authorities to enforce change.  
 
“Last year the Israeli government stopped Palestinian goods from entering 
Jerusalem. In return we put pressure on the Palestinian government to stop 
the same Israeli companies to sell their goods in the Palestinian 
markets…after one week the Palestinian government took this decision, the 
Israelis reopened the borders for the Palestinian companies because these 
Israeli companies put pressure on the Israeli government, so they relaxed the 
restriction, because they (Israeli companies) were getting damaged from not 
being able to sell their products in the Palestinian markets” (NGO 8).  
 
The data received from MNC and NGO participants display a coherent argument in 
how institutions can gain the attention of key strategy decision-makers. In turn, the 
findings show how NGOs could gain institutional control over MNCs. During data 
analysis three second-order themes were formed to explain this phenomenon. Firstly, 
it was seen that NGOs ‘highlight an area of social concern’ to gain recognition. 
Secondly, MNCs are open to external ‘influential channels’. This would be either 
from institutions applying consistent pressure, a need to utilise NGO expertise or 
firms involved in CSR activities. Thirdly, several categories show that NGOs possess 
‘institutional power’. By collapsing these three second-order themes, the second 
meso aggregate theoretical dimension was formed, labelled as disturbing the bottom-
line. NGOs can gain institutional control within heterogeneous conflict environments 







The purpose of this chapter was to answer the second research question: How can 
NGOs as institutions possess legitimacy and power to influence a firm’s strategy 
process in conflict zones? From a meso perspective, the institutional literature has 
been vague in identifying the source of legitimacy for NGOs to pass firm filters and 
how NGOs can possess institutional control. This understanding was unclear, 
particularly given the complexities of strategy formulation in conflict zones. The 
meso findings formed two interlinked aggregate theoretical dimensions: 1) 
institutional value or interception, and 2) disturbing the bottom-line. 
 
Firstly, the findings show that NGOs could pass firm legitimacy filters either from 
‘institutional value’ or ‘institutional interception’. These terms have emerged from 
analysis to explain the sources of legitimacy. NGOs are legitimised by MNCs if they 
are seen to provide a sense of value to firm objectives, for example, enhancing brand 
image or support in business operation. Hence, MNCs prefer NGOs that are 
collaborative and professional in their approach. This is to limit any hindrance to 
their business operations. Alternatively, due to the organisational differences 
between NGOs they can intercept business decision-making. As social regulators, 
NGOs can gain legitimacy from collective public support possessing the ability to 
question business integrity. NGOs that represent social welfare can intercept business 
practise if seen as inappropriate.  
 
Secondly, in passing firm legitimacy filters NGOs can ultimately gain institutional 
control to influence business strategy by ‘disturbing the bottom-line’. In other words, 
from a meso perspective NGOs would need to positively or negatively impact the 
firm’s financial flow or business operations. Power within institutional theory 
dictates how change is enforced and how institutions gain management capacity to 
influence strategic direction (Peng, 2003; Mtar, 2010). The three themes that 
supported this conclusion were, highlighting a social concern, influential channels 
(consistent pressure, NGO knowledge and CSR activities) and institutional power 
(credibility, regulatory figure, personal network, emotional attachment and 




firm’s financial gain. However, different methods can vary in strength within a 


































CHAPTER 8  
EMBEDDED AGENCY WHO CAN INFLUENCE STRATEGY 
- MICRO DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
8.1 Introduction  
 
This empirical chapter presents the micro level of analysis exploring the third 
research question: Which external individual actors are involved in influencing 
strategic decision-making for a firm in conflict zones? A macro perspective has 
shown that firms set a legitimacy filter and an institutional rank of importance within 
their strategy process. In closer analysis, the previous chapter showed from a meso 
level that NGOs could gain legitimacy through value or interception, in turn 
achieving institutional control by disturbing the bottom-line. A subsequent question 
remained concerning which individual actors possess the ability to carry forth such 
activities. The theoretical literature shows that the correct embedded agents are 
instrumental to influence organisations (Leca et al., 2008; Abdelnour et al., 2017). 
However, it is unclear which type of agency and which roles within social relations 
have the ability to influence (Powell and Colyvas, 2008). This was particularly 
within a conflict heterogeneous environment. Drawing on the theoretical concept of 
embedded agency, this empirical chapter explores which types of actors are needed 
to influence firm strategy.  
 
The presentation of findings follows the micro data structure shown in the 
subsequent section. This chapter begins by understanding how firms view their 
partnerships with NGO representatives. The findings further show the importance of 
rapport building between MNC and NGO actors, developing how the actions of 
individuals can influence the thought process of decision-makers. The second part of 
this chapter reviews organisational behaviour within NGOs, progressing to assess 
how NGOs select particular actors to form strategic partnerships. The chapter 






8.2 Micro Data Structure  
 
Figure 8.1 illustrates a data structure formed from a micro level of analysis. This 
chapter provides discussion on how each of the key themes had been developed. To 
fully comprehend organisational influence, data collected from a micro level of 
analysis highlight which types of agency within NGOs possess legitimacy and 
power. 














8.3 MNCs Rank Individuals of Importance  
 
To understand individual actors it is important to first recognise how MNCs view the 
members who represent NGOs. From MNC participant responses shown in Table 
8.1, there was a commonality that firms prefer to engage with senior management of 
external organisations. This was to ensure that communication was effective and the 
vision of both organisations was equal. MNC 3’s comments suggest that it is 
First-order categories Second-order themes Aggregate theoretical dimensions 
3. Institutional 
internal behaviour  
 A. MNCs want to speak with upper 
hierarchy in external organisations 
 B. Rapport building between individuals 
is important to influence change 
 C. Actions of individuals can change 
thought process  
 D. A need to change internal dynamic to 
build relationships with MNCs 
 E. Individuals who understand business 
attitude are chosen to connect 
 F. Want to connect locally with key 
decision makers 
 1. Individual ranking 
of importance 











 G. Individuals with social concern can 









necessary to ensure long-term relationships between organisations. MNC 5 gave a 
concise perspective stating that the NGOs’ management should be ready to 
collaborate with MNCs. With the growth of inter-organisational collaboration, the 
literature shows that higher-level management needs to accept certain changes 
(Kostova et al., 2008; Wry et al., 2013). Thus, where MNCs recognise the benefit of 
working with external organisations, they want to certify the stakeholder’s 
willingness to collaborate. This is based on the assumption that working with senior 
managers can improve the collaborative process as they have a higher influence on 
how the NGO operates.  
 






Participant Representative data 
1.A MNC 2 
“The Middle East is very restrictive for NGOs to operate…for those 
that have access generally we would want to speak with higher up the 
chain”. 
 
1.A MNC 3 
“It depends on the organisations…they are all structured differently 
and all run differently. I wouldn’t suggest that there are key people in 
an organisation that you would need to engage with to influence”. 
 
“In <NGO name> we spoke with an individual that had a vision to 
work with corporates…He was really a change of how their 
organisation previously operated. We need to work with people that 
have vision to collaborate long-term. We work in places for 
decades…There is really an opportunity to work on a long-term 
sustainable conversation”. 
 
1.A MNC 5 
“What is really important is that at the top of the NGOs there is a 
readiness to collaborate with the company. So it starts at the top”. 
 
1.A MNC 6 
“Transparency is important. We should be seen as a part of the process 
not just as doers…With the initial connection it would definitely be 
with the head of the NGO in the first instance and then when it comes 
from an operational aspect, a project member would then step in from 
the NGO. It always starts at a high level…we can then also see their 





1.A MNC 7 




As seen above, MNC 6 elaborated on the notion of collaboration stating that there 
has to be a ‘level of commitment’ from NGOs. By speaking with higher 
management, MNCs can be satisfied with what the main agenda would be. Sun et al. 
(2010) show how firms have linked higher management with experience. This is 
particularly when management need to operate within unstable environments and 
have to connect with institutions for strategic assistance. However, being within a 
conflict environment, data analysis has also showed the importance of rapport 
building to form a connection with the senior managers of NGOs.  
 
Organisations have collaborated in market-driven environments on a professional 
level (Driouchi and Bennett, 2012). However, as NGOs are non-market organisations 
the type of connection between representatives differs. Table 8.2 shows the 
importance of rapport building between individual actors to influence strategic 
change. There is a common theme in the participant responses, however MNC 10 
further highlighted the importance of building individual relationships given the 
business culture of the Middle East. MNC 3 highlighted within their comments that 
building a relationship with an NGO had allowed them to work on continuous 
projects. Having invested much resource on building the network, it can be seen that 
the firm had recognised value. The MNC and NGO’s individual partnership proved 
to support their own organisations’ goals. However, MNC 3 expressed an issue that 
there are members within the company and NGO that are cynical of the partnership.  
 






Participant Representative data 
1.B MNC 3 
“Yes hugely. We worked on a few things in 2010, 2011 and 
recognised there was an opportunity to do something more on a global 
scale”. 
 




networks and relationships...There still are cynics in both organisations 
about why we are partnering with each other”. 
1.B MNC 7 
“MNCs and NGOs can collaborate on great initiatives…the NGOs just 
need to recognise this model rather than attacking the business 
practise”. 
 
1.B MNC 8 
“Building a strong relationship with your stakeholders is so important. 
It builds trust and aids the mutual respect for each other’s operations”. 
 
1.B MNC 9 
“Individuals are indeed important. The relationship between an NGO 
and company is first a relationship with two or a group of individuals. 
It is quite important for them to get along with each other”. 
 
1.B MNC 10 
“Over here in the Middle East, relationships are very important. 
Without relationship you can’t do anything”. 
 
 
MNC 3 expanded on their comment, providing reasoning for why members are 
cynical within their organisation.  
 
“Some people that work here are still in the mind frame that the private 
sector are only profit driven and <NGOs> limit us reaching our 
organisational goals…I am here to try to expand their vision” (MNC 3).  
 
This shows that organisational representatives have to not only build rapport but also 
convince their counterparts to support them. MNC 7 expressed a similar notion, seen 
above, underlining how NGOs would be more beneficial if they collaborated.  
 
In discussion of rapport building with NGOs, it was noted that MNCs could be 
criticised by stakeholders due to lack of business integrity. MNCs are faced with 
ethical demands by NGOs. Consequently, a representative of the firm would have to 
make the decision whether to respond to such claims. Barraquier (2011) states how 
managers are faced with strategic implications due to ethical demands from 
stakeholders. MNC 8 concurred, being supportive of building relationships with 





“If you come across a person saying well in reality you should not be doing 
this, because of this, this and this reason, well that may well be that 
individual’s opinion on what standards we should have, but that individual 
opinion may not be shared with the large part of society. So in that sense are 
you required to do what this person says? And internally you need to have a 
good reflection on it. Is the person right and society not…or if the person is 
not right, living to higher standards and is not factually correct” (MNC 8).  
 
Where MNCs are faced with such issues, Teegen et al. (2004) suggests that building 
rapport with NGOs can allow MNCs to know the acceptable parameters of business 
practice. MNC 8 expands on personal morality, explaining that a firm should not 
have to wait for an external organisation to correct their business practise.  
 
“What we need to also see is what is my moral conduct today and do we 
really need to have an internal discussion about this. Your moral compass 
should be so sensitive and it shouldn’t have to take a third party to tell you 
your moral compass is broken” (MNC 8).  
 
This comment is aligned with MNC 9 and 10, sharing the concept of individual 
capacity. Land et al. (2014: 233) show how individual traits and environmental 
factors could shape how firms operate in ‘grey zones’, “where the boundary between 
acceptable behaviour and misconduct is unclear”. On the other hand, the literature 
also shows how individual actors influence business operations to support peace-
building in conflict regions (Katsos and AlKafaji, 2017) or address unethical practise 
(Kassinis and Vafeas, 2006; Kraemer et al., 2013). Thus, individual capacity can 
influence the direction of a business. The following section expands on this second 
developed theme on a micro level. 
  
8.4 Individual Capacity to Change MNC Thought Processes 
 
Research participants from MNCs were questioned on the microelement of 
influencing strategic decision-making. The findings show both internal influences 




illustrates that from an MNC perspective, personal interests can direct some level of 
influence on strategy. However, the extent of influence from firm actors is based on 
their individual capacity. For example, MNC 2 has attempted to encourage their 
company to carry out more charitable work. However, the participant shows that still 
‘more convincing’ is needed. This highlights that there is not enough authority to 
make such decisions. Conversely, MNC 3 and 5 gave part of their authority to 
external individuals, basing their strategic decisions on external advice. This finding 
resonates with Henisz et al. (2014) illustrating that strategic value can be gained from 
knowledgeable members whether internal to the organisation or external 
stakeholders.  
 






Participant Representative data 
2.C MNC 2 
“I myself have tried to influence the company to work with a charity. 
Some influence is there but still work needs to be done to convince”. 
 
2.C MNC 3 
“One of the things we do in our planning sessions is identify, ok 
where are your (NGO partner) priorities for the year, where are your 
areas of interest, what things are you trying to achieve. And then we 
will tell them. And together we will see mutual areas of interest and 
focus on them”. 
 
2.C MNC 5 
“For one particular project we set up an external advisory board. 
These individuals had a strong influence on what we should do. They 
were from NGOs. Though what we do when we first start is we 
develop a jointly based fact-finding”. 
2.C MNC 6 
“In the NGO decision process, my team and I are removed from the 
equation, as we are the ones who often have a relationship with the 
NGO. They (directors) will look at the project against the criteria the 
project framework and the objectives they have”. 
 
2.C MNC 8 
“At the <governmental conference name> I will be sitting at the table 
with various NGOs and the <industry check initiative> where I will 
be sitting at the table with various NGOs. It is the relationships we 






It was also seen that internal organisational members (Thomas and Ambrosini, 2015) 
and external actors (Kolk and Lenfant, 2012) are needed to understand how strategy 
is to be implemented. The collected data show that the level of influence can be from 
two angles internal to the firm. Firstly, participant responses have shown NGOs 
influencing the MNC representative. NGO actors attempt to influence firm 
representatives with the anticipation that they have access to firm resources to 
support the NGO cause. The second angle of influence would be based on MNC 
representatives advocating the social cause internal to the firm. It can be argued that 
MNC actors have higher forms of legitimacy over external actors, in turn 
strengthening their influential ability to strategy makers. MNC 6 has described the 
second angle of influence internal to the firm. 
 
“My team have to conduct continuous presentations to the higher 
management. Project proposals come in from the entire region. Sometimes 
we can get too close and be extremely passionate…that can sometimes cloud 
our judgement. That’s why we have a second level of defence where they are 
looking at it much more rationally. And if we are opposite ends of the project, 
we can take it offline and ask what parameters we could introduce into this 
project that would make it comfortable to proceed” (MNC 6).  
 
“NGOs do not really have a lobbying role, it’s not Europe. They don’t have a 
public advocacy role. This is for most of the Middle East and North Africa, 
though Turkey is slightly different” (MNC 6).   
 
These comments suggest that within this research context, individual actor’s 
influence is based on accessibility and capacity. Where NGOs could have limited 
power to ‘lobby firms’ within in the Middle East and North Africa, there could still 
be a level of influence on strategic decisions if firm representatives endorse the 
cause. To ensure that firm representatives are confident in the NGO cause, 
institutional actors would have to be at a specialist position. Such positions can be 
seen as external knowledgeable sources or areas of authority. 
 
From an MNC perspective, the findings developed a second-order theme of 




management within external organisations. This is due to firms preferring to 
understand the NGO’s agenda as well as their level of commitment. It can be seen 
that building rapport increases the chances for NGO actors to influence firm strategy. 
Subsequently, the findings developed ‘individual capacity’ as another second-order 
theme. Where NGO actors can inspire the firm representative, this representative 
may need to influence higher management internal to the business. The data show 
that NGO actors need to be specialised within their field to possess importance. 
Collapsing these two themes had developed the first micro aggregate theoretical 
dimension being a specialist authoritative partner. According to firms, NGO actors 
need to be a specialist authoritative partner to increase the chances of influencing 
strategy.  
 
8.5 Internal Institutional Behaviour  
 
NGO participants were asked questions with regard to how they build relationships 
with MNC actors. The first theme shows that NGOs have to internally change their 
behaviour on an individual level to accept business partnerships. This in turn would 
support embedded agents of change. From the comments shown in Table 8.4, NGO 
actors recognise a need to adapt their approach to connect with firm representatives. 
This is due to the recognition that firms prefer to work with NGOs that are accepting 
of MNC actions and collaborative in their approach. NGO 2 mentioned that actors 
need support from their senior management to change internal behaviour. 
Furthermore, the participant also reiterates the need to build rapport with firm 
representatives. However, this rapport can only be built if it fulfils organisational 
interests. NGOs who want to form collaborative relationships recognise that 
networking is key and to view firms as allies, as mentioned by NGO 3 and 6. For 
partnerships to form efficiently, the correct agency is needed (Hardy and Maguire, 
2008). Operating within the MENA region, the notion of trust was a reoccurring 
factor for MNCs to form links with NGOs. NGO 9 raised this topic while discussing 













Participant Representative data 
3.D NGO 2 
“When we decided to push our corporate partnership we had to change 
the internal organisation dynamic. There were many cynics who we 
had to have discussions with…But the senior management were 
supportive and I think there was enough progress with some key 
people. Every organisation has some key change-makers in them”. 
 
“In the early stages, there is almost always a rapport with the two 
individuals but then that rapport has to go through a fairly hard internal 
analysis to make sure there is a common ground and there is an 
understanding of the differences”. 
 
3.D NGO 3 
“You need to build long term relationships…This could be for 
financial support but also networking with other businesses”. 
 
3.D NGO 6 
“We are always going to look out for persuaders or networkers. People 
in the business community that are allies”. 
 
3.D NGO 9 
“We saw an interview of a particular lady, part of a company. We 
contacted her and they were interested in connecting and 
contributing…They like to follow up for the project they sponsor”. 
 
“Yes it is important here in Lebanon. We must connect with someone 




NGO 2’s following comment supported the notion that institutional trust can only be 
derived from a personal connection. The participant’s comments reinforce that a 
specific type of agency embedded within NGOs are required to build external 
partnerships.  
 
“That institutional trust level always flows through human individuals so it’s 





Dahan et al. (2010) describe the importance of trust, particularly within corporate 
collaboration with NGOs. Firms want to ensure that the NGO will not hinder any 
business operations or reputation (Doh and Guay, 2006). As noted earlier, activist 
NGOs have made it harder for the social sector to gain legitimacy. NGO 8’s 
approach shows how in some cases, NGOs refuse to change their organisational 
behaviour where agendas differ. Thus, actors in these scenarios operate a different 
strategy to gain influential power.  
 
“Of course not. They (Israeli companies) are our enemies. Why would we 
want to communicate with them…they are trying to compete in the 
Palestinian market and we want to boycott them” (NGO 8).  
 
Nevertheless, NGO 9 elaborated on their comment to show how they have 
understood the need for personal connection and approaching firms who they could 
relate with.  
 
“It happens two ways. First you find people you know personally…Then you 
can contact to see if they have a CSR division. It will happen through your 
PR. People will connect you” (NGO 9).  
 
Overall, these participant comments demonstrate that internal institutional behaviour 
plays a role in forming institutional attitudes towards partnerships. The institutional 
attitude in turn would determine how embedded agents choose to connect with firm 
actors. Hence, for an agent of change to form external relationships would begin by 
changing the internal institutional behaviour. This is because the success of a social 
movement is reliant on collective support (Soule, 2012). In identifying a change of 
internal behaviour within institutions, data analysis was directed towards specific 
individuals that could form strategic partnerships. 
8.6 NGOs Selecting Specific Actors to Form Strategic Partnerships 
 
From a micro level, individual actors are fundamental for any organisational change 
(Battilana et al., 2009). The findings show that only specific embedded agents 




makers. NGO 7 simply stated this importance where key actors are vital to build 
connections with firms.  
 
“Individuals in the NGO play a vital role in building relationships. If they 
have the correct skill set, they can have the power to inspire and influence” 
(NGO 7).  
 
NGO participants were questioned concerning which key members within their 
organisation work with firms. The findings show that NGOs select individuals who 
understand business attitudes and local situations. The aspect of communication is 
key to influence and form a strong partnership (Nielsen, 2013; Wilden et al., 2013). 
The responses in Table 8.5 illustrate how NGOs select an internal actor who best 
possesses such traits. NGO 1 describes multiple levels existing within their 
organisation and where each role would be best suited. Primarily, it can be noted that 
relationship managers have a skillset to connect with external organisations, which 
technical mangers may not. These actors possess the ability to communicate in a way 
that would resonate with business attitudes, focusing on the value gained. NGO 3 
further reiterates that senior management would not only have greater experience but 
also strategic vision, which would be necessary when showing MNCs their 
commitment. The strategy literature explains the importance of managers working in 
line with organisational strategy to ensure power is kept when forming external links 
(Oliver, 1997). 
 






Participant Representative data 
4.E NGO 1 
“There are different levels within the NGO. There are those that can 
communicate well with the business sector and those with the NGO 
sector, that are very technical who really need a relationship manager 
between their engagements with the corporation”. 
 
“You have relationship managers. And then you have technical staff 
and country staff. They all support each other, but the country staff are 




4.E NGO 3 
“This would mainly be concerned with the board members…The 
board of trustees has some good relations, some good experience, has 
the strategic vision and they can be helpful in working with 
businesses…The chairman and the vice chairman and secretary, we 
can have meetings in building partnership”. 
 
4.E NGO 5 
“The project manager in Lebanon would be essential in working with 
companies…this role would require experience as you need to speak 
with businesses in a particular style which resonates with them”. 
 
4.E NGO 6 
“There are always people that are A) reformists, B) powerful. 
Sometimes they overlap. We are pretty good at getting the most 
appropriate person speaking. We’re not too worried about rank, or 
gender, could be an issue in some countries. We tend to put the experts 
relating to an issue in front of somebody. We have some quite young 
people meeting, up to presidential level in their own countries. In some 
cases it’s more appropriate for them rather than someone more senior 
such as myself or board level. On occasion it’s appropriate for the guns 
to be brought out (referring to the senior members of the NGO). The 
head of our Afghanistan is the one who meets the Afghan president 
along with the policy advisers there”. 
 
4.E NGO7 
“For our organisation, it is definitely the president of the NGO. This is 
one of her life achievements. She really is the face of the NGO and the 
voice of the NGO as well. She has a really, really strong network and 
really, really strong reputation”. 
 
4.E NGO 9 
“I am one of the founders and currently vice president…It depends. 
Companies would like to meet people from the co-founders. It may 
give them more credibility”. 
 
4.E NGO 11 
“They (MNCs) generally respond when they recognise that it is the 
founders that are getting in touch…but it helps that we are becoming 
more known…younger employees can then take the lead”. 
 
 
In connection, it was also noted by several participants that certain actors within 
NGOs have networks, which they can utilise for social agendas. Thus, the data show 
that individual experience is also connected with organisational authority and social 
capital. The following comments by NGO 7 and NGO 10 further articulate that 
strategic agents of change possess personal contacts, experience and reputation, 





“Her and all the people that work around her...Other people also such as the 
people of the board, they have international experience… Within the board 
members, we have CEO companies, we have international players and we 
have this very strong local person that is our president…it is beneficial to 
have members of the board from abroad as it increases our social net worth” 
(NGO 7). 
 
“Generally it’s by word of mouth and personal contact. My profession is a 
psychiatrist. So people get to know me through my reputation. My patients 
would recommend me. The same with my co-founder” (NGO 10).  
 
Therefore, an ideal embedded institutional actor would possess business acumen, 
being able to communicate value to a firm. This actor would also have an accessible 
network, which they can utilise for their cause. In recognising how NGOs choose the 
correct internal actor to form strategic partnerships, the findings also show a need for 
context-based understanding. NGOs take into consideration the situation of the local 
environment. The chosen actor to represent the NGO would have to be locally 
proficient to connect with key decision-makers. NGO 6 in Table 8.5 expressed such 
scenarios where at times, experts could be younger members of staff or country-
based specialists.  
 
Table 8.6 shows the findings on how NGOs form strategic partnerships sensitive of 
local situations. NGO 2 and 4 expressed concern on credibility. Dependent on the 
NGOs’ social agenda it can be seen that organisations can be faced with a challenge 
to select the most appropriate actor to represent the organisation. Gifford et al. (2010) 
show this phenomenon where locally based stakeholders can gain greater legitimacy 
over international players. MNCs rely on a balance of global and local strategies and, 
where CSR is concerned, firms are more likely to respond to local actors (Gifford et 
al., 2010). From participant responses, NGOs have recognised this behaviour. 
However, it was also seen that NGOs use local actors as a technique in gathering 
public support to further endorse their social movement. Where NGO 8 relies on 
public support, they have recognised their decision-maker to be of the younger 




create strategic partnership with both firms and their source of power. In NGO 8’s 
example, the younger generation would be their source of power.  
 






Participant Representative data 
4.F NGO 2 
“When building new relationships, say in Lebanon, it would usually be 
the country director who has developed a relationship, who seems to 
have an affinity, from that becomes a project that gains credibility 
which then gets bumped up the line”. 
 
“The other way that these things happen is that one of us is speaking at 
a conference and someone comes up saying that it really resonates and 
would like to talk about that in collaboration”. 
 
4.F NGO 4 
“Though we have many chapters around the world, we are local 
people, fighting local issues…nobody would welcome a guy from say, 
London to Yemen to tell them that they are corrupt...So you need local 
guys who are well connected but not part of the system, to be seen as 
part of the problem. So it is a challenge to find people in some 
countries that are seen as natural but are respected and creditable to be 
able to tackle this”. 
 
4.F NGO 8 
“Youth! Students. School students and university students. I noticed in 
Palestine, students in the school are free of Israeli goods. That’s 
because the children are the age group that are influenced by emotional 
matters…When my children come home from school and ask Baba 
(father), why do we have Israeli milk in our fridge? I would feel 
ashamed. I have many friends that have told me that their kids have 
said that they will not drink milk if it is Israeli milk”. 
 
4.F NGO 10 
“It is not easy at all. This company in the HR, there was a young lady 
sensitive to mental health, so she is the one that contacted us. But 
companies in general are not. It should be someone in the HR. 
Someone that wants to look into the welfare of their employees”. 
 
 
In understanding the type of actors that can form strategic partnerships the topic of 
personality arose. It can be seen that NGOs select a specific individual actor to fulfil 




NGO 4’s role to regulate corporate corruption or NGO 9’s role to seek financial 
support. The collected data show that the chosen actors possess a key trait, which has 
enabled them to influence other individuals. In turn, the theme of an ‘actor’s 
conviction’ was formed by commonality in responses. 
 
8.7 Institutional Actor’s Conviction 
 
Key NGO members had been seen to acquire the ability to build rapport and 
understand the business dynamic. However, a significant area recognised was how 
actors articulated different social concerns. The participant responses in Table 8.7 
show dedication for the social cause that they support. The attitude shown by NGO 
actors has illustrated a sense of institutional motivation, which in turn can be 
recognised as influential power. NGO 2’s response suggests that the organisation has 
gained admiration from the local community. Being within a turbulent environment, 
the participant had experienced protection from the local community due to building 
rapport. Where firms would not experience the same sense of security, collaborating 
with NGOs allows a degree of community admiration to be passed on. The study of 
Shropshire et al. (2013) shows firm responsiveness where stakeholder concerns were 
heightened. Furthermore, the strategy literature also shows cases whereby firms have 
formed links with NGOs to support in local issues (Teegen et al., 2004; Henisz et al., 
2014; Husted et al., 2016).  
 






Participant Representative data 
5.G NGO 2 
“Executive sponsors are generally in the senior management of the 
company. And then you have organisational context points. In our case 
it used to be me and now it’s another member from the executive team. 
The operational points of context are country directors…and then we 
have <employee name> who is the central point of contact for global 
partnership”. 
 
“I was the country director in Iraq during a difficult time, and we 




special relationship with them. They saw the benefits and when there 
were threats, the community both warned us and then protected us and 
that can transfer to companies, but it kind of requires a reboot in 
relationship between company and community”. 
 
5.G NGO 4 
“People understand who I represent and the work we carry out. If 
corporates don’t follow our guidance and get caught doing unethical 
practise, my team will make sure the wider community know about it”. 
 
5.G NGO 7 
“Building rapport is extremely needed…our partner relationships have 
taken long to build but now they understand who we are and what we 
do…our partners respect my suggestions and value my expertise…I 
will continue to do what I do regardless as it is the right thing to do”. 
 
5.G NGO 8 
“We are suffering. And it is because they (opposing party) don’t care. 
They are always in self-interest. I will not see this happen. I must 
protect the interests for my people and make sure my family grow up 
in a fair system”. 
 
5.G NGO 9 
“Someone from the board members have higher ability to influence. 
They can gain more attention as they carry passion…their experience 
and determination for our projects can be very admirable”. 
 
5.G NGO 10 
“What we are doing has to be done. We must carry on good work and 
protect the interests of mental health. There are so many charities that 
focus on illnesses, heart disease or AIDS or whatever, but mental 
health is a big issue in Egypt. Companies need to recognise this”. 
 
5.G NGO 11 
“I started this whole thing because I care. People cannot be oblivious 
of the difficulties that communities go through in some parts of the 




The collected data shown in Table 8.7 suggest that the attitude of actors within 
institutions can be an influential factor. NGOs are known to support the welfare of 
the public and act as a regulatory force (Berrone et al., 2013). It can be seen that an 
individual actor’s conviction is necessary to influence firm strategy. Moreover, NGO 
1’s following comment shows how their organisational role and conviction must be 
aligned with strategic partnership. NGO 1 develops their discussion emphasising that 




time and temporality is also seen within this statement, where NGO 1 had to learn 
the skill of how to speak with MNCs.  
 
“Without sounding narcissistic, I am in my role as I know what is necessary 
to connect with the business mind set. I am very proud of the work <NGO 
name> does and it requires an individual to articulate this same passion into 
a strategic value-based proposition to business representatives…It has taken 
time to learn this and I guess it is also my duty to teach this internally to 
improve how our members connect with their (MNC) members” (NGO 1).  
 
From an NGO perspective three second-order themes were formed in understanding 
embedded agency. Firstly, in order to form corporate links there needs to be a change 
in the ‘institutional internal behaviour’ at an individual level. Secondly, an ideal 
NGO actor needs to have the capacity to form ‘strategic partnerships’. Finally, the 
data shows that the ‘actor’s conviction’ on social cause can enhance their influential 
ability. Collapsing these three themes formed the second micro aggregate theoretical 
dimension, a prominent micro actor. This theoretical concept highlights the type of 
embedded agency within NGOs that possess the ability to gain legitimacy and power 




The purpose of this chapter was to answer the third research question: Which 
external individual actors are involved in influencing strategic decision-making for a 
firm in conflict zones? The institutional literature has been vague in understanding 
the type and role of embedded agency within context (Abdelnour et al., 2017). The 
micro findings formed two aggregate theoretical dimensions: 1) a specialist 
authoritative partner, and 2) a prominent micro actor. 
 
Firstly, a ‘specialist authoritative partner’ has emerged within this study to show 
which individual actors MNCs appeal to work with. The concept has provided a 
clearer understanding of which specific external actor can gain legitimacy and power 




understand agency who can shape the strategy process (Burgelman et al., 2018; 
Kouame and Langley, 2018). The findings show that MNCs prefer to communicate 
with external senior management based on the belief that higher authority is linked 
with experience and organisational plans. Furthermore, being an institutional 
specialist increases an NGO actor’s influential capacity. This is needed to not only 
inspire the MNC representative, but also ensure the MNC representative influences 
senior management internal to the firm. This is particularly necessary within conflict 
zones where NGO accessibility is low. 
 
Secondly, a ‘prominent micro actor’ has emerged to describe a type of institutional 
embedded agency. These actors possess the ability to gain legitimacy and power to 
influence firm strategy, building on Bitektine and Haack's (2015) notion of actors 
establishing an alliance or partnership. To support agents of change first requires a 
positive institutional internal behaviour to connect with MNCs. In turn, a prominent 
micro actor would be able to influence firm strategy by forming strategic 
partnerships. This would be based on their business acumen and ability to connect 
locally with key decision-makers. Moreover, the findings show that an actor’s social 




























9.1 Introduction  
 
The strategy process of a firm has been identified as an important area in the field of 
strategic management (Mintzberg and Lampel, 1999; Burgelman et al., 2018). 
Scholars have reviewed the planning and formulation of business strategy from 
different angles, each contributing to the overall field (Chakravarthy and Doz, 1992; 
Farjoun, 2002; Whittington and Cailluet, 2008). As a result, it has been argued that 
the process of how strategy is generated and executed is vital for the success of firms 
(Covin et al., 2006). In understanding the underpinnings of the strategy process, it 
was evident that contextual application was necessary (Shepherd and Rudd, 2014). 
This was because several functions of the strategy process were governed by the 
environmental context (Nadkarni and Barr, 2008). Consequently, there was a 
limitation in understanding how the strategy process changes within a conflict zone 
where firms are exposed environmental complexities and institutional demands. This 
final chapter revisits the research rationale, highlighting the literature and theoretical 
contributions.  
 
Empirical studies show that MNCs who are expanding into new regions have to 
adapt their strategy process to address local demands (Kolk and Lenfant, 2012). This 
has led to a growing interest in how the strategy process changes within differing 
contexts (Oh and Oetzel, 2016), particularly where the environmental context can 
influence strategic decision-making (Shepherd and Rudd, 2014). Environmental 
influence can emerge from characteristics linked to turbulent environments such as 
corruption (Berman et al., 2017) or institutions operating in the same region such as 
NGOs (Vachani et al., 2009; Kolk and Lenfant, 2012). Therefore, it is necessary to 
continue exploring the impact of specific contexts on the strategy process in order to 
further understand the influence of adverse environments (Hutzschenreuter and 





Within conflict zones NGOs are recognised as influential institutions, but are rarely 
considered (Kraemer et al,. 2013). The strategy literature has been limited in 
recognising the effect of non-political institutions (Delmas and Toffel, 2008). Hence, 
this study aimed to understand how the strategy process is influenced by social 
institutions within an unstable context. Drawing on institutional theory, this study 
comprehends external organisational influences on the strategy process. The 
theoretical concepts of legitimacy, power and agency have been recognised, 
extending insight into strategic management within a conflict context. To fully 
comprehend NGO influences on the strategy process, this study chose a multilevel 
method of analysis. This provided a comprehensive perspective in understanding a 
firm’s strategy process at a macro level, NGO relationships at a meso level and 
individual actors at a micro level. A multilevel analysis has been argued as an 
effective method to understanding how micro influences can equate to macro 
changes in the strategy process (Burgelman et al., 2018; Kouame and Langley, 
2018). 
 
The multilevel method of analysis was reflected in the following three research 
questions designed to contribute to the overarching research aim:  
 
1) What indicators are used in the strategy process for firms entering a 
conflict zone? 
 
2) How can NGOs as institutions possess legitimacy and power to influence a 
firm’s strategy process in conflict zones? 
 
3) Which external individual actors are involved in influencing strategic 
decision-making for a firm in conflict zones? 
 
The findings were gathered from twenty-one semi-constructed interviews, conducted 
with senior individuals in MNCs and NGOs. These organisations have gained 
experience operating within the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) economic 
zone, which was the context of this study. Figure 9.1 illustrates the main findings 
within the macro, meso and micro levels of analysis. This chapter expands on these 




narrative and institutional theory. The chapter continues, suggesting 
recommendations for further research and highlighting the limitations of the study. 

















Research question 1 
Macro: Contextual change in the strategy process 
Feasibility indicators 
Institutional rank of importance 
Research question 2 
Meso: NGOs influencing strategy 
Institutional value or  
Institutional interception 
Disturbing the bottom-line 
Research question 3 
Micro: Embedded agency within NGOs 
Specialist authoritative partner 
 
Prominent micro actor 
 
Source of legitimacy 
Institutional control (power) 
MNC appeal 
NGO necessity 
How do NGOs pass the firm 
legitimacy filter? 
Which actors possess 




9.2 Contributions to the Strategy Process Narrative 
 
In comparing several strategy process models in chapter two, a conceptual strategy 
process framework was developed. This framework was further developed in chapter 
three integrating how firms account for operating within a conflict environment. 
However, from a macro level there was contextual limitation in the strategy process 
narrative to showcase, which key indicators firms use to operate within a conflict 
zone; particularly with how firms plan to enter adverse environments and where 
institutions are accounted for within the strategy process. Understanding how the 
strategy process changes was necessary to comprehend how NGOs could pass firm 
legitimacy filters at a meso level and which type of agency possesses legitimacy at a 
micro level. Hence the direction of the study began at the macro firm level by 
understanding how the strategy process changes when placed within a conflict 
environment.  
 
Building on previous scholars’ understanding (Farjoun, 2002; Hutzschenreuter and 
Kleindienst, 2006; Burgelman et al., 2018), this thesis provided two key 
contributions to the strategy process narrative. These have been highlighted in Figure 
9.2 building on the conceptual framework. Each of the two contributions has been 


















The first contribution was recognising feasibility indicators within the Situational 
analysis step. This was the main implication for the strategy process in conflict 
zones increasing complexity for strategic planning and formulation. The strategy 
process, when contextualised, needs to account for local indicators different to those 
of a stable operational environment. To plan for potential crisis, there are five key 
indicators specific to MNCs planning to enter a conflict environment: to identify 
commercial opportunity, political stability, corruption index, reputational risk, and 
employee safety. Though each of these areas is mentioned within the management 
field, the concept of feasibility indicators is an introduction to the strategy process 
and conflict zone narrative.  
 
Mintzberg's (1978) seminal work in understanding ‘emergent’ and ‘deliberate’ 
strategy formations has been an important review in strategy process discussions. 
Mirabeau and Maguire (2014: 1212) argue that one aspect to reach an emergent 
strategy is by “manipulating strategic context for consonance”. In other words, this 
would entail adding new categories and stretching a firm’s capability to fit the 
situation. In the case of operating in a conflict zone firms have to analyse feasibility 
indicators and review if their capabilities can overcome the local demands. MNCs 
are not only concerned with their ability to operate in an unstable infrastructure, but 
also to ensure that they are not seen to fuel the conflict or have to operate within 
unethical practises. 
  
In connection with feasibility, a hierarchical importance was identified where senior 
management and government regulation had greater control of strategic direction 
over NGOs in the early stages. Due to some regions possessing tight regulatory 
control, external influences would need to pass a host governing body filter before 
gaining access to MNCs. Hence, the concept of a host governing body filter was 
included within the Formulation step. From an institutional perspective, this creates 
a barrier for external influences to enter into the strategy formation discussion. This 
is specific to the context of this study. Particularly within the Middle East, 
governments have a tight regulatory control on which NGOs can operate, limiting 





The second contribution involves recognising an institutional rank of importance 
within a conflict zone. For those NGOs that pass the host government body filter, 
MNCs are faced with how to react to different external forces. MNCs have an early 
recognition of NGOs that are activist or collaborative in their approach. Hence, the 
findings suggest that firms rank external pressure to gauge the necessity to respond 
to such demands. Dependent on the institution’s ability to add value in the strategy 
planning stages, MNCs can gauge how useful an NGO would be. This has been 
reflected within the framework, as the institution’s ability to reduce the risks 
identified in the feasibility indicators and contribute to the process outcome in the 
Implementation stage. NGOs have to support the firm’s process outcome in order to 
be recognised as an important institution. Within a conflict setting if NGOs can 
reduce the firm’s concerns highlighted within the situational analysis stage, they can 
be seen as a valuable organisation. This level of institutional rank is a key 
contribution to the strategy process narrative. Strategic management’s recognition of 
where institutions such as NGOs fit within the process can extend insight on the 
effect of external organisations (Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst, 2006). 
Understanding that firms have an institutional ranking system at a macro level 
supports a theoretical understanding of institutional legitimacy and power at a meso 
and micro level. 
 
In the development of these two key contributions it is relevant to highlight the 
notion of temporality identified throughout the study. Given the context of this 
study, participants engaged with and provided experiences at different stages of 
conflict. This was recognised particularly where past experiences had informed 
subsequent strategic decision making in terms of movement and lowering 
reputational risk. There was also a link of how NGOs as institutions could gain 
recognition within the strategy process based on time taken to build credibility and 
micro actors learning the correct methods of rapport building. Where different 
periods of time can impact how firms engage with its operational environment 
(Bucheli and Kim, 2012; Guidolin and La Ferrara 2007), the concept of time would 
need to be taken into consideration. This can be the case in conflict contexts where 
historical events could determine how stakeholders react, directly or indirectly 
impacting firm strategy (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016; Henisz et al., 2010). Incorporating 




providing a greater understanding of how feasibility indicators and institutional 
ranks change at different conflict stages.  
 
9.3 Contributions to Institutional Theory 
 
NGOs are recognised as trusted institutions due to their social regulatory role 
(Hollensbe et al., 2014). NGOs are motivated to manage societal issues, governing 
social behaviour and cognitive structures becoming subjects that define institutional 
theory (Scott, 1995). From a macro perspective, firms set a legitimacy filter and an 
institutional rank of importance within their strategy process. As a result, a question 
remained from a meso level as to how NGOs could gain legitimacy to influence key 
strategy decision-makers. Additionally, it has been identified that legitimacy is 
interlinked with power (Henisz and Zelner, 2005; Delmas and Toffel, 2008) and 
actors from a micro level (Daniels et al., 2002; Stevens et al., 2015). Therefore, to 
fully understand legitimacy and NGO influence, power and actors were also 
intertwined. Firms are exposed to NGO influences within the Formulation step and 
Evaluation step of the strategy process. This is reflected as the external influences 
and stakeholder reviews subsections. Using an institutional theoretical lens to 
understand how NGOs can influence firm strategy, three key contributions are made.  
 
The first theoretical contribution is the source of legitimacy. Legitimacy is a central 
concept within institutional theory (Suddaby et al., 2017). Due to the increase of 
external demands firms have developed a legitimacy filter to gauge the importance 
and urgency to respond (Henisz and Zelner, 2005; Scherer et al., 2013). The 
literature provides in-depth knowledge of the necessity to gain legitimacy for 
external organisations to influence (Suddaby et al., 2017). However, the source of 
legitimacy is vague, particularly for non-political institutions such as NGOs in 
heterogeneous environments. From a meso level, this study shows that NGOs can 
pass firm legitimacy filters either through institutional value or institutional 
interception. This is has extended insight of the sources of legitimacy within a 
conflict environment, where legitimacy research needs to advance within the 






The concept of institutional value highlights that MNCs prefer to work with 
collaborative firms. Firms set an internal legitimacy filter to restrict any external 
organisations that would hinder business operations, such as activist NGOs or 
organisations that question business integrity. Thus NGOs have to provide value to 
the firm in order to gain recognition. As recognised earlier, if a NGO can assist in 
removing firm concerns, MNCs are willing to accept external influences on strategic 
direction. Examples from research participants show MNCs working with 
humanitarian organisations and allocating resources for CSR to enhance brand 
image. These NGOs are collaborative and professional in their approach. Suchman's 
(1995) notion of strategic legitimacy resonates with the argument of NGOs passing 
the legitimacy filter with institutional value. However, in this case NGOs are seen as 
non-market performers, thus the organisational influence of strategy can be for 
alternative interests. 
 
Alternatively, there are NGOs who can pass the legitimacy filter through 
institutional interception. As recognised, there are operational differences between 
NGOs. For those NGOs that play a stronger regulatory role, legitimacy is gained 
through collective public support. These NGOs can question business operations and 
MNCs must respond due to the NGO representing societal concern; for example, 
organisations involved in eliminating unethical business practises (corruption, 
human rights and environmental abuse). NGOs that represent social welfare can 
intercept business practise if seen as inappropriate. Cases have been reviewed within 
the business management narrative (Sharma and Henriques, 2005); however, within 
strategy process research this institutional perspective has been overlooked.  
 
The second theoretical contribution was to institutional control. Institutional control 
has been placed under on the theoretical concept of power (Goodstein and Velamuri, 
2009). Institutional power has been commonly associated as a micro phenomenon 
(Pacheco et al., 2010). However, given the complexities of conflict zones and 
strategy-making (Grant, 2003; Berman et al., 2017) it was vague as to how NGOs 
can gain the attention of key strategic decision-makers. This is due to the complex 
dynamic between actors internal to a firm involved in the formulation of strategy 




need to understand how NGOs could gain institutional control over the firm’s 
underlying objectives from a meso perspective. Understanding power at a meso level 
can support the link between organisational objectives (macro) and individual agents 
of change (micro) (Rao et al., 2000; Kozlowski et al., 2013). This study shows that 
from a meso level, NGOs’ ability to gain institutional control is based on disturbing 
the bottom-line; NGOs would need to positively or negatively impact the firm’s 
financial flow or business operations. 
 
The three themes supporting this conclusion include, highlighting a social concern, 
influential channels (consistent pressure, NGO knowledge and CSR activities) and 
institutional power (credibility, regulatory figure, personal network, emotional 
attachment and influencing the legal system). By highlighting an area of social 
concern MNCs are open to influential channels. In these cases, institutions choose to 
influence through shaping individual ideologies (Munir, 2015). However, the 
empirical data shows that influential power is only possible if the NGO possess 
credibility and is recognised as a regulatory figure. By representing a social cause 
and public welfare, a section of society legitimises the organisation, in turn providing 
power to represent the public opinion. An example was seen by a Palestinian activist 
group convincing consumers to boycott Israeli food companies. In turn, the Israeli 
company only responded once their financial flow was affected. 
 
The third theoretical contribution focuses on which embedded agency could 
influence firm strategy. In understanding how NGOs could gain legitimacy and 
power from a meso level, a question remained as to which individual actors possess 
these abilities. Embedded agency refers to individual actors who are purposefully 
placed within an institution with assigned roles (Garud et al., 2007). Only certain 
external agency would be able to influence the formulation of firm strategy (Drori 
and Honig, 2013). However, institutional insight has overlooked the interaction 
between actors and how they can influence intentions and behaviour (Lawrence, 
2008). Hence, there was a need to uncover which type of embedded agency within 
NGOs could influence firm actors. Furthermore, within the strategy process research, 
understanding the micro phenomena that can lead to macro changes has become an 
emerging topic (Kouame and Langley, 2018). Hence, Burgelman et al. (2018) call 




study forms two types of embedded agency within NGOs that could influence 
strategy, a specialist authoritative partner and a prominent micro actor. 
 
The concept of a specialist authoritative partner was formed by understanding 
which individual actors MNC’s appeal to work with. This study shows that MNCs 
prefer to communicate with senior management of an external organisation. This is 
based on the belief that higher authority is linked with experience and organisational 
plans. As recognised at a macro level, MNCs will connect with an NGO if the 
external organisation can add value to the firm by removing concerns in a conflict 
setting. Thus, from a micro level also being an institutional specialist within an 
actor’s field can increase their value and influential capacity. This is not only to 
influence the MNC representative, but also to ensure that the MNC representative 
influence senior management within the organisation. This influential power is based 
on possessing a higher knowledge resource.  
 
The concept of a prominent micro actor is used to describe the necessities of the 
individual actor’s characteristics embedded within NGOs. These type of actors 
possess the ability to gain legitimacy and power to influence firm strategy, building 
on Bitektine and Haack's (2015) notion of actors establishing an alliance or 
partnership. To support these agents of change first requires a positive internal 
institutional behaviour to connect with MNCs. If the support is limited an embedded 
actor needs to shift internal organisational behaviour to support their cause. 
Subsequently, with the backing of their organisation this micro actor should possess 
the ability to form strategic partnerships. As NGOs are socially driven (Doh and 
Guay, 2006), not all members have the business acumen that resonates with MNCs. 
This prominent micro actor would need to be able to understand business attitude 
and possess the ability to connect locally with key decision-makers. Additionally, 
this actor should possess institutional conviction. Being driven through social 







9.4 Recommendations for Future Research  
 
This study provides insight into how the strategy process changes when applied to 
conflict zones, specifically within the MENA region. Furthermore, the influential 
effect of NGOs on the strategy process has been reviewed, understanding how 
external organisations and micro actors can gain legitimacy and power. Though this 
study has joined the strategy process narrative in the strategic management field, the 
themes that have arisen also bring into question temporality (Lippmann and Aldrich, 
2016), organisational studies (Land et al, 2014), sustainability and CSR (Sharma and 
Henriques, 2005; Oetzel et al., 2010; Husted et al., 2016) and peace through 
commerce (Branzei and Abdelnour, 2010; Katsos and AlKafaji, 2017). Each of these 
key themes can extend this study on strategy process and provide direction for future 
research. Furthermore, a recommendation can be made for future data collection.   
 
9.4.1 Temporality  
 
Conflict has shown different stages based on periodic events. As a result, how firms 
react at different stages of conflict can impact their relationships with their 
operational environment and institutions. This opens up an avenue for future 
research to understand where temporality sits within the strategy process. To gain a 
greater perspective of how social institutions can influence the strategy process, a 
subsequent study can understand if historical events and different stages of conflict 
change how strategists think. To make sense of data collected in different time 
periods, a notion of temporality needs to be included within a research design 
(Langley, 1999). Use of a temporal context can support an understanding where 
research participants may sit at different points in time (Lippmann and Aldrich, 
2016). Lippmann and Aldrich (2016: 61) expand suggesting that temporality is a 
necessary context particularly where “cross-national and historical investigations has 






9.4.2 Organisational studies  
 
The empirical data show that firms react to conflict differently, which is reflected 
within decision-making and the strategy process. This is based on the organisational 
behaviour of firms with their capacity to absorb risk and industry experience. The 
literature recognises the strategy process as not linear, but rather being shaped 
through multiple internal and external influences (Farjoun, 2002; Hutzschenreuter 
and Kleindienst, 2006). Thus, further understanding the manner of which 
organisational behaviour can shape the strategy process in conflict zones would be 
an interesting dependent variable. This could incorporate the views of firm 
characteristics in strategic decision-making (Elbanna and Child, 2007) and 
institutional complexity (Marano and Kostova, 2015). 
 
9.4.3 Sustainability and CSR 
 
Sustainability has been viewed from both international strategy (Hitt et al., 2016) and 
social responsibility (Jamali and Mirshak, 2010; Kolk, 2015). Within the findings it 
is seen that the majority of the firms link NGOs to corporate social responsibility 
(CSR). With firms becoming more aware of the social expectations to provide back 
to the international community, there is a call for research to review where CSR fits 
within corporate strategy (Miles, 2012; Kolk, 2015). The notion of shared value has 
emerged within the management literature (Porter and Kramer, 2011). Thus, there is 
a need to understand the process of CSR internal to a firm when subjected to 
institutional pressure. This extension of research would contribute to the study of 
Henisz et al. (2014), understanding financial returns from stakeholder engagement.  
 
9.4.4 Peace through commerce 
 
Studies have reviewed the impact of commercial activity in stabilising post-conflict 
zones and the contribution to establishing peace in unstable environments (Berman, 
2000; Katsos and Forrer, 2014; Ford, 2015; Forrer and Katsos, 2015). Subsequently, 




2009; Oetzel et al., 2010). Katsos and AlKafaji (2017) share insight into businesses 
operating in war zones, providing positive findings of firms contributing to peace 
within Iraq. This aspect correlates with the empirical data uncovered within this 
thesis. It was seen that firms were more likely to respond to NGOs during a conflict 
period. The notion of MNC and NGO relationships can be extended to research how 
the ‘peace through commerce’ agenda enters into strategic decision-making. 
However, this enquiry requires extended time and access to research subjects.  
 
9.4.5 Case study research design 
 
A methodological recommendation for future research is to incorporate a case study 
research design. A case study can be useful to focus on a particular scenario or event 
(Williams and Shepherd, 2016). In turn, collecting data on a specific event can 
provide further clarity of why organisations react to external influences. A case study 
was particularly useful in Drori and Honig's (2013) research design to draw 
inferences from internal and external organisational legitimacy. The authors 
conducted a longitudinal case study on one company in order to understand casual 
relationships. Future research on MNC and NGO interactions can build a series of 
case studies understanding the relationship of two organisations that have a direct 
impact on each other in conflict zones; for example, gaining a multilevel 
understanding of how the activist NGO Greenpeace could influence MNC Shell Oil 
(Soule, 2012). 
 
9.5 Limitations of the Research  
 
As with all studies there are some limitations that inevitably restrict the full potential 
of the research. This study carried three limitations. Firstly the findings have been 
generalised to all industries operating within the MENA region. Focusing on one 
industry could have shown clearer understanding, though this would require an 
extended data collection period and access to research participants. Nonetheless, 
understanding a specific industry was not the main aim of the study. Where the main 




the study was open to all industries operating in the region. Furthermore, the 
intensity of conflict within MENA differs between countries. This factor was also 
not indicated within the conceptual strategy process framework due to complications 
in providing accurate measurement. Nevertheless, as noted within the literature, 
conflict can affect a complete region, thus firms are more likely to react in the same 
way (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008; Czinkota et al., 2010). 
 
Secondly, this study did not account for firm implementation to enter the conflict 
country. As the MNC participants were sharing their experience already operating 
within the MENA economic zone, the focal point was on external influences. 
However, how the firm entered the conflict region could have impacted the 
perception and relationship with NGOs. Where this study was taken from an 
institutional perspective, the main focus was on external influences. The researcher 
made an assumption that how the MNC gained access into the conflict zone would 
be indifferent to how NGOs could influence strategic direction.  
 
Lastly, there is a limitation in this study to take into account the degree of individual 
actors’ experiences within a conflict region. Prior studies show how experience can 
develop the resilience of firms when operating within unstable environments 
(Branzei and Abdelnour, 2010; Bullough et al., 2014). The experience of each 
participant could have contributed to building relationships with MNCs and NGOs. 
Though this study took into account the traits needed for influential micro actors, the 
level of experience was not accounted for.   
 
9.6 Managerial Summary: NGOs Influencing Strategy and Strengthening the 
Relationship with MNCs 
 
This study provided insight from ten MNC and eleven NGO representatives who had 
gained experience operating within the MENA economic region. Additionally, an in-
depth literature review was carried out on both MNCs and NGOs operating within 
conflict environments. From both of these primary and secondary sources, an 
understanding had been developed on how and why each party operates. In 




NGOs lacked complete clarity of regional stakeholders’ necessities and intentions. 
Understanding these perceptions would benefit academics and practitioners, 
strengthening the relationship between MNCs and NGOs.  
 
MNCs enter unstable environments on the basis that they can absorb the risk factors 
attached. Prior to entering a conflict zone firms conduct a thorough situational 
analysis, particularly reviewing feasibility. Key feasibility indicators include 
commercial opportunity, reputational risk and safety. Furthermore, due to the 
increase in external demands, firms have established an internal cognitive legitimacy 
filter. Firms use this filter as a rank of importance, assessing risk and value. In 
entering a conflict region further financial resources are allocated to ensure the 
correct infrastructure is in place. An example provided by a participant highlighted 
an employee compound with luxury amenities and increased safety measures to 
attract a workforce to a conflict area. Therefore, the potential monetary gain for the 
MNC to set up in a conflict area must be high enough to account for the increase in 
start-up costs. These considerations are made in the early stages of the strategy 
process. The notion of providing something back to the host community would not 
be acknowledged until financial gain can be made or value is given back to the firm. 
For example, a participant shared an experience where the firm had built a hospital 
to form a relationship with the local community. Generating a positive image to the 
local community was important to ensure the ten-year strategic plan was not 
interrupted. Institutions must understand this level of thought when attempting to 
influence MNCs. Depending on the global reach of the MNC, certain connections 
with NGOs in the conflict zone are based on enhancing global and local reputation. 
Discussions of sustainability and CSR have entered into professional strategy 
discussions due to consistent pressure and social expectation. Some participants had 
further explained that, due to the rise of open source media, business practices have 
become easier to regulate. In turn, institutions such as NGOs have found it easier to 
form social movements increasing their influential ability. NGOs can be categorised 
into three key structures.  
 
Firstly, the most common are organisations that specialise in solving a particular 
issue within society. Some issues shared by participants include access to clean 




collaborative and legitimate to cooperate with. If there were an internal influence 
within the firm or external request for assistance, MNCs would be more willing to 
incorporate the support within their strategic decisions. Particularly, within a conflict 
environment, an MNC would be more willing to respond to a collaborative NGO if 
they can reduce risk and support toward the business objectives. In other words, 
these NGOs would have to add value to the firm in order to be considered. 
Collaborative NGOs thrive from the financial support provided from businesses, thus 
they are also more willing to meet MNCs’ demands.  
 
The second category can be considered as activist NGOs. The objective of an activist 
NGO is to create a social movement to hinder MNC business operation due to 
conflicting agendas. The approach used by these NGOs aims to support a segment of 
society who may be negatively affected by business operations. In turn, the main 
agenda would be to hinder the firm’s financial flow and brand image. This study 
recognised that within some parts of the Middle East, activist NGOs would be 
restricted from entering the country. Consequently, for NGOs to achieve their goal a 
different approach would be advisable. The empirical findings suggest that NGOs 
are unfamiliar with the strategy process of MNCs. This insight would support an 
NGO’s ability to negotiate in a strategic sense.  Institutional control could be gained 
if the NGO could disturb the firm’s business operation or finances.  
 
Lastly, the third type of NGO would sit between collaborative and activist. These 
NGOs play a regulatory role to ensure the business sector stay within the ethical 
parameters. Social regulative NGOs aspire to collaborate with MNCs as an educative 
consultant to trade in conflict areas. However, if NGO investigations prove that an 
MNC is being successful at a negative cost of society, the NGO can become 
authoritative. None of the twenty-one participants interviewed insinuated any form 
of unethical behaviour. However, some examples shared highlighted NGOs 
uncovering corporate corruption to win tenders and bribery to gain access to certain 
markets. Social regulative NGOs can intercept the strategy process if they can gain 
institutional control.  
  
Within strategic management, knowing that external influences are applied from 




turn, understanding these empirical observations from a general management sense 
can strengthen the relationship between MNCs and NGOs within conflict zones.  
 
9.7 Concluding Remarks  
 
In summary, valuable insight has been gained to answer the aim of this thesis, to 
understand how the strategy process is influenced by social institutions within an 
unstable context. Conflict zones are becoming an increasing area of discussion 
within the business management literature (Kolk and Lenfant, 2012; Dai et al., 2013; 
Hiatt and Sine, 2014). Thought on market survival and foreign direct investment has 
been extend to conflict regions (Branzei and Abdelnour, 2010; Hiatt and Sine, 2014; 
Darendeli and Hill, 2016). Due to NGOs operating within the same region, firms 
have been faced with institutional pressures (Vachani et al., 2009; Kolk and Lenfant, 
2012). As a result, it is important to understand how the external environment can 
influence the strategy process (Farjoun, 2002; Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst, 
2006) and microelements that direct strategic decision-making (Burgelman et al., 
2018). This study aspired to extend strategy and institutional narratives into a 
conflict context.  
 
Drawing on institutional theory supported an understanding of NGOs influencing the 
strategy process in conflict zones. Theoretical concepts of legitimacy (Suddaby et al., 
2017), power (Lawrence, 2008) and agency (Leca et al., 2008) became apparent in 
organisational influence. To answer the research aim, three research questions were 
formed addressing the macro, meso and micro phenomena. From a macro level of 
analysis, it was seen that feasibility indicators and an institutional rank of importance 
was needed to contextualise the strategy process to conflict zones. From a meso 
level, the NGO’s source of legitimacy to pass firm filters was based on either 
institutional value or institutional interception. Ultimately, institutional control was 
dependent on the NGO’s ability to disturb the bottom line. A microanalysis 
recognised that only certain embedded agency within NGOs could possess 
legitimacy and power. Agents of change either had to be a specialist authoritative 





This thesis has brought together three important and relevant areas of discussion 
contributing to strategy and institutional literature. By understanding the process of 
strategy within an environment, which is governed by institutional expectations and 
civil or political instability, scholars can conceptualise actualities. The complexity of 
strategy planning and organisational influence has been displayed in recognisable 
terms, contributing a conceptual framework and developed concepts to theory and 
practise. As Burgelman et al. (2018) suggest, strategy process research continues to 
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1 How do you define business strategy for your firm? 
What is the step-by-step process in creating strategy?  
(Situational Analysis, Formulation, Implementation, Evaluation) 
How is this different when planning to operate within a conflict zone 
or turbulent environment? 
What are the key components in building strategy? 
What is your role in this process? 
Which other members/teams are involved? 
Does one member have greater influence than others? 
 
2 When planning to enter a conflict zone, does the firm experience 
external pressure?  
Has the firm worked with or had faced pressure from NGOs? 
How does the firm account for this? 
Does the actions of an NGO affect the strategic decision making 
process? If so, what are the actions?   
Do these affect strategy directly or indirectly? 
How does the firm legitimise which NGOs to respond to or not? 
 
3 From a micro perspective, is there an individual or a group of 
individuals within an NGO, which you would regard as important? If 
so, why? 
Has the actions of this individual changed or influenced the business 


















What is your role within the NGO?  
Are you aware of the process or steps taken by firms when creating a 
business strategy to enter a conflict zone? 
As an NGO is it within your interest to work with or take action against 
the firm? Why so? 
Which point of the firms strategic process would you feel your NGO 
should be included or to intercept? 
 
2 Would you want to influence the strategic decision of the firm? 
If so, why and how? 
Do you get recognised by the firm?  
Do you take any steps to legitimise your approach to gain recognition 
from the firm? 
Have you been successful in influencing a firm’s actions? 
If so, what do you feel gave you the power to execute that change? 
 
3 Would you say your position plays a part in creating change? 
Who are the key members within your NGO who work directly with 
firms?  




























State of Palestine 
Syrian Arab Republic 
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4 – Participant MNC 1 Interview Transcript 
 
Interview  
Participant MNC 1 
 
Interviewer: 0:03  
I want to start by gathering an understanding of your views of business strategy. 
How would you define business strategy? 
 
Participant: 0:03 – 0:10 
Oh, you are putting me on the hot seat (laughter). It was some time when I did my 
MBA. Ok, so lets see. Ours is predominantly a card business. Not predominantly, it 
is a card business. Card and merchant acquirers, merchant being where a card is 
accepted. Industry is very fast changing in terms of technology, in terms of 
environment, mainly because it is Saudi Arabia and so on. So we do a strategy of 
generally three years. It is never more than three years. But sometimes we extend 
that, those financial projections extrapolate them into years four and five, because 
our head office always wants a five year view point as to where we are going to be. 
Then we keep rolling these numbers sometimes. But at any given times we do not do 
more than three years because the technology changes a lot. We are in the card 
business, technology keeps changing so our strategy must stay in line with that. The 
population in the Middle East is very transient including Saudi Arabia. Though our 
client base in Saudi, predominantly Saudi, the non-Saudi client base is very fluid, 
transient. You have people come into the portfolio, leaving portfolio and last couple 
of years, the oil prices being where they are, that hasn’t helped. So there has been 
more churning in that part of the portfolio. Even within Saudi portfolio, people 
cannot afford to pay, that’s the long and short of it.  
 
So what we do, we start off with the geo-political situation, oil prices, because the 
economy is a good 70-80% based on oil or oil related. Particularly Saudi more so, if 
you look at UAE, Dubai, maybe Bahrain, Qatar and all that, it is less dependent on 
oil. Oil and Gas predominantly, but they have certain amount of trade, certain 
amount of import export, export also which Saudi has very little off. So whatever 
Saudi import is for internal consumption. Never for value adding and then 
processing and sending it out. So this is differences between other GCC countries 
and Saudi Arabia. Within the Middle East you will find many other big markets in 
terms of population, like Turkey is there, Egypt is there which is the big market 
again and of course Levant counties which is Jordan Syria Yemen. Syria is very 
unstable and Syria main, and Lebanon is unstable as well. And Yemen which again 
is having a War with Saudi Arabia. So this is very testing times, trying times. So 
what we do, we start off with the economic indicators, the population and trade, oil 
price estimate for next three four years, domestic product, you could say GDP 
growth, GDP per capita growth, surplus for people to spend, that’s specific to our 
industry probably, because people will have to spend of the food, education, clothes, 
where they stay, their cars, basic minimum. And beyond that, whatever they have 
that would be their discretionary spend, and a fair amount of that may be spent using 
plastic cards. And then on plastics cards, what is our share, so we look at our share of 
that, and we see how that is going to grow. We take into account the technological 





And the technological development is driven by a few things, also by the regulators. 
The regulators say that you have to have certain technological, common grounds for 
processing of payments, from transferring the charges from one issuer to another 
issuer. From an acquirer and you know the merchant acceptances and so on. So 
technology is driven by that. Technology is driven by what is happening in the rest 
of the world, because the cards will not be used only in Saudi Arabia, but also when 
I travel to UK or US of wherever, obviously I’ll be using cards over there. 
Technology will be used, not only for processing the charges, but for 
communications, for marking strategies, marking information coming to me. If I go 
to New York, then obviously I would want to know where I can use my <business 
name> card. Or <business name> has my profile. They know I like to eat at such and 
such places, maybe go to a golf tournament, maybe watch let’s say a theatre or 
something. So they have profiled me. And all the related information will come to 
me. But that has to be through the merchant network as well. Because we will not 
have all the information over here. But as a network we have the entire information. 
The US network will be coordinating with our Network and sending me information. 
And the two of them and so on. So technology is very important.  
 
Interviewer 00:10 
Ok, so Technology is a very important aspect when it comes to your strategy, 
particularly for the card market being one of your key products. When we look at the 
process steps for creating strategy, you mentioned Yemen was at war with Saudi 
Arabia. Would you have to account for this somewhere within your strategy process? 
Would you have to account for unstable countries, which could affect your strategic 
planning?  
 
Participant: 0:10 – 0:14 
Yes, it affects it big time. We are a global business at the end of the day. Not just 
Yemen, in the sense, our people would travel to Yemen, try to generate some 
business, that business has come to a standstill. Same thing with Syria and few of the 
Levant counties. Feasibility is needed. Turkey has been, I mean, we are not even 
allowed to travel to Turkey from a security point of view. Leave that aside. Take 
Brexit. Brexit has brought down the pound sterling from 1.3, 1.35 to the dollar to 1.2 
or something, so the business generated over there also gets affected. What, as an 
example, if you were our customer and you were to spend, thousand pounds on a 
particular item. You would still spend a thousand pounds. But in the past we would 
have billed you one thousand five hundred dollars because that was the rate. Now we 
could bill you one thousand three hundred dollars. Because it is a dollar based 
economy. So as the dollar gets stronger, this is not good for us at times. To some 
extent it is good for us because people would travel more and spend, but if you look 
at the elite class of people that is our customer, they would spend of the higher end 
of the spectrum, these people don’t have, these people’s demands are rather inelastic. 
If they need to buy a property, lets say, or if they need to buy a car, they are not 
going to buy a car and half just because the dollar rates have gone down. Again, you 
know what I mean. Or if they are going to stay in London for a week, they are going 
to stay for a week. They are not going to say if the pound is cheaper they going to 
stay for nine days. It’s doesn’t happen that way. We found that the demand is rather 
inelastic. So the exchange rates really matter a lot to us. One way or the other. This 




And what impact this could have if crisis was to occur. Within the first stages of our 
strategic forecasting we need to plan for any potential crisis which could arise.  
 
Interviewer 00:14 
I see, ok. So when it comes to formulating strategy and setting up within Saudi, who 
would you say are the key members involved? 
 
Participant: 0:14 – 0:16 
It’s pretty much done locally, a bottom up approach. For <company name>, so 
different units, in Europe Middle East and Africa would have their strategy prepared 
and that would be consolidated EMEA level, Europe Middle East and Africa level, 
and that would then go up. Each country would have a local director. There always is 
a dialogue, if we say one hundred, the head office will say one hundred and twenty, 
and we would come to middle and say one hundred and ten. There’s a negotiation 
with the headquarters when setting targets That’s just an internal discussion, but the 
strategy is pretty much around governance, regulation requirements, economics 
conditions, geo political situation, oil crisis, as we are so much dependent on that and 
technology, I would say.  
 
Interviewer 00:16 
Who would have the greater influence, if we were to look at specific heads and 
employees within the organisation? Who would have greater influence in dictating 
what the strategy should be? 
 
Participant: 0:16 – 0:18 
Along with myself, we have other key executives which have to shape the direction 
of business. It’s pretty much the CEO, the CFO which is myself, we will have head 
of IT, head of compliance governance to tell us what are the new trends, head 
business development to keep a tab on where the business growth is possible, and 
that’s about it really. And then there’s head of marketing and other departments that 
makes sure are using the latest communication channels, such as Facebook and 
social media. They take lead but that is more on implementation side. When it comes 
to strategy its CFO which is myself, CEO and head of business development, 
governance. We play a role in entering markets, setting targets etc. Working with our 




Has <company name> ever experienced influence from any other organisation? For 
example any interest groups who may put pressure on CSR or any organisations who 
want to change your strategic direction? 
 
Participant: 0:18 – 0:20 
We don’t have any external pressure as such in Saudi Arabia. We do have some CSR 
activities, but those are voluntary and where we can contribute has to be monitored 
by <company name>, local governance, just to make sure that the NGOs we go for, 
or the charities or the non-profit organisations that we go for are kind of clean, are do 
not get us into any reputational trouble. Also the government control which NGOs 
can operate here. Beyond on that there is no pressure as such to contribute more to 




part. It’s more our internal culture. There are no regulatory requirements, we take 
care of it. We do this from a voluntary aspect. It’s purely out of our own interest to 
give something back. 
 
Interviewer 00:20 
Oh ok, that’s nice. Do you have any examples of how you have connected with any 
groups or organisations? 
 
Participant: 0:20 
Not really, I can’t think of anything at the moment. (Laughter) 
 
Interviewer 00:20 
That’s fine. As you read in my brief, I’m looking into the NGO corporate link and 
where this sits within the process of strategy, and it was interesting to recognise 
which external factors can influence strategy, as you mentioned the local governance 
plays a huge role.  
 
Participant: 0:21 
Absolutely, absolutely, yes! The local governance has more of an influence on 




If I’m correct, you also mentioned the oil prices has a big impact on strategy, but not 
particularly any external organisations, such as the common example of activism on 
the mining industry? Within the banking sector do you experience such activities?  
 
Participant: 0:22 
No, no, not from Greenpeace, not from anyone really. We don’t really make contact 
with them directly or indirectly. That’s how it is.  
 
Interviewer 00:22 
Ok, so when we look at the strategy process, in the planning stages, do you take into 
consideration any scenario planning as you mentioned Saudi can be affected by 
unstable countries in the Middle East.  
 
Participant: 0:22 – 0:25 
I wouldn’t say exactly scenario planning, but we have a risk department, right, and 
that risk takes into account geo-political risk, country risk, takes into account, lets 
say other external factors which are out of our control, market risk, country risk, 
what else can I say. We monitor these things, but we do not necessarily put a price 
tag on that, that if this goes down then will mean to many million dollars lost for us. 
We generally don’t do that. But we have a fairly detailed risk register for internal 
processes which accounts for what may be the external impact. Its almost like a 
SWOT analysis, of which these are the treads which we do not have much of a 
control of but yes, it could be geo-political stability or instability or oil prices going 
down, so forth, and the local labour requirements keep changing, again that is part of 
the government, governance issue. We have to have certain amount of Saudis 






Ok, so you mentioned that Saudi is going through some issues in international 
relations with certain countries but how could you regard the issue from where you 
are based in terms of conflict? 
 
Participant: 0:25 – 0:27 
It’s a pretty safe place, and I think the economy is growing despite the oil prices 
going down and so on, you can do a Google search on Saudi, our business has been 
growing, our economy has been growing. There has been some disruptions in the 
geo-political climate, but security is tight. For example though Saudi has trouble 
with some of their neighbours, it’s at a higher international level. And because it is 
highly regulated on a ground level we don’t face any particular NGO pressure. The 
country likes to keep a strong control on what is happening. There is a tight control 
in this country. More than the disruption on the economy, have been concerned on 
the digital disruptions, we don’t know when the smart phone will replace the credit 
card. I don’t know. So (laughter), so that’s the bigger worry, than the government or 
the economic conditions, I must say. But it is a safe place. I feel safe. My mum is 
here. If it wasn’t a safe place I probably wouldn’t be here.  
 
Interviewer 00:27 
Ok that’s nice to hear, thank you for sharing. There were some questions relating to 
NGOs but I don’t think they apply to you given what you have shared. If civil 
conflict was to arise in Saudi Arabia, has <company name> put into place any 
measures to effectively respond?  
 
Participant: 0:27 – 0:32 
I hope it doesn’t arise. And it is a difficult question but something we cannot put past 
us. We have detailed business continuity plans in disaster recover sites. Operating in 
the Middle East, requires through planning, even if Saudi is a safe place to live, from 
a business point of view, conflict is not far away geo-graphically. It’s not the same as 
operating for example in Scandinavia. (Pause) So whatever set up we have in Riyadh 
is replicated in another city, but that is assuming that everyone who can work in 
Riyadh can move to the other city and work there as well and keep the business 
going. There are standard business continuity plans. Some of disaster specifications 
are also internal, given to us by <company name>, as well as what the central bank 
mandate. (Pause) So, we take all that into account. If there was a civil disturbance, as 
long as there was no physical threat to our lives, and property, then business may go 
down, but it will continue. That’s for sure. If the conflict was to get out of hand, then 
no doubt safety comes first. Also conflict affects conversion rates. This needs to 
been analysed. But there is only so much pre-planning that can be done.   
 
Interviewer 00:32 
Wow, for sure. Ok, so you mentioned that your strategy is in a cycle of three years. 
At the end of three years, how do you evaluate and renew the process of strategy to 
update your next movement? 
 
Participant: 0:32 – 0:37 
We touch base with our head office, ok, we have shareholders which are not in card 
business, but <company name> is a share holder and we have some local 




and where <company name> as a brand wishes to go in the next three, four, five 
years. We get thorough directions from them, local shareholders and local 
management decides on what our capabilities are, what our bandwidths are, how far 
we are growing, what’s our strengths and weaknesses and so on. And the strategic 
process goes on for three, four, five months at least. It starts around May, June, and 
goes on till about October, November when the board accepts the strategy and the 
first year of the strategic plan becomes the budget and subsequent year. And then the 
years after that we keep comparing our annual plan with the strategic plan and see 
where we are. We say that we wanted to achieve such and such in year one, such and 
such in year two, and other things in year three, where do we stand against that, so 
that strategy document gets updated on an annual basis, if not more frequently.  
 
Interviewer 00:37 
Ok and within the renewal of strategy, of course competition would be include and 
the market environment, but would you also take into account non-market 
environment and the social aspects, civil movements etc. as you mentioned geo-
political.  
 
Participant: 0:37 – 0:38 
Yeah, all of it, all of it. The benchmarks are against the competition and market 
share. We need to at least maintain the market share, if not increase it. If the market 
is increasing we need to increase our share also. We take into account competition as 
well as all the other factors you mentioned such as political climate, conflict arising 
and so on.  
 
Interviewer 00:38 
Ok, so we are coming near to the end. I just wanted to know, the aspect of 
legitimacy. When you work with external organisations, how do you legitimise the 
external requests? How do you feel or what parameter do you use to assess if it 
would be appropriate for <company name> to speak with the external organisation? 
 
Participant: 0:38 – 0:41 
There are some NGOs that we work with, I don’t know if you can call them NGOs 
or charities or whatever. These are the ones that have been given a clearance by the 
government in terms of what they can do in Saudi Arabia and have registered and 
they probably have a registration number. We go through their charter, articles of 
association. We run things throughout our head office, making sure there is no 
conflict of interest There is no (pause), we don’t want any surprises later on. We 
want to do some work in the society obviously, but if it is not acceptable to the 
government or not acceptable to <company name> then we wouldn’t do that. So we 
generally find common grounds, and then do that. And there is a fair amount of 
information on websites also these days so we do that. It’s more of a communication 
rather permission. We tell them this is what we are going to do and if there is any 
objection, please let us know. We haven’t had any issues in the last 10 years we have 
been actively been working.  
 
Interviewer 00:41 
And these connections are voluntary, meaning you have approached the NGO? Do 





Participant: 0:41 – 0:42 
Yes, that’s correct. We do get some requests, and we see if it is a reputable 
organisation and then follow suit, but mainly our work.  
 
Interviewer: 0:42 
Well, thank you very much for your time.  
 
Participant 00:42 
You’re very welcome. Please be in touch if you want any follow up. I’m sorry if I 
couldn’t answer much directly relating to NGOs. Card industry is not like others 
such as mining as you said, where NGOs are direct threats.  
 
Interviewer: 0:43 
No, you have provided me much information of the strategy process as a whole. 
Thank you so much for your time and sharing of information. I was wondering, as I 
am in the early stages of my data collection, if you could refer me or connect me 
with any senior members of MNCs or NGOs who have operated within the MENA 
area? It would be amazing to gain multiple insights to build towards my research 
aim. If they would be willing to speak with me.  
 
Participant 00:43 
Well, Yemen could be a very good analysis for you, but that would difficult. What I 
can do, I have a friend of mine who could connect you with someone. Let me speak 
with them and get back to you. He handles the Middle East portfolio for his 
organisation and has worked in some turbulent areas such as Afghanistan, Iran. I’ll 
check with him. I will also check with my counterpart in Bahrain.  
 
Interviewer: 0:44 
That would be amazing. Thank you so much. I look forward to hearing from you. It 
would be great to see different perspectives in the strategy process and NGOs. 
 
Participant 00:44 
Yes, that would be very insightful for you. If you have any further questions feel free 

















































6 – MNC Parent and Child Nodes 
 
Group 1 - MNC 
Level of 
Analysis 
Parent Node Child Node Sources References 
Macro Defining Strategy Industry related 5 15 
    Technology 3 5 
    Objectives 2 4 
    Position 3 3 
    Shared value 3 8 
  Strategy components Economy 3 3 
    Commercial 2 2 
    Levels 3 3 
  Contextualising Strategy Feasibility 6 18 
    Crisis planning 4 10 
    Experience 6 8 
    Indicators 6 12 
    Reputation 9 15 
  Hierarchy Key members 4 4 
    Influential 3 3 
    
External 
organisations 6 9 
Meso External Pressure Government 5 18 
    Security 5 12 
    Profit 6 15 
  Legitimacy Filter Professionalism 7 21 
    Hindrance 5 6 
  Influential Channels NGO pressure 6 18 
    NGO need 5 13 
    CSR 4 7 
Micro Ranking Hierarchy 6 6 
    Rapport 6 9 









7 - NGO Parent and Child Nodes 
 
Group 2 - NGO 
Level of 
Analysis 
Parent Node Child Node Sources References 
Macro NGO Agenda Activism 4 8 
    Collaboration 7 16 
  Limited Authority Knowledge  3 3 
    Recognition 4 7 
    Under valued 6 11 
Meso Firm Change Profit 6 6 
    Unethical 8 27 
  NGO Differences 
Collaborative 
approach 7 18 
    Resilience 6 10 
  Social Concern Work 11 38 
    Recognition 8 19 
  NGO Power Regulation 8 17 
    Emotion 6 11 
    Legal 4 7 
Micro 
Internal 
Behaviour  - 4 12 
  
Strategic 
Partnership Acumen 7 18 
    Connection 5 11 
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 1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet and have had 
the opportunity to ask any questions to the researcher. 
 
2. I understand that my participation in this interview is voluntary and I will not 
be paid. 
 
3. I understand that the researcher will find the interview intriguing however if I 
feel uncomfortable, I can decline to answer a question and withdraw from the 
study at any given time without reason. 
 
4. Participation will involve an individual interview by Jaydeep Pancholi from 
Heriot-Watt University, lasting approximately 50-60 minutes. 
 
5. I am aware that the interview will be audio recorded and transcribed. All 
information will remain anonymous and confidential. Audio recorded files and 
transcription files will be password protected. The participant’s name will not 
be used. 
 
6. I agree for the interview responses to be used as research material subject to 
standard data use policies protecting anonymity of individuals and 
organisations. 
 
7. I agree to take part in this research study and have received a copy of this 
consent form. 
 
For any questions or validation, contact the researcher or supervisors on the details shown above. 
 
Name of participant    Date               Signature 
Name of Researcher    Date                Signature 
Researcher certification: I certify that I have provided the above individual an information sheet 
explaining the purpose and potential benefits of this research. I have also answered any questions 
raised. 
 
